795.00/11–2652
The Secretary of State to the President1
Dear Mr. President: Events in the past twenty-four hours have moved swiftly here and with all the elements of an old-fashioned melodrama.
Vyshinski’s speech in the Political Committee Monday2 as you may have gathered, set everyone in the Committee on their ears. He not only rejected Menon resolution, along with all other resolutions except [Page 684] his own, but he attacked the whole Indian effort as a device for perpetuating the war in Korea.
Why he did this is still a matter of speculation here. Our best guess is that it was done on sudden, last-minute instructions from Moscow, and probably for reasons that had little if anything to do with the tactical situation in the Assembly. There is a possibility that it may have been a move to head off incipient Chinese softening toward the Indian approaches, but there is so far no hard evidence to support this possibility.
Paradoxically, the Vyshinski speech both helped us and hurt us. It helped because we were no longer in the situation of having it said that the Russians would reject Menon’s resolution if we were to add the amendments we thought necessary, since his rejection preceded our discussion of amendments. Also his intransigent tone discouraged some of the middle-ground people who had been bending as far as possible in the hope of finding a compromise the Russians might accept.
However, some of our friends, with whom we have been having trouble here, now professed to see the increased urgency of passing the Menon resolution without amendments. They argued that since there was no longer a possibility of Communist acceptance there was no need to have an entirely satisfactory plan. They urged that we must not risk driving India away from its own resolution since the propaganda importance of having unanimous non-Communist support for a resolution supporting our basic principle was paramount. We have argued against this view; first because we did not feel we could accept a resolution that we could not live with in view of the possibility, however remote, of its later acceptance; and second, because the resolution as passed would probably form the starting point of the negotiations at Panmunjom whenever they were renewed.
In my speech in the Political Committee following Vyshinski, I commended Menon warmly for his statesmanship and devotion to peace, and described our desired amendments as clarifications which would bring the text of his resolution into conformity with the speech Menon made in Committee. I also quoted with approval some of the things Eden had said in Committee in order to show that both Eden and Menon had supported in principle the elements we sought to get incorporated in the resolution. The conciliatory tone of the speech had a good effect in the Committee, coming as it did after Vyshinski’s speech and after the weekend reports of disharmony among the 21 powers.
While indicating that we were firm about necessary changes in the paragraph dealing with the disposition of the nonrepatriates (Menon’s paragraph 17), I suggested that we much preferred to omit the reference to a political conference. I had in mind that we could fall back if necessary to our second choice wording, which does accept reference of the issues to a political conference, but sets a time limit by which all prisoners must be released to a UN agency if they have not been repatriated. [Page 685] I also referred without insistence to the other changes we and the Joint Chiefs have felt would be important.
Tuesday morning, I had another session with Eden,3 and found him reluctant to support any amendments to Menon’s draft, for the reasons I have indicated. Finally, we were able to work out together a wording for paragaph 17 which provides that responsibility for the “care and disposition” of any prisoners not repatriated, or not provided for by the political conference, shall be transferred to a United Nations agency at the end of 120 days, that is 30 days after the conference begins.
I told Eden that we did not like this, but that we could live with it and would accept it if it meant that both he and Menon would support the resolution. Otherwise, we would prefer our own draft of paragraph 17 which did not mention political conference. Eden avoided firm commitment, but said he would work on Menon along these lines and advise us later of both Menon’s and his own reactions. In a later telephone call, however, the British said they had not meant to leave the impression they were going to get in touch with Menon, and urged that Menon not be “crowded” at this time.
At our request, the 21 powers met Tuesday afternoon.4 They agreed that priority in voting should be granted Menon resolution. It was also understood that “necessary textual clarifications in paragraph 17” of that resolution would be sought to make it conform to statements in Committee. We had been holding back on agreeing to the priority for Menon, as a form of pressure on him to accept our amendments, but now felt it desirable to agree to the priority on the grounds that it would be advantageous to us to vote on his resolution first, having our 21 power resolution in the background. Meeting was otherwise inconclusive, except for tactical agreement that additional speakers should be sought, particularly from among Arab-Asian group, to support need for amendment of paragraph 17.
Last night (Tuesday) as the result of a talk between Gross and Lloyd of the British delegation (Eden having left) and Menon, all three agreed to consider an amendment which Menon would either propose or accept, and which would provide that 120 days after the armistice was signed—that is, 30 days after the 90 days—the disposition of the prisoners, as well as their care and maintenance, should be transferred to the UN. This is the heart of the matter from our point of view since it terminates the jurisdiction of the political conference and terminates it one month short of the period which some have advocated here. This morning, I have authorized Gross to confirm our adherence to this settlement of the matter, provided Menon comes along.
[Page 686]All of us here believe that we can live with resolution, with these changes. I understand that the Joint Chiefs share this view. I understand also that Menon will amend paragraph 5 to make it clear that the classification of the prisoners will be done by the Repatriation Commission.
We shall see what the day brings forth. For the moment, we seem to be in pretty good shape.
Respectfully,