320/11–2552: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Department of State
priority
Delga 259. Limited distribution. Re Korea: Meeting this morning of Secretary and Eden with Lloyd, Jebb, Hickerson and Gross present.
Eden stated UK sees present posture of Korean problem as major tactical and political problem in cold war transcending PW issue. Lloyd expressed feeling that we have been losing ground in cold war in past 6–8 months and while admitting that we may have regained most of it yesterday as result Vyshinsky and Acheson speeches, he thought we are in danger of re-losing it during next 2 or 3 days if not careful.
Turning to PW question Secretary restated US position. He said para 17 is not deliberately ambiguous but in fact leaves to political conference alone authority for indefinite period to make recommendations re disposition of non-repatriates. This would mean our negotiating under Commie military pressure. Secretary reviewed negotiations at Panmunjom and explained relationship of concessions made there as part of “package”. In light of Menon and Eden speeches Secretary could not see any argument against making minimum essential changes we required. Nor could he see how Menon could use such changes as ground for repudiating res if we did no more than to make it agree with his own speech. Problem, therefore, was to reach agreement on language to meet this point.
Secretary said that in order to make job of bringing Menon around less difficult we would be prepared to make minimum changes in Menon’s own version. After discussion, with Eden most reluctant to support any amendments, group produced text which keeps Menon’s first sentence and revises second sentence to read: “If, at the end of a further 30 days, there are any prisoners of war whose return to their homelands has not been effected under the above procedures, or whose future has not been provided for by the political conference, the responsibility for their care and disposition shall be transferred to a United Nations agency.”
Secretary said he thought we could live with this, but we don’t like it. We would accept this version if necessary to induce Menon to stick by res; otherwise we would prefer our previous amendment to 17 which did not mention political conference. If quoted text were to be [Page 681] adopted, we insisted on need for having some UN agency in being to do job when need arises. We said that if UNKRA is not acceptable we would have to establish another UN agency by GA res before end of 120 days from armistice.
Secretary sought from Eden firm commitment to above text, but latter took line that if UK committed themselves to this draft, they would have to tell Menon and he would complain of Anglo-American conspiracy and reject his own res. Eden said he would see Menon and work on him on basis of above text, then advise us whether British would make commitment to support it.
Lloyd asked how it would be if US and UK abstained on Indian res; or if UK abstained on Indian res as amended by US. Secretary said it is impossible for US to abstain on any res on Korea. UK abstention on res supported by US would be bad.
Eden objected to firming up text at 21 power meeting scheduled for this afternoon. This would make amendment an “American draft”, would antagonize Menon and appear an ultimatum. Also, Eden took position that if 21 agreed on amendments they would leak and would become amendments of group. Hope of getting Menon acceptance would be diminished. He thought it preferable that any amendments should be put in by Menon or at least by some other power not among 21 sponsors.
Secretary stated that at 21 sponsors meeting he would call for agreement in principle on need for clarifying amendments to bring text of para 17 in line with Menon’s own intentions as indicated Menon, Eden and Acheson speeches. Eden did not disclose what UK position would be at meeting. Eden and Lloyd pressed Secretary to tell 21 that we favor unconditional priority for Indian res. Secretary said he would think it over, but expressed reluctance to surrender priority for 21 power res before we were certain of UK support for necessary amendment to para 17.