In an informal conversation on April 22 the following matters of
possible interest were discussed.
- 1.
-
Relations with China. Mr. Nishimura said that on April
22 Prime Minister Yoshida, Minister of State Okazaki, and he had
discussed the negotiations now taking place in Taipei. The
Prime Minister and Mr. Okazaki decided that Japan should attempt by
statements in the Official Minutes to meet the position of
the National Government regarding the scope of application
of the proposed treaty, despite Mr. Nishimura’s objection that
Japan was going too far to meet the Chinese position. He
also said that Chinese representatives were concerned that
the wording of the clause on the treaty’s scope of
application (“territories now or
hereafter under control of National Government”) might raise
an inference that National China’s claim to Formosa could be
subject to some form of United Nations control depending on
future developments.
Regarding the Yoshida
letter of December 24 to Mr. Dulles, Mr. Nishimura said that the Prime Minister had
been strongly impressed by his discussion of the China
problem at San Francisco with Secretary of State Acheson,1 who had advised Japan not to be
“hasty” in making its decision about a peace settlement with
China. Mr. Yoshida had
therefore been “very much vexed” by later developments in
United States policy and by the position taken by Mr.
Dulles, who had
been present at the conversation in San Francisco.
Mr. Nishimura
indicated, however, that Japan was fully prepared to make
strenuous efforts to reach agreement with National China.
Mr. Nishimura also
said the Prime Minister was extremely interested in United
States Far Eastern policy and had many times expressed the
view that Japan, as an old nation familiar with the Far
East, could assist and even guide the United States, which
is inexperienced in foreign policy and has got itself in a
“circle” on the China question.
- 2.
-
Relations with Korea. Regarding the
present negotiations, Mr. Nishimura observed that the issues raised by
the property claims of the two Governments were so
complicated that months would be required to settle them. I
asked whether the Japanese Government actually expected that
it would recover any of its property in Korea, private or
public, and Mr. Nishimura said no and added
[Page 1252]
that the Japanese position
was designed largely to protect Japan against the excessive
claims being made by Korea to property in Japan. I asked how
Mr. Nishimura thought
the problem would be solved and he said that eventually the
Japanese expected a reciprocal waiver of claims and were
attempting to maneuver the Koreans into a position where the
Koreans would make this proposal. I asked whether the
Japanese expected the Koreans to waive their claims to
allegedly looted cultural objects, postal savings accounts,
wages due conscript labor, and items of that sort, and Mr.
Nishimura replied
that Japan hoped to include these items in any reciprocal
waiver of claims since the amounts claimed by Korea would
probably be very high.
I commented that it was desirable for Japan and Korea to have
some legal basis for diplomatic relations upon the coming
into force of the Peace Treaty. Mr. Nishimura said that within a
few days Japan would propose to the Koreans that notes be
exchanged providing for establishment of diplomatic
relations; I inferred the Japanese proposal would be made
without prejudice to the present discussions. Mr. Nishimura felt that United
States assistance in gaining Korean acceptance of this
proposal might be sought.
By way of comment, Mr. Nishimura said he thought the San Francisco
Treaty was defective in the treatment accorded Japanese
external assets, although he agreed with my observation that
some such solution as Article XIV, A,2, was necessary in
view of the watered-down reparations provisions of the
Treaty. Mr. Nishimura
also said President Rhee’s view that Japan’s control of Korea
from 1910 to 1945 was illegal and all acts thereunder null
and void posed a serious obstacle to resolution of problems
between the two countries and he indicated that he was
pessimistic concerning their good relations while President
Rhee remains in
office.
- 3.
-
Diplomatic Relations with Other
Countries. Mr. Nishimura said the Japanese Government was
gratified and encouraged by the cordiality attending its
negotiations with a number of other countries for resumption
of diplomatic relations. He said this was particularly so in
respect to India, with whom relations will be established on
April 28 pursuant to exchanges of notes. Similarly,
arrangements have been made with Spain, Portugal, Italy,
Norway, Denmark, Yugoslavia, and apparently several other
countries. In the case of the Philippines and Indonesia
Japan has proposed that diplomatic relations be resumed on
April 28; this proposal will probably be accepted by
Indonesia and possibly by the Philippines, despite the
failure of both countries to ratify the Peace Treaty,
although there is considerable concern in Manila lest the
Philippine Senate consider its constitutional prerogatives
to be involved. Diplomatic relations with the Netherlands
will also be resumed on
[Page 1253]
April 28 by an exchange of notes,
although the Netherlands has not yet ratified the Peace
Treaty.
In regard to the Soviet Union Mr. Nishimura said the Japanese Government
intended to follow closely the policy to be declared or
otherwise adopted by the United States in respect to
official Soviet activity in Japan. I got the impression that
the Japanese do not contemplate issuing any strong statement
or taking any strong measures in this regard. Mr. Nishimura also said that a
Soviet vessel is expected to arrive at a Japanese port on or
shortly after April 28 and that the problem of how to treat
its passengers and cargo is now under consideration by the
Foreign Office, added emphasis being given to this matter
since this will be the first test of post-treaty
Japanese-Soviet relations.
- 4.
-
Administrative Agreement. I asked
Mr. Nishimura whether
in his opinion the Japanese attitude toward the
Administrative Agreement and the security arrangements with
the United States would prove to be a serious obstacle to
good relations between the two countries. He said no and
that he felt the Japanese were already gaining a favorable
impression of United States intentions, particularly as a
result of the accomplishments of the Preliminary Working
Group and the understanding attitude of the American
representatives in the Group. He expects that future steps
to implement the Administrative Agreement will further the
good impression already made. I observed that a number of
Japanese critics, such as Professors Kisaburo
Yokota and Hikomatsu
Kawakami, had made sharp attacks on legal
points in the Agreement and had gone unchallenged, and I
inquired whether the Japanese Government might in some way
attempt to present a more balanced picture to the Japanese
public. Mr. Nishimura
said the Government was aware of the need for fuller
information on the Agreement and that it was planned to
issue a pamphlet on April 28 explaining the Agreement and
refuting some of the legal criticisms made against it.
I asked whether Mr. Nishimura felt there had been in connection
with the Administrative Agreement any significant
development of anti-American feeling in Japan and commented
that such a development together with a possible truce in
Korea might seriously weaken the desire of many Japanese to
cooperate whole-heartedly in the security arrangements with
the United States. Mr. Nishimura said he thought a truce in Korea
would undoubtedly lead many Japanese to believe that the
threat to Japan’s security, together with the need for
American forces in Japan, was largely ended and that this
situation would pose serious problems in the conduct of
Japan’s foreign policy. He also said that depurgees were
showing marked antipathy toward the United States and he
mentioned
[Page 1254]
Professor Kawakami, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and
former Foreign Minister Hachiro
Arita2 in this category. He said the
latter two had several times told Foreign Office officials
and the Prime Minister that Japan was following an unduly
pro-American policy and that this was undesirable for Japan.
Mr. Nishimura observed
that most purgees could not help being anti-American as an
expression of resentment over their treatment under the
Occupation.
