Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Joint Chiefs of Staff to the Commander in Chief United Nations Command (Clark)1

top secret
operational immediate

JCS 935136. From JCS. Reur CX 61673.2

1.
Your proposed reply to Communist Commanders is approved subject to following changes: Amend first sentence para 1 to read as follows: “I hereby acknowledge with pleasure the receipt of your letter of 28 March 1953, in reply to my letter of 22 February 1953, and understand that you are fully prepared in accordance with our proposal to proceed immediately with the repatriation of all seriously sick and [Page 823] wounded captured personnel during the period of hostilities”. Delete second paragraph and substitute following: “I share the hope you expressed that a conclusion of the exchange of sick and wounded prisoners of war during the period of hostilities would make more likely a smooth settlement of the entire prisoner of war question. Accordingly I will be prepared to instruct my liaison group as a second order of business to meet with your liaison group to arrange for a resumption of armistice negotiations by our respective delegations. We take it as implicit in your suggestion in this respect that you would be prepared to accept UN proposals or make some comparable constructive proposals of your own which would constitute a valid basis for resumption of Delegation meetings.”
2.
Amendments do not represent any change in substantive position set forth your draft. However, consider that your letter should proceed on public assumption that Communist letter implies willingness on their part to meet substantive UNC position if armistice negotiations are resumed, and place on them responsibility for either accepting that assumption or publicly stating that there is in fact no change in their position on repatriation all POWs.3
3.

Re Part II para a your CX 61673:

Purpose of including “impartial verification” in your letter to Communists of 22 February4 was to include in your proposal a safeguard against UNC being required to accept without recourse an unreasonably small number of UNC sick and wounded as constituting Communist implementation of UNC proposals. However, as Communists most unlikely to accept ICRC in this role behind their lines and suggestion of members of Neutral Nation Supervisory Commission also impracticable and of questionable desirability from our standpoint do not believe UNC should put forward any specific proposal in this regard pending indication from Communists of number UNC sick and wounded they are prepared exchange. Therefore, in event number to be returned by Communists appears reasonable you are authorized omit demand for verification. If, however, in your judgment number indicated by the Communists is unreasonable you should submit your comments and recommendations to the JCS as to some procedure for impartial verification.

4.
Re Part II para b concur that prior resumption of armistice negotiations as a condition for exchange of sick and wounded is unacceptable.
  1. The initial draft of this telegram, prepared by State and Army G–3, was concurred in by Army, Navy, and Air Force and by Bradley and Nash. Secretary Dulles discussed the draft with President Eisenhower, who approved certain changes. U. A. Johnson, who was present during the discussion, revised the draft to reflect the President’s views. After Lemnitzer informed Bradley that the text was in accord with the President’s views, the telegram was transmitted as telegram JCS 935136. (Memorandum from Stephens to Dwan, Apr. 1, 1953; JCS records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3–14–45)) For the message of concern to the President, see memorandum by Secretary Dulles to the President, Apr. 1, p. 833.
  2. Supra.
  3. For the complete text of Clark’s letter, sent Mar. 31, 1953, see Department of State Bulletin, Apr. 13, 1953, p. 528.
  4. For text, see telegram CX 61281, Feb. 19, p. 788.