Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Indochina, Volume XIII, Part 1

751G.00/4–954: Telegram

The Ambassador in France (Dillon) to the Department of State

confidential

Paris, April 9, 1954—8 p.m.

3823. Repeated information London 914, Saigon 432. Laniel delivered Indochina statement in Assembly this afternoon before unusually well filled benches and virtually all members government.¹

Following main points of particularly short (20 minutes) but effectively delivered speech:

(1) Assembly has widely rejected two interpellations for Indochina debate this week (one Socialist, one Communist). Since October government has answered Assembly and Senate six times on Indochina questions and each time Parliament has voted support government’s policy. Therefore, government cannot be reproached for not consulting Parliament. Present declaration is simply “mise-au-point” and not intended to start debate.

(2) At moment French soldiers are giving lives at Dien Bien Phu least Assembly can do is maintain sang-froid and not give world spectacle of public haggling.

(3) Policy of government rests on two main points: (a) “Do everything to achieve victory, at Dien Bien Phu as elsewhere, with matériel aid which Franco-Vietnamese forces are receiving from US”. (Note: Word matériel strongly emphasized), and (b) “Take up under full liberty of action the negotiations at Geneva with the intention of arriving at solution”. Note: In this portion speech Laniel confirmed Chinese participation operational activities Viet Minh for first time publicly. He referred to communications system, radar, anti-aircraft weapons, advisers, and trucks of USSR manufacture driven by Chinese.

(4) Obvious intention of enemy is to achieve objectives by force, pointing out that Dien Bien Phu campaign started only when Geneva Conference became certainty and citing recent attack on Cambodia.

(5) France will do everything possible to obtain peaceful solution at Geneva. “In the event of any serious and unexpected change in present situation and if circumstances make it necessary government will itself take initiative of informing Parliament.”

(6) Speech ended with announcement of message of tribute to Colonel de Castries in which Assembly asked to join.

Speech greeted with hearty applause all benches excluding Communists.

Statement by Defferre (Socialist) followed. He insisted that, in deference to Parliamentary tradition, government had to inform Assembly exactly what its intentions were re Indochina and in particular re following questions:

(a) What were government’s intentions with regard to proposal for “united front” Southeast Asia? (b) Would government accept participation foreign troops Indochina, i.e., American aviators, Korean and “Chiang Kai-shek” divisions, etc.? (c) What would government do if Chinese react by invading Indochina?

Following Defferre, Vice President Assembly Bruyneel (Independent Peasant) refused recognize Communist deputy on grounds there was no debate and Assembly rules provided for only one speaker after government statement. Assembly thereupon passed other business with approval majority floor and visible relief Laniel and Bidault.

Speech, presentation and Bruyneel ruling effectively achieved government’s purpose of avoiding open debate on Indochina before Easter recess.

Dillon

1. For the record of the discussion on Indochina which occurred in the National Assembly on the afternoon of Apr. 9, see France, Journal Officiel, Assemblée Nationals 1954, Débats, pp. 1972–1975.