Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

795.00/11–1852

The Secretary of Defense (Lovett) to the Secretary of State¹

top secret

Washington, 18 November 1952.

Dear Mr. Secretary: There is attached a memorandum dated 17 November 1952 from the Joint Chiefs of Staff outlining the military reasons why it would be undesirable to conclude an armistice in Korea on the basis that the disposition of non-repatriated prisoners of war be left for subsequent settlement. I fully concur in the military reasons outlined in the Joint Chiefs of Staff memorandum.

In addition to the points outlined in the memorandum it appears to me that deferral of the question of non-repatriated prisoners of war for subsequent settlement would result, due to probable Communist delays in the final settlement of the Korean conflict, in an indefinite maintenance of at least the present level of U.S. forces in Korea, with the probability that United States forces will have to be increased if we are to maintain military strength comparable to that of the Communists. It is felt that Communist tactics would most certainly include tying up large numbers of U.S. forces in Korea. In addition, it occurs to me that subsequent to an armistice in which the question of non-repatriates is deferred to later negotiation, there would develop in the United States a substantial pressure to “bring the boys home.” Such pressures would be difficult to resist and might result in considerable weakening in the U.S. military strength in Korea while the Communists would be engaged in a substantial military buildup.

I consider that deferral of the question of non-repatriated prisoners of war to a political conference, following a truce, would lead to protracted delays in which we would be faced with increasing pressures to either retreat from our announced position of no forced repatriation, or concede to Communist demands on other important issues in order to secure Communist agreement to the UN position of no forced repatriation.

In view of the foregoing it is my view that the United States position with respect to a truce in Korea must continue to be on the basis that we will not agree to any proposal that leaves the disposition of non-repatriated prisoners of war for subsequent settlement.

Sincerely yours,

Robert A. Lovett

[Attachment]

Memorandum by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Secretary of Defense (Lovett)

top secret

Washington, 17 November 1952.

Subject:

• United States Position on Korea in the General Assembly of the United Nations.

1. This memorandum is in response to your memorandum of 27 October 1952,² subject as above, in which the Joint Chiefs of Staff were requested to prepare a statement embodying the reasons substantiating the military point of view that it would be undesirable to conclude an armistice in Korea in which the disposition of non-repatriated prisoners of war (POW’s) would be left for subsequent settlement.

2. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that the reasons set forth in the succeeding paragraphs provide adequate grounds for their view that it would be unwise for the United States to agree to an armistice “arranged on the basis of the agreed provisions and immediate exchange of those prisoners of war willing to be repatriated, leaving only the disposition of non-repatriates for subsequent settlement.” In this connection, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would point out that such a proposal carries the presumption that agreement to an armistice on this basis would automatically settle both the airfield question and the matter of the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission which, at present, remain unresolved.

3. a. In their proposal of 28 April 1952³ (the so-called “package” proposal) the United Nations Command (UNC) representatives stated unequivocally that acceptance by the UNC of the Communist proposal regarding reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields was contingent upon acceptance by the Communists of the UNC position regarding POW’s and the composition of the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission. Moreover, the UNC representatives stated then that this was the UNC’s final offer and no substantive changes in this proposal would be acceptable. The Joint Chiefs of Staff consider that this concession by the UNC with respect to the airfield question is of such importance that it would only be warranted if it resulted in a final and complete resolution of the POW problem followed by an armistice with no residual military issues remaining to be resolved. Agreement to an armistice on the basis of that set forth in paragraph 2 above would breach the “package” proposal and would constitute an unwarranted concession on this important issue, which would be extremely damaging to the prestige of the United States;

b. On 28 September 1952 the UNC representatives presented proposals⁴ to the Communists relating to the POW issue which, while adhering to the principle of nonforcible repatriation of POW’s, offered the Communists a wide selection of choices for a reasonable solution of this problem. The subsequent firm rejection of these proposals by the Communists is evidence that they have no present disposition to accept this principle or to agree to an armistice with such acceptance as a precondition. It appears logical to assume, therefore, that if they were to agree to a deferral of this question for later solution it would only be in the interests of serving ulterior motives;

c. The principal factor favorable to the UNC in the present military situation in Korea is the air superiority which the UNC air forces hold over North Korea. This air superiority has enabled the UNC to defeat, in large measure, the attempts by the Communists to rebuild and restore airfields, railroads, bridges, and other communication facilities. This action combined with the naval blockade of North Korea, has thus deprived the Communists of the means to transport and support military forces considerably larger than those which they are now able to supply and maintain in the combat area in Korea. This air superiority is an important element in the ability of the UN ground forces to maintain their positions in the face of the superior numbers of the enemy forces. It also constitutes the most potent means, at present available to the UNC, of maintaining the degree of military pressure which might impel the Communists to agree, finally, to acceptable armistice terms;

d. Communist air forces operating from restored bases in North Korea would be within easy striking distance of the UN front lines, lines of communications, and rear installations. At a minimum they would be in a position to harass and disrupt troop and supply movements, render close support to their ground forces, subject UN ground forces to air attack and render UN air reconnaissance and bombing missions much more costly than they are at present. They could challenge more effectively UN superiority in the air and, in time, possibly could counterbalance the UN air effort over North Korea. Under these conditions the build-up of Communist ground forces and support for those forces could proceed with comparative impunity. With the loss of UN superiority in the air, accompanied by a considerable build-up of Communist ground forces and supplies in the forward area, the security of the UN forces would be seriously jeopardized;

e. With the coming into force of an armistice the Communists could, and undoubtedly would, undertake without molestation the reconstruction and rehabilitation of airfields in North Korea as well as the restoration of other communication facilities. The restored airfields could then, on short notice, become fully operational, should the Communists elect to resume hostilities. Their attainment of the increased capability referred to in subparagraph 3d, above, would then become a distinct possibility. The Joint Chiefs of Staff recognize that this possibility will exist whether or not unresolved issues remain after an armistice comes into effect. They recognize also that should the Communists desire to violate the armistice and to resume hostilities they could readily concoct a pretext. However, with the POW question not completely resolved, they would be presented with a “prefabricated” pretext in the likely event that post-armistice negotiations on this issue became prolonged; and

f. In view of the refusal by the Communists in the face of military pressure to agree to the principle of no forced repatriation, it can hardly be expected that they would agree to that principle in the post-armistice negotiations. It is more likely that they would prolong their intransigent tactics while improving their military facilities in North Korea. On the other hand, with this important issue remaining unresolved and affording the Communists a ready pretext for violation of the armistice, it is probable that the United Nations representatives would come under increasing pressure for settlement of this problem on the Communist terms, in order to reduce the threat of a renewal of hostilities under conditions favorable to the Communists.

4. The foregoing views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff reflect and are consistent with the views on this subject held by General Clark, Commander in Chief, Far East, and the Chief of the United Nations Command Armistice Delegation, Lieutenant General W. K. Harrison.

For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:

Omar N. Bradley
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff

1. In a covering memorandum by Johnson to Kitchen, dated Nov. 18, 1952, Johnson admitted he was not sure why Lovett had sent this communication, but he was forwarding it to the Secretary of State as requested. Johnson noted that the letter and the attached memorandum from the JCS “appear merely to confirm the discussions which we have had with the JCS [and] which the Secretary has had with General Bradley and Mr. Lovett.”
2. Not printed.
3. For text of the proposal, see telegram C 67603, Apr. 26, p. 173.
4. For the text of the proposal, see telegram Z 23092, Sept. 28, p. 545.