695.0024/5–1953: Telegram

The Political Adviser for the Armistice Negotiations (Murphy) to the Department of State

secret

3626. From Murphy to Alexis Johnson. No distribution. Proposal UNC advanced 13 May includes proposition for outright release 35,000 North Korean POW’s in South Korea and also does not include acceptance in principle of eventual disposition all remaining POW non-repatriates by Political Conference with 30-day cutoff.

I want you to know that I have not been happy about these two items and it was in part due to my insistence that CX 624561 outlining proposed final position contains provision under which European neutral state would be responsible for custody of North Korean POW’s in Korea. While I understand Clark’s preoccupation with ROK opposition to anything but release of these North Korean POW’s in South Korea and apprehension that there may be violence and disorder in South Korea if they are not released, UN technically does not have a foot of ground to stand on.

If we insist on outright release North Korean POW’s I doubt that an armistice can be obtained. I have advised Clark that if there is a choice between an armistice and difficulties with ROK we must face the latter philosophically as the lesser of two evils.

I just want you to know that personally I find it incomprehensible that we put up a twelfth hour stand for the outright release of North Koreans merely because of apprehension over violent ROK reaction which is at best speculative. The POW issue has been built into enough of a Frankenstein without this added and unnecessary complication.

I also urged Clark several times to offer acceptance of the principle of the Political Conference with 30-day cutoff promptly, as originally contemplated in our 13 May position, but he and staff strongly felt they should be reserved as part of our final offer.

I hope that during this five day recess these two features especially can be thoroughly reviewed by Department and would appreciate your comment.

[Murphy]
  1. Dated May 16, p. 1033.