Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

790.5/4–754: Telegram

The Secretary of State to the Embassy in France¹

top secret
niact

Washington, April 7, 1954—8:25 p.m.

3535. Eyes only Ambassador Dillon from Secretary, Aldrich for info. Deptels 3476 and 3478 rptd London 5175 and 5177.² FYI and for background, reftels summarize my meetings with Makins and Bonnet re formation coalition of nations in Southeast Asia to prevent that area from falling into Communist hands. On April 4 President sent message to Churchill indicating tremendous importance we attach to formation such coalition with our reasons. He concluded his message by indicating that so vitally important are the stakes that he was prepared to send me or Bedell Smith to London at earliest date this week convenient to Churchill. He added that whoever came would also spend day in Paris to talk with French and that cover for trip would be preparation for Geneva. Churchill today replied to President³ that UK Cabinet has discussed our proposal and he would be glad for me to come to London next Monday⁴ to talk about Southeast Asia coalition. You should know Eden in supplementary message raised question of inviting Bidault to London to make affair tripartite.⁵

I recognize that instead of my visiting London and Paris the French may also suggest tripartite meeting as alternative. This would not be satisfactory as I must have opportunity to discuss French situation with Churchill and Eden very frankly. Also I believe possibility of getting French and British to move in right direction is greater if we see them separately. I believe we will have to ride out damage to French sensibilities which may not be all net disadvantage in connection with EDC. I plan to arrive London evening April 11 and would remain there until afternoon April 13 when I would proceed to Paris if this were convenient and did not raise any problems for Laniel and Bidault. End FYI and background.

With above in mind, you should see Bidault and convey to him following verbal message:

Begin message. In my talk with Ambassador Bonnet on April 3 I outlined to him in detail our views on situation in Indochina and Southeast Asia and our firm belief that threat of Communist domination in that area should be met by united action on part of those govts and peoples whose security is directly concerned. I also informed Ambassador Bonnet that I was explaining our views along same lines to British Ambassador.

We indicated to British that we believed our proposal was of such vital importance, involving as it does entire principle of ability of free nations to act in coalition and in time to prevent stark tragedy and peril, that if it were deemed useful we would be glad to send someone to London and Paris or come myself, to discuss it and other related aspects of Geneva.

British have now indicated they would be glad to have me come to London April 12 to talk about it. I would very much wish to come to Paris to talk to you and Prime Minister Laniel if this were convenient and if it would not create any difficulties. I could arrive Paris afternoon of April 13 and we could have our talks on April 14. I would have to leave the night of April 14 as I must be back in Washington April 15.

In announcing my trip Thursday afternoon⁶ I plan simply to state that I am making a brief visit to London and Paris to have discussion with British and French Govts on problems relating to Geneva Conference.

Information re my trip is being held in greatest secrecy here and I know you will agree with the importance of there being no premature leaks to the press prior to the announcement which we will make here on Thursday 4 p.m. Washington time. End message.

Dulles

1. Drafted by the Secretary of State, MacArthur, and Merchant. Repeated to London as telegram 5252.
2. See footnote 1, p. 1225, and footnote 1, p. 1214.
3. Prime Minister Churchill’s reply of Apr. 7 has not been found. In Mandate for Change, p. 347, Eisenhower states that the message was “to the effect that his government would talk over the matter with Foster in London on April 12.” Eisenhower adds that “his brief message showed that the British had little enthusiasm for joining us in taking a firm position.”
4. Apr. 12.

5. The message from Foreign Secretary Eden was delivered orally to Secretary Dulles by Makins on Apr. 7. MacArthur’s memorandum of their conversation read in part as follows:

   “Sir Roger Makins called on the Secretary this afternoon to convey a message from Mr. Eden regarding the Secretary’s prospective trip to London. Sir Roger said that on the assumption the Secretary would accept the invitation to begin talks in London on April 12, Mr. Eden wished to convey to him the following: 1) Mr. Eden was eagerly looking forward to seeing the Secretary and talking over a number of matters of mutual interest; 2) Mr. Eden wished to know the Secretary’s views on how the French should be handled in connection with the Secretary’s trip. Specifically, Mr. Eden suggested that consideration might be given to asking M. Bidault to come to London and have tripartite talks.

   “The Secretary replied that he did not think tripartite talks at this particular juncture were desirable. He said he wished to talk very frankly to Sir Winston and Mr. Eden about the entire French situation and this would not be possible if the talks were tripartite. He recognized that the French might not like his visiting London and Paris and might strongly prefer tripartite talks. However, a tripartite meeting just did not seem suitable under the present circumstances, and on balance the Secretary was not certain that the over-all effect of his visiting London and then Paris would be bad with respect to the French situation.”

   The Secretary and the Ambassador also discussed the form of the announcement of the prospective trip and the Secretary’s tentative schedule. (751G.00/4–754)

6. Secretary Dulles actually announced his trip in a White House press release of Saturday, Apr. 10; for text, see telegram 3593 to Paris, Apr. 10, p. 1302.