Office of the Historian

FE files, lot 55 D 338, “South Korean Attitude Toward Armistice, May 1953”

Paper Submitted by the Commanding General of the United States Eighth Army (Taylor)1

top secret
Seoul, 4 May 1953.

Subject:

  • Outline Plan Everready

Map: AMS L552,—Korea, 1:250,0002

1.
Mission: Eighth Army takes prompt action to safeguard UNC forces and supplies in Korea and to insure that the UN position with regard to the Armistice Agreement is maintained, in the event that operational control of Republic of Korea forces is weakened or lost prior to or after the conclusion of an armistice.
2.
Assumptions:
a.
That an armistice is being negotiated or has been concluded and that UN forces are disposed along the present line of contact or along Line Wyoming Extended.
b.
That the government and people of the Republic of Korea may be reluctant to accept the terms of the armistice, and that this reluctance, depending upon its intensity, may produce any one of the following conditions:
(1)
ROK troops, while not overtly hostile, are not responsive to UN directives.
(2)
ROK Government and military units proceed along an independent course of action.
(3)
ROK Government, military units or people are overtly hostile to UN troops.
c.
That relationships between UN forces and the ROK Army may decline gradually or suddenly and the conditions described in the preceding paragraph may develop in sequence, or any one of the conditions, may be precipitated on short notice.
d.
That Communist forces may attack at any time.
3.
Intelligence: Annex 1, Intelligence3
4.
Concept of Operation:
a.
Tasks to be accomplished:

Condition One: See Para 2b (1) [Not Responsive]4

(1)
Intensify CIC coverage of all ROK Government and ROK Army activities.
(2)
Division “A”, Army Reserve, alerts Task Force #1 for the mission of securing the Seoul area and the Seoul-Taejon Railway.
(3)
Division “C”, Army Reserve:
(a)
Prepare for movement to Southeast Korea to secure the Pusan and Taegu areas under the command of CG, KCOMZ.
(b)
Prepare to pass control of Divison Artillery to X US Corps.
(4)
I US Corps—Prepare to secure the Uijongbu area.
(5)
IX US Corps—Prepare to secure the Chunchon area.
(6)
X US Corps—Prepare to secure the Wonju area.
(7)
Alert Navy and Air Force Commanders as appropriate.
(8)
Initiate action to reduce the level of supply in forward areas.
(9)
In addition, take such other actions from those listed in paragraph 4b, below, as are appropriate to the situation.

Condition Two: See Para 2b (2) [Independent]

(1)
Accomplish tasks of Condition One as necessary.
(2)
Move ROK units in the vicinity of vital installations to less sensitive areas.
(3)
Commanders having area defense responsibility concentrate installations and units, close out non-essential installations, relieve and disarm ROK Security units, and establish strong security of vital installations utilizing resident UN forces to the maximum.
(4)
UN forces secure areas as follows:
(a)
Army Reserve—Seoul, Seoul-Taejon Railway.
(b)
I US Corps—Uijongbu.
(c)
IX US Corps—Chunchon.
(d)
X US Corps—Wonju.
(5)
Division “C” (—)—Move to Southeast Korea, on order.
(6)
Supply loyal ROK units from US supply points and depots, if necessary.
(7)
Turn in non-essential supplies for outshipment.
(8)
Restrict movement of civil population as necessary.
(9)
In addition, take such other actions from those listed in paragraph 4b, below, as are appropriate to the situation.

Condition Three: See Para 2b (3) [Hostile]

(1)
Accomplish tasks of Conditions One and Two as necessary.
(2)
UN and dependable ROK forces regroup and prepare to conduct, on order, a phased withdrawal to appropriate defensive positions.
(3)
In addition, take such other actions from those listed in paragraph 4b, below, as are appropriate to the situation.
b.
Possible measures which may be taken as appropriate:
(1)
Send for Chief of Staff, ROKA, and instruct him to secure enforcement of orders.
(2)
Confer with commanders of disaffected units.
(3)
Relieve disloyal or recalcitrant leaders and replace them by commanders personally loyal to CG, Eighth Army.
(4)
Dispatch teams of loyal ROK officers to present the UN cause orally to ROK units.
(5)
Notify recalcitrant units that continuation of logistical support is conditioned on full compliance with UN policy.
(6)
Discontinue supply of fuel and munitions to the disaffected units and move arms and munitions from ROK supply channels to US installations.
(7)
Request CINCUNC to make a demand for compliance on the President of Korea.
(8)
Recommend to CINCUNC a declaration of UN policy and reasons therefore to be given the Korean people and Army via:
(a)
US radio facilities.
(b)
Vehicle and airborne loudspeakers.
(c)
Preempted Korean radio facilities.
(d)
Placards, handbills, and leaflets.
(9)
Withdraw supporting artillery and air support, including the grounding of the ROK Air Force by arrangement with CG, Fifth Air Force.
(10)
Demand return of US supplies and equipment in hands of ROKA.
(11)
Cut off all communications between disaffected units of ROKA, their headquarters, and the ROK Government.
(12)
Secure control, within Army area, of Korean civil and military communications, to include telephone, telegraph, radio, bus, railroad, and water transportation.
(13)
Seize, divert, and secure in US installations all supplies in hands of dissident elements.
(14)
Proclaim and establish martial law in the name of the UN.
(15)
Secure custody of the dissident military and civil leaders.
(16)
Proclaim military government in the name of the UN.
c.
Location of Forces: Annex 2, Overlay.5
5.
Forces Available to Execute This Plan:
a.
I US Corps—1 UN and 1 US division.
b.
IX US Corps—2 US divisions.
c.
XUS Corps—1 US division.
d.

Army Reserve—3 US divisions.

(Note: All ROK forces still responsive to UN direction will be used.)

6.
Logistics: Annex 3, Logistics. (Omitted)
Taylor
Lt Gen
  1. This plan was subsequently discussed at the State-JCS meeting of May 29, 1953; for a memorandum of that discussion, see p. 1114.↩
  2. Not printed.↩
  3. Annex 1 was not attached to the source text and is not printed.↩
  4. All brackets in this document are in the source text.↩
  5. Annex 2 was not attached to the source text and is not printed.↩