795.00/9—852: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the United States Mission at the United Nations1
109. Re Lie’s proposed trip to Eur (urtel 218).2 While we have some doubt re polit wisdom Lie visit to London and Paris, we feel we are [Page 491] not in position interpose any objection, since idea was first broached to us in form of decision already taken.
In ur conversation with Lie, suggest you stress fol points:
- 1.
- Lie will appreciate importance avoiding any implication to Brit and Fr he is in any way acting as agent of U.S.
- 2.
- It wld nevertheless be appropriate for Lie to stress to Brit and Fr seriousness with which U.S. Govt and public opinion regard current status Kor problem. While armis negots are virtually stalled, U.S. continues bear brunt of Kor mil effort, with steady drain of life and resources. Difficult for U.S. to sympathize with those who advocate limitation our efforts at forthcoming GA merely to hortatory res calling on Commies to accept an armis, while we wait patiently for something new to turn up. U.S. therefore strongly believes additional measures shld be taken by forthcoming GA, as soon as it is clear Commies will not agree to acceptable armis terms.
- 3.
- We consider GA recommendations for additional measures thoroughly warranted for a number of reasons. First, insofar as they will equalize burden borne by U.S. and other UN members, or induce other members adopt embargo and other arrangements now applied by U.S., they are matter of simple equity to U.S. people. Second, GA failure take action signalizing UN intention to persevere in and even strengthen resistance to Commie aggression in Kor will redouble Commie intransigence, hampering armis negots, and in long run tending sap vitality of UN. Third, it is possible additional measures of type we envisage, even if their immed effect on Commies is not decisive, may tip delicate bal of forces motivating Commies so as to induce them to reach agreement at Panmunjom.
- 4.
- We are not prepd accept Lie’s estimate of practical value of econ and polit measures we are now contemplating. Nor are we convinced additional measures will not in proper circumstances be voted by large GA majority. At same time, we are as eager as we have ever been to obtain additional UN forces for Kor. We shall welcome anything Lie can do to obtain such forces. However, without wishing discourage Lie we doubt either Fr or U.K. in position furnish additional forces now and greater emphasis might be placed on obtaining forces from countries which have not yet made mil contributions. If they were to be forthcoming in significant quantity, effect from standpoint both U.S. and UN wld be most salutary.
Since Lie already aware contents our working paper, you may show him copy if you believe it desirable, emphasizing its topsec character and extent of consultation. In doing so, however, you shld emphasize it is in fact a working doc being used as a basis for discussion and not an expression US Govt policy.