State-JCS Meeting, lot 61 D 413
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
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General Collins: In the new paper on alternative courses of action in Korea that we have just sent forward,2 we had a section which indicated that consideration should be given to use of atomic weapons. Personally, I am very skeptical about the value of using atomic weapons tactically in Korea. The Communists are dug into positions in depth over a front of one hundred fifty miles, and they are very thoroughly dug in. Our tests last week proved that men can be very close to the explosion and not be hurt if they are well dug in. …
Mr. Nitze: The question of the use of atomic weapons in Korea was raised at length with us by the seven consultants.3 They seem to have the attitude that we had gone to great expense to develop these weapons, we have tested them only in such tests as we could conduct ourselves, and we could certainly test them better under combat conditions. Their question was why should the State Department object to their use in Korea. We replied that there was no unshakeable policy barrier to use of atomic weapons, but the real question was whether the advantages would outweigh the disadvantages. We had to assess whether or not atomic weapons could be effective under Korean conditions. If they were not effective, we would have to be concerned with the question as to whether this would not depreciate the value of our stockpile. We had to weigh the political difficulties with our allies, which would arise from employment of atomic weapons, and these difficulties would be magnified if the weapons were not in fact effective. [Page 818] And the further question had to be considered as to whether the U.S.S.R. would not be faced with a decision and whether or not in that case they might not decide to retaliate in kind.
General Bradley: I think the consultants reflect the thinking of a lot of our people. Because of the casualties that will be involved in any stepped up ground action, we may find that we will be forced to use every type of weapon that we have.
General Vandenberg: I hope that if we do use them, we use them in Manchuria against the bases. They would be effective there.
General Collins: Before we use them we had better look to our air defense. Right now we present ideal targets for atomic weapons in Pusan and Inchon. An atomic weapon in Pusan harbor could do serious damage to our military position in Korea. We would again present an ideal target if we should undertake a major amphibious operation. An amphibious landing fleet would be a perfect target for an atomic weapon at the time when it was putting the troops ashore. On the other hand, the Commies, scattered over one hundred fifty miles of front, and well dug in, don’t present nearly as profitable a target to us as we do to them.
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A note on the title page read: “Draft. Not cleared with any of participants.”
Of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Generals Bradley, Collins, and Vandenberg and Admiral Fechteler attended, Nitze headed the Department of State contingent. Gleason represented the NSC and Admiral Smith the Department of Defense. In all, 16 persons attended. China and Panama were also discussed at the meeting.
↩ - Presumably the reference was to JCS estimate, “Future Courses of Action in Connection With the Situation in Korea”, Mar. 27, 1953, not printed, which was Appendix “B” to NSC 147. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series)↩
- The reference was to an ad hoc committee of civilian consultants established on Feb. 25, 1953 to study and advise the NSC on basic national security policies and programs in relation to their costs. (NSC Action No. 726-c, S/S–NSC files, lot 66 D 95)↩