Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

State-JCS Meetings, lot 64 D 417

Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting¹

top secret

Washington, September 16, 1952—3 p.m.

Admiral Fechteler: At a meeting yesterday with the Secretary of Defense²—Mr. Lovett, the Chiefs and the Service Secretaries found themselves in complete agreement with General Clark on the question of the next move in the Panmunjom negotiations. In brief, we are opposed to any Presidential proposal, and we are opposed to deferring resolution of the question of non-repatriation until after an armistice. We favor permitting General Harrison to lay it on the line at Panmunjom and then if the Communists do not accept, to propose an indefinite recess without a date for resumption unless the Communists, through the liaison officers, ask for a meeting and provide a written indication that they have something of substance to present.

Mr. Johnson: What will you propose that General Harrison should lay on the line?

Admiral Fechteler: The course of action proposed in Clark’s last telegram.³

Mr. Johnson: The last part of that telegram really sets forth what we should do if it is decided to go ahead with the President’s statement.

Admiral Fechteler: What we agreed was that we should go ahead as stated in that telegram except that there would be no Presidential statement.

Mr. Johnson: That means the alternatives that we have approved here but not those for turning the problem over to neutrals. (At this point Admiral Fechteler distributed the Defense version of a draft JCS telegram⁴ which included instructions for General Harrison to make a general summary of previous proposals, to present three “new” alternative proposals, to present a statement on our willingness to make disposition of non-repatriates contingent on mutual agreement and which provided for indefinite recess if the Communists do not agree to these proposals.)

Mr. Johnson: If you include the statement on not sending the non-repatriates anywhere without mutual agreement, there is actually not much difference substantively between this telegram and that which would call for the Presidential statement. This proposal really says that we will continue to negotiate after the armistice about the disposition of Chinese non-repatriates because we will be committing ourselves not to send them anywhere without Communist agreement. All the President’s proposal says is that we will negotiate about all non-repatriates after the Armistice, which would presumably include the Koreans as well.

Admiral Fechteler: The package proposal of the 28th of April made a resolution of the problem of non-repatriation a part of the armistice. The President’s statement would take this question completely out of the armistice.

Mr. Johnson: The President’s statement doesn’t take the principle of non-repatriation out of the armistice. The President’s proposal says that we will exchange the prisoners we are willing to return for the prisoners of ours that they hold and that we will negotiate after the conclusion of an armistice about such disposition of the remaining prisoners as may be made “without the force”. What the present proposal says is really that we will continue to negotiate about the disposition of the non-Korean non-repatriates after an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: (At this point Admiral Fechteler read the draft of the President’s proposal and the State draft telegram.⁵) You can’t get away from the statement “The armistice need not await the final disposition of the question” as meaning that this question would be put outside of the armistice. This is what the Chiefs disagree with. We believe that the principle of non-forcible repatriation must be an integral part of the package.

Mr. Nitze: But your proposal also calls for negotiating about a question which is not finally disposed of by an armistice. Under either proposal the issue of what disposition is made of the non-repatriates remains unresolved.

General Lemnitzer: The difference I see between the two positions is that the Chiefs don’t want to leave any question hanging which would be open to Communist veto.

Colonel Matthews: The easiest thing to say would be to state openly that we undertake not to send the Chinese non-repatriates to Formosa. This obviously would invite some rough handling by U.S. public opinion.

Admiral Fechteler: It’s my understanding that if the Communists don’t agree to your proposal you don’t want General Harrison to proclaim an indefinite recess.

Mr. Johnson: On the contrary—both drafts have instructions in the same language for General Harrison to go into indefinite recess if the Communists do not accept the proposals.

Mr. Nitze: We originally had some doubts about the wisdom of an indefinite recess but in view of Clark’s comments we tried to meet his position on the issue.

Admiral Fechteler: I think the main point is that the Chiefs are opposed to leaving the POW issue unresolved after an armistice and therefore are opposed to the Presidential statement.

Mr. Hickerson: Your proposal leaves the POW issue unresolved also. The only real difference is that you seem to be opposed to a Presidential statement.

Admiral Fechteler: Where do you find that in our proposal?

Mr. Johnson: Essentially the disposition of the Chinese POW’s is left subject to agreement after the armistice by your paragraph 1 (3). There is really not much substantive difference between us. It seems to be only a question of whether the President should make a statement.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me that there is a good deal of difference. The Chiefs feel that if you leave the POW question unresolved you would have a pseudo armistice and the Commies would go ahead and build airfields and strengthen themselves and we would be in a bad position.

Mr. Johnson: How would it be a pseudo armistice? All the other articles about buildup and inspection would be exactly the same.

Mr. Nitze: It would really be exactly the same kind of armistice under either course of action. In either case we would have to keep the non-repatriated POW’s, or at least part of them, in camp sometime after an armistice.

General Cabell: Wouldn’t the solution be to take out the proposal which would make us keep the Chinese non-repatriates in escrow.

Mr. Nitze: General Clark felt that the only bait that we might offer the Communists was a proposal that we would agree not to send the Chinese to Formosa.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me the next step is to get together on a re-editing of these two drafts. The Chiefs are firm that the principle of non-repatriation should remain in the package proposal.

Mr. Nitze: We feel that the inclusion of the principle of non-forcible repatriation is perfectly clear in the President’s proposal. That proposal essentially calls only for negotiating such disposition of the non-repatriates as could be made without the use of force. There is no thought of deviating from that position now or in the future.

General Lemnitzer: But the President’s proposal still leaves the question open for post-armistice negotiations that would give the Communists pretext for violation of the armistice.

Mr. Nitze: If they want to violate the armistice they could find any number of pretexts—the question of withdrawal of foreign forces, claims of UN violation of air space, claims that we were violating the rotation or build-up clauses of the armistice, or any one of a thousand other claims or pretexts if they really wanted to violate an armistice.

General Lemnitzer: But they couldn’t use the issue of non-forcible repatriation of prisoners as a pretext.

Mr. Nitze: They couldn’t use the principle as an issue under the President’s proposal and particularly if Clark comes up with a revision of articles 51 and 54 and we secure Communist agreement to the revision; the armistice agreement itself would be clear cut.

General Cabell: But if we commit ourselves to negotiate on the disposition of the prisoners in due course of time because of the fact that we will have to retain them, our stand on non-forcible repatriation would become a posture of forced retention.

Admiral Fechteler: What effect would holding prisoners in escrow have on the issuance of the greater sanction statement?

Mr. Hickerson: It would have no effect at all. We would go right ahead and issue the greater sanction statement as soon as there was an armistice.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me that we should hold with non-forcible repatriation as a part of the package. Your telegram seems to me to be walking right back on our package proposal.

Mr. Nitze: Actually the Communists would be retreating from their principle and in practice accepting the principle of non-forcible repatriation because they wouldn’t be getting all their prisoners back.

General Lemnitzer: But we would be committed to further negotiations about the prisoners that we didn’t send back.

Mr. Nitze: Your draft telegram also really commits us to negotiating about the disposition of Chinese prisoners we don’t send back.

General Lemnitzer: I guess the only thing is to strike out that part of the telegram.

Mr. Nitze: If you do strike it out this takes out the only real bait for the Commies and also by not making the kind of proposal that we recommended the President make, would tend to take out any effect on our Allies.

General Lemnitzer: We would, however, be giving some ground.

Mr. Nitze: We are quite willing to admit that our proposal does in effect give some ground, but the only ground it gives is to leave the disposition of the non-repatriates for further negotiation after the armistice. Our proposal holds to all the armistice agreements that have been made and it holds to the principle of non-forcible repatriation.

Mr. Hickerson: There is also no question that it holds to the idea of a greater sanction statement.

Mr. Nitze: The virtues of our proposal are that it gives the maximum possibility that there might be Communist agreement to an armistice and at the same time persuades our Allies that we have exhausted every possible scheme for securing an armistice. If the Communists should refuse the proposal, we would have the best possible platform for an indefinite suspension. We had also thought that if there were an indefinite suspension after we made this proposal and it was refused, we would then be in the best position to unilaterally dispose of those Korean and Chinese prisoners who said they don’t want to go back and then maybe come back to the Communists with the problem, in effect, liquidated.

Admiral Fechteler: The Chiefs feel that we should stick by the package proposals, reiterate our propositions in the way the Clark proposal says and then have General Harrison walk out of the tent and then put military pressure on to see if the Communists will come up with a proposal.

Mr. Johnson: What additional military pressure can we put on?

Admiral Fechteler: We are already putting on military pressure by stepping up our air raids.

Mr. Johnson: We were somewhat perturbed by the intelligence that Communist artillery and mortar have fired more rounds in the past month than ever before.

General Cabell: The more artillery they have the more targets we have. In any case military pressure is merely a function of time. The longer our air raids last, the more they are hurt, and now that winter is coming up the foliage will disappear and the need for shelter will increase and our targets will be easier to find.

General Twining: They must be hurting now. We are continuing to shoot down MIG’s and if they weren’t hurting they wouldn’t send the MIG’s down.

Admiral Fechteler: I think there is evidence they are running out of competent pilots. The other day a MIG was shot down by one of our Marine planes.

Mr. Nitze: Is there any new evidence as to the percentage of Russian pilots that are in combat.

Admiral Fechteler: No, I don’t think so.

Mr. Nitze: I thought our people felt that about 75 per cent of the pilots that they were meeting in combat were Russians.

Admiral Fechteler: There is no real way of telling.

Mr. Johnson: What are the possibilities of stepping up pressure by commando raids on the coast?

Admiral Fechteler: We are already doing that on the West Coast all the time.

General Lemnitzer: Our strikes on their power supply stations must be hurting them. I remember what a job we had getting our power facilities in operation.

Admiral Fechteler: Do you have anything on the results of the Moscow Conference?⁶

Mr. Johnson: Nothing really aside from what is in the press. It may be from the fact that there is no mention of economic assistance that the Chinese may not have gotten everything that they wanted and there might be, if this is the case, a possibility that they might be somewhat more in the mood for an armistice now. But we don’t have anything really to go on and we should avoid wishful thinking.

Mr. Nitze: There is the fact that the Russian-Chinese Agreement on Port Arthur⁷ makes it more difficult for us to impose a blockade. The Chinese may not be too unhappy about that Agreement. Going back to Korea, one could make the argument that this would not be a good time for us to have an armistice, that our military posture is such that continuation of hostilities does more harm to the Communists than it does to us. On the other hand one could make out a good case that we do want an armistice both to stop casualties and to improve the pattern of deployment of our forces. If we do want an armistice, the degree to which we want one is important in determining the kind of proposals we should make or whether we should make any proposals at all. We thought that the President’s proposal does not retreat from the important principle on which we are standing. It does leave part of the POW question open to negotiation. It does leave one additional pretext for Communist violation of an armistice. We didn’t think these two points weighed very heavily against whatever increase the proposal might bring in the possibility for an armistice or against our improved position with our Allies or against the platform that the proposal would give us for future action.

Admiral Fechteler: What would you think of telling them to take it or leave it on the present basis, calling off the negotiations, putting on military pressure, and then making them come up with a proposal.

Mr. Johnson: That is why we asked about the prospects of military pressure.

Mr. Nitze: What has worried all of us around this table has been the question of whether we could go on with this indefinitely. I think we would all agree that public opinion has supported a continuation of the present type of hostilities surprisingly well. There probably is little question that it might support us another winter, but there is real question as to whether it won’t build up sometime to a dangerous point.

Admiral Fechteler: I think the main difficulty is that we have kept on going back to the tent and I think we should stop it.

Mr. Nitze: Under your proposal you’re going back to the tent again.

General Lemnitzer: The main thing is that your draft would postpone one question for further negotiation.

Mr. Nitze: Your draft also postpones one question for further negotiation.

General Lemnitzer: I agree that we would have to change our draft. As a matter of fact I don’t think the Communists would accept either proposal.

Mr. Nitze: If that is the case, the President’s proposal would provide a much better platform for us to suspend the negotiations.

Colonel Matthews: That might be disputable. You are thinking about our position with our friends. I think we should think about our position with the enemy. The Communists haven’t made a new proposal since April or May. We keep coming forward with new proposals. There is nothing in our military posture that should make us rather than them present a proposal. We think the contrary is true. At the last Deputies Meetings with the Russians,⁸ the State Department succeeded in breaking off a series of unsuccessful meetings. The military is asking for help in breaking off this series of meetings.

Mr. Nitze: We didn’t get an agreement out of breaking off the discussions at Paris.

Admiral Fechteler: (Reading Clark’s message.) The Chiefs agree that the fundamental issue is that we shouldn’t throw non-forcible repatriation out of the armistice negotiations because it would be providing, militarily, a dangerous armistice.

Mr. Nitze: (Reading the JCS reply to Clark’s message.) If the Communists want to violate an armistice there will be plenty of pretexts for them to seize upon and we know they will be unscrupulous if they want to be.

Colonel Matthews: If the Communists should come back with a proposal to refer the whole POW issue to a political conference, I should think we would be in a weak position with our Allies.

Mr. Hickerson: As a matter of fact, it is surprising how firmly our friends have stood by us on the principle of non-forcible repatriation. The Mexican proposal really spells out that position and no one of our Allies has ever questioned the principle. I think we would be in a continuing strong position.

Admiral Fechteler: It seems to me that we can’t get much further in this discussion. I think you understand the position of the Chiefs and the position of the Department of Defense.

Mr. Nitze: I think that we have brought out the various views on the various issues involved. We will want to talk to Secretary Acheson and it may be that he will want to talk to Secretary Lovett. I think that is the next thing to do.

1. A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”

   Of the JCS, Admiral Fechteler attended as did Vice Chief Twining. Hickerson headed a five-man contingent from the Department of State and General Lemnitzer attended for the Department of Defense. The entire meeting was concerned with Korea.

2. Presumably a reference to the meeting described in the memorandum, supra.
3. The reference was to CX 55003, Sept. 11, p. 506.
4. Not printed.
5. The draft has not been located in Department of State files.
6. The reference was to the talks between a Delegation from the People’s Republic of China, headed by Chou En-lai, and officials of the Soviet Union, which took place Aug. 17–Sept. 15.
7. The agreement provided for the maintenance of troops of the Soviet Union at Port Arthur.
8. Presumably the reference was to the Council of Foreign Ministers Deputies meetings at Paris, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951. For documentation on these meetings, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. iii, Part 1, pp. 1086 ff.