Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 144th Meeting of the National Security Council, Wednesday, May 13, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

May 13, 1953

Present at the 144th meeting of the National Security Council were the following: The President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Acting Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; and the Acting Director for Mutual Security. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Attorney General (for Item 1); the Director of Defense Mobilization; the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Chairman, Atomic Energy Commission (for Item 1); General John E. Hull, for the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Robert Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Adm. Lewis L. Strauss, Special Assistant to the President; Major General J. S. Bradley, Joint Chiefs of Staff; Mr. J. Patrick Coyne, NSC Representative on Internal Security (for Item 1); the Military Liaison Officer; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion and the chief points taken at the meeting.

[Here follows discussion on item 1. “Eligibility of Representatives of Foreign Governments To Receive Classified U.S. Security Information” and 2. “Negotiations with Spain”.]

3. Analysis of Possible Courses of Action in Korea (NSC 147;² NSC Actions Nos. 703,³ 759,⁴ 765⁵ and 782;⁶ Memo for NSC from Executive Secretary, subject: “Future Courses of Action in Connection with the Situation in Korea”, dated March 30, 1953⁷)

At the outset of the discussion of this item, Mr. Cutler noted that the Director, Bureau of the Budget, had questioned the accuracy of the course figures for the several alternative courses of action in Korea. Mr. Cutler said he merely wanted to state that these figures were not intended to be precise, but rather to provide a general idea of the costs which these several courses of action would entail.

Mr. Cutler also briefly informed the Council as to the nature of Project Solarium and the proposed study of general alternatives open to the Administration with respect to the basic decisions confronting it in view of the Communist menace and the world situation.⁸

Thereafter, General Slayton [Sladen] Bradley briefed the Council on the military implications of the six possible alternative courses of action in Korea. In the course of his briefing, General Slayton Bradley stated that none of the courses of action which involved operations outside of Korea could really be effectively carried out without the use of atomic weapons.

… In the event that atomic weapons were used, General Hull also warned the Council that the Joint Chiefs of Staff were convinced that they must be used in considerable numbers in order to be truly effective.… While there were no good strategic targets within the confines of Korea itself, the military were most anxious to make use of atomic weapons in any of the courses of action which involved operations outside of Korea. Their use would be highly advantageous from the strictly military point of view.

The President seemed not wholly satisfied with the argument that atomic weapons could not be used effectively in dislodging the Chinese from their present positions in Korea. He inquired as to whether or not a test had been made at Bikini as to the effectiveness of a penetration type of atomic weapon. Could not such weapons be used with effect on tactical targets of the Chinese Communists?

General Hull said that the test of a penetration bomb at Bikini had been abandoned, but that tests of such weapons had been made at the Nevada Proving Grounds. The effect had been as of an earthquake, but there was some doubt as to whether use of such weapons could really be justified in terms of the large-scale destruction of enemy personnel and matériel.

The President nevertheless thought it might be cheaper, dollar-wise, to use atomic weapons in Korea than to continue to use conventional weapons against the dugouts which honeycombed the hills along which the enemy forces were presently deployed. This, the President felt, was particularly true if one took into account the logistic costs of getting conventional ammunition from this country to the front lines.

. . . . . . .

There ensued an extended discussion of Course C as set forth in NSC 147 and described by General Slayton Bradley, which the latter described as the Van Fleet concept.

The trouble with it was, according to the President, that if our commanders succeeded in destroying a very great number of the enemy in a military operation which moved up to the waist of Korea, it would not be long before the enemy would bring up replacements and we should find ourselves in the same posture and in the same stalemate that we were now in, excepting only that we should have advanced to the waist of Korea. This seemed a doubtful gain to the President, whose view of the matter was confirmed by General Hull.

Secretary Smith then briefed the Council on the political results and implications to be anticipated from the six courses of military action which had been outlined.⁹ He dismissed Course A as having no significant implications, since it was a continuation of the status quo. Allied reaction to Courses B and C, thought Secretary Smith, would be determined in large part by whether the United States took the initiative in embracing these courses, or whether the decision to enter into them were forced on us by the enemy. The reaction of our allies and the effect on the neutrals would also depend on the achievement of success in a short period of time. Much would be forgiven us if we were quickly successful and ended the war. In summary, Secretary Smith stated that he was personally not very much worried about the reactions of our allies and of the neutral powers to these courses of action, which did not involve the lifting of current restrictions or expanding the war outside of Korea.

On the other hand, said Secretary Smith, Courses D, E and F were all fraught with danger for us from the point of view of the reaction of our allies. If we chose any one of these three courses on our own initiative, our allies might well refuse to go along with us in them and indeed might actually withdraw their contingents from the UN Command. Again, however, Secretary Smith estimated that if we achieved a rapid success with any of these three courses, and especially with the most drastic of them, Course F, many of our friends who had fallen away at the outset would climb back on the victorious bandwagon. The criterion again would be quick success. We should not, however, underestimate the severe Chinese Communist reaction to any of these three courses. We must count on a probable Soviet intervention and on the real possibility of general war. While it was not, strictly speaking, germane to the present discussion, said Secretary Smith, he could not but recall Dr. Sonntag’s remarks apropos of Chinese Communist success in the present operations. History, Dr. Sonntag had predicted, would probably record this success as the turning point in the long history of relations between the East and the West. For the first time in a thousand years the East has successfully stood up to the West and secured a stalemate. For this reason, concluded Secretary Smith, the boldest line of action is probably the one which will leave us in the best position.

The President inquired as to the effect of pursuing such a bold line of action on our NATO defenses and all of our arrangements in Europe.

Secretary Smith replied that in all probability NATO and our European system of alliances would all fall to pieces temporarily. If, however, we were successful in our bold line of action, and if global war were avoided, our system of alliances could be rebuilt.

The President replied that the simple truth of the matter was that many people in the European countries believe that global war is much worse to contemplate than surrender to Communist imperialism. To many of them there was simply nothing worse than global war, for the reason that it would amount to the obliteration of European civilization. We desperately need, continued the President, to maintain these outposts of our national defense, and we do not wish our allies to desert us. We were already in considerable difficulties with these allies and, it seemed to the President, our relations with Great Britain had become worse in the last few weeks than at any time since the end of the war.

To this, Secretary Smith replied that one must confess that our relations with Great Britain were now “not good.”

The Vice President again reverted to the view he had expressed at last week’s Council meeting, that the decision which the Council must presently take, with respect to alternative courses of action in Korea in the event of a breakdown of the armistice negotiations, should be taken only in the context of the longer-term problem which would confront us when the Soviet Union had amassed a sufficient stockpile of atomic weapons to deal us a critical blow and to rob us of the initiative in the area of foreign policy.

The President agreed with the views of the Vice President, and explained that Project Solarium was being initiated with this precise problem in mind. He outlined briefly the alternatives which Project Solarium would present to the Council, and noted that the Council would sit in judgment on these alternatives much as would judges in a case in a law court.

Secretary Smith agreed with the Vice President’s exposition of the long-term problems which were confronting the Administration, but also noted that if, as seemed very likely, we obtained an armistice in Korea, the Administration would also face a serious short-term problem. The first reaction of the American Congress and people to an armistice in Korea would be relief and rejoicing at the end of the bloodshed. Presently, however, Congress and the people would begin to tot up the net results of two years of savage fighting, and there would be bitter criticism of the small result which could be attributable to this long and costly effort.

The President showed some impatience with this prospective criticism of our efforts in Korea. If people raised hell when they contemplated these results, the thing to do would be to ask them to volunteer for front-line action in a continued Korean war.

The National Security Council:¹⁰

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on feasible military courses of action in Korea by General John E. Hull and Major General J. S. Bradley, representing the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

b. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the probable effects of such courses of action on other nations, particularly our allies, by the Acting Secretary of State.

c. Agreed that the Joint Chiefs of Staff should present to the Council at its next meeting their choice of the most advantageous course for the United States to adopt.

d. Noted that the President, in accordance with NSC Action No. 765-b, authorizes the Commander-in-Chief, United Nations Command, to activate additional Republic of Korea divisions, over and above the 16 already activated, to a total of 20.

e. Noted a report by the Secretary of Defense that, within existing authorization, he has approved the Joint Chiefs of Staff recommendations for the following personnel increases in Republic of Korea forces:

(1) Marine Corps—19,880 to 23,500

(2) Navy—9,402 to 10,000

(3) Air Force—7,034 to 9,000

Note: The action in d above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation.

[Here follows discussion on items 4. “Possibilities for Psychologica Operations Based in Thailand”, 5. “Position of the United States With Respect to Switzerland”, and 6. “NSC Status of Projects”.]

S. Everett Gleason

1. This memorandum was drafted by Gleason on May 14.
2. Dated Apr. 2, p. 838.

3. NSC Action No. 703, Feb. 4, 1953, read as follows:

   “Noted that the President, at the request of the Secretary of Defense, approved a recommendation by the Joint Chiefs of Staff to permit immediate activation of two infantry divisions in addition to the present twelve in the Republic of Korea Army, with a consequent increase in the personnel ceiling from 415,120 to 460,000.” (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)

4. For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892.
5. In NSC Action No. 765, Apr. 22, 1953, the Council noted the President’s approval of a JCS recommendation that two more infantry divisions be activated and added to the ROK Army, consequently raising the personnel ceiling from 460,000 to 525,000. The Council also agreed with the Department of Defense recommendation that an increase to a total of 20 ROK divisions should be authorized, subject to activation of additional divisions above 16 on the approval of the President. These actions were subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)
6. For NSC Action No. 782, see the memorandum of discussion at the 143d meeting of the NSC, May 6, p. 975.
7. Not printed, but see footnote 2 p. 838.
8. For documentation on Project Solarium, a 1953 study of national security policy by a three-panel task group, see volume ii.
9. The paper on which this briefing was based was a memorandum by Robertson to Smith, May 12, 1953, not printed. (S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series) The six courses of action are those set forth in NSC 147, Apr. 2, p. 838.
10. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 787; a record copy can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.