Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/10—252

Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for United Nations Affairs (Hickerson) to the Secretary of State¹

secret

[Washington,] October 2, 1952.

Subject:

• General Assembly Action on Korea in Event that Communists Fail to Agree on an Armistice

During the last six weeks we have consulted with representatives of the United Kingdom, France, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa regarding action to be taken in the General Assembly in the absence of an armistice in Korea. For discussion purposes, we handed these representatives a working paper (Tab A).² The reaction to the first stage of Assembly proceedings envisaged in that paper—an exhortation to the Communists to conclude an armistice on United Nations terms—was favorable. The reaction to the second stage proposed in the paper, relating to subsequent action to be taken if the Communists maintained their present position, was almost wholly negative. The steps suggested in this contingency included a General Assembly resolution recommending strong additional measures among which were a complete economic embargo and interruption of diplomatic relations with the Chinese Communists.

We have proceeded to refine the tactics proposed for the first stage of Assembly action and have broadened our consultations on this matter to include other friendly delegations. (Telegram of instruction to the United States Mission to the United Nations—Tab B.)³ We do not anticipate major difficulties in obtaining broad Assembly support for a resolution along these lines.

There remains the problem of determining what United Nations measures should be taken if, despite the Assembly’s appeal to the Communists, the present impasse continues. The program suggested in our working paper (Tab A) in effect amounted to an attempt to induce other United Nations Members to apply the measures we ourselves have undertaken: a complete embargo on commercial, financial, and shipping relations, severance of diplomatic relations, and an increase in military participation in Korea. No action was suggested which in our view would extend the hostilities. We expressed to the six governments our belief that failure of the General Assembly to intensify the pressure upon the recalcitrant Communists would seriously impair the effectiveness of United Nations action and encourage the aggressors. We stated that General Assembly action of the type contemplated would increase the likelihood of Communists agreement to an armistice. We did not exclude the possibility of a compromise program which would involve strengthening the existing selective embargo and taking other steps to emphasize the determination of the United Nations to persist in the struggle.

The negative response of the six governments stressed the difficulties our proposals would encounter in the Assembly. The principal points made by them may be summarized as follows:

1. A total embargo would be ineffective in producing an armistice, our primary objective.

2. It might be provocative, substituting “a new drift toward the worst” for “the present relative stabilization”.

3. Since it would be futile without a naval blockade, it might ultimately entail recourse to one.

4. It would split the majority upholding United Nations action, fail to gain Arab-Asian support, and heighten neutralist sentiment in the General Assembly.

5. It would mean the ruin of Hong Kong, whose position is of great importance to the free world.

There is a difference of opinion within the Department on the desirability of pursuing our “second stage” proposals in the face of strong resistance from some of our best friends in the United Nations. The seriousness of the economic or psychological effect of an embargo upon Communist China, even if faithfully applied by the free world, is open to dispute. It will take a major effort on our part to push such proposals through the Assembly; Members are loath to assume additional commitments of this type, and their resentment over our pressure tactics will be reflected in their action on other important problems.

On the other hand, the United Nations will not be exerting the utmost pressure for an armistice unless additional measures are adopted. Failure to press for them will tend to perpetuate the existing inequality of sacrifice. Inaction may impair the efficacy of the United Nations effort and stimulate frustration and resentment in the United States.

We should make a decision now among three alternative courses which might be pursued if the Communist position continues to be adamant:

1. We can press for the complete “second stage” program as set forth in the working paper and summarized above.

2. We can seek action short of that program, including an extension of the present strategic embargo and certain ancillary shipping controls. (For one possible proposal, see Tab C.)⁴ Whether we can best achieve this objective by continuing now to advocate a complete embargo program and later receding, or by immediately making known what we are prepared to accept, is a question of tactics which must also be decided.

3. We can refrain from asking the General Assembly to sanction any additional economic measures for the time being. This would not preelude us from seeking a “second stage” resolution covering non-economic matters, such as an appeal for additional troops.

I recommend that a meeting⁵ be held in your office to reach a decision. Those present should include Messrs. Johnson, Linder, Bonbright, Nitze, Jessup and myself.

Tab C

Recommendations for Extension of United Nations Selective Embargo

The General Assembly might recommend that every state prohibit all direct or indirect exports, re-exports and trans-shipments to Communist China and North Korea of communications and electronics equipment, airfield and road construction equipment, chemicals and chemical equipment, electrical and power-generating equipment, metals, minerals and their manufactures, metal-working machinery, petroleum equipment, precision instruments, and general industrial equipment; and impose the following ancillary controls:

1. Prohibit vessels or aircraft of its registry from carrying from any point to Communist China or North Korea any types of goods embargoed by itself or by the country of origin of the goods.

2. Prohibit the sale or charter of vessels and aircraft to the Chinese Communist regime or to the North Korean authorities, or to their nationals, or to any person or entity acting for them.

3. Deny bunkering and port facilities to vessels owned or controlled by the Chinese Communists or North Koreans, and to vessels of any nationality believed to be carrying to Communist China or North Korea types of goods embargoed by itself or by the country of origin of the goods.

4. Prohibit the insurance or reinsurance within its territorial jurisdiction of vessels included in paragraph 3 and of cargoes included in paragraph 1.

1. A marginal notation on the source text indicated that the Secretary of State saw this memorandum.
2. Tab A, the working paper of Aug. 14, was attached to the source text, but is not printed here; for its text, see p. 454.
3. The reference was to telegram 126 to USUN, Sept. 19, p. 525. Tab B was not attached to the source text.
4. For text of Tab C, see below.
5. No record of this meeting has been found in Department of State files. Subsequent information on the U.S. position can be found in the Position Papers of Oct. 6, 9, and Nov. 11; see footnote 2 p. 599.