Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 1

S/S–NSC files, lot 63 D 351, NSC 147 Series

Political Annex to NSC 147 Prepared in the Policy Planning Staff¹

top secret

[Washington,] June 4, 1953.

1. NSC Action 794² calls for an evaluation by the Department of State of the foreign policy implications of the recommended course of action. This involves a brief analysis of the probable attitudes and reactions of—

a. Allies of the United States, especially the NATO members;

b. The Soviet bloc;

c. The neutral states, especially India.

General Basis for Evaluation

2. For the purpose of this evaluation, it is assumed that the United States would adhere to the proposed course of action despite the possible reactions of allied and other nations.

3. The attitudes and reactions of the various nations may be much affected by the timing and extent of their knowledge about the proposed course of action. As outlined, the plan calls for maximum secrecy in order to capitalize on surprise. Certain factors, however, will work strongly against effective secrecy:

a. During period of build-up, estimated by JCS at nine months to a year, it would be more and more difficult to conceal the extent and nature of the expansion in military forces and supplies, and its probable purpose, especially in view of the necessity of obtaining additional funds from the Congress. (JCS Appendix,³ paras (c) and (e))

b. The plan proposes to notify our Allies of the general course of action and to seek their concurrence. If for no other reason, this would be necessary to explain diversion of equipment from NATO. Since this could not be postponed beyond the time when the military build-up became a matter of public knowledge in the United States, they would have such notice several months or more before the time fixed for action. (JCS Appendix, paras (b) and (d))

Accordingly, while it should be possible to conceal the precise date fixed for action or its exact scope and nature, it seems realistic to assume, for the purpose of this analysis, that the American public, our Allies, and the Soviet bloc would be aware for several months of a substantial build-up and of its probable purpose.

Reaction of Free European and Commonwealth Countries

4. The reaction of each country in Europe would be directly related to:

a. Its estimate of its own exposure in the event of a Soviet attack in Europe;

b. Treaty obligations linking it to the United States; and

c. The present state of national morale which, in turn, to a large extent is a product of the first two factors.

5. The first response almost certainly would be—

a. Fear that the risk of Soviet reaction in the form of a military offensive against Western Europe would markedly increase; and

b. A loss of confidence in American leadership as impetuous and disregardful of the consequences of its actions to them.

6. To the extent that shipments of end-items and particularly ammunition were reduced below expectations, their sense of exposure would correspondingly increase. If American air, ground, or naval forces should be withdrawn for redeployment in the Far East, that would critically affect their will to fight.

7. In attempting to distinguish in degree the effect, country by country, a vital factor is the present extent of neutralist sentiment particularly where rooted in defeat in World War II and subsequent occupation. The paramount fear of the population in countries which were occupied during or after World War II is the fear of another occupation. There is the gravest doubt that many countries in Europe would fight if they were convinced in advance that initial defeat was probable and that it could only look forward to a future liberation.

8. Knowing of the proposed action in advance, our NATO allies and Germany would certainly attempt to exert the strongest pressure on the United States not to take such action, both by diplomatic means and public statements. In the end their positions would probably become so firmly and publicly fixed that the United States would be faced with choosing directly between Allied and neutral support and the pursuit of the proposed course of action. In view of this fact, taking the action would have a profound impact on our Allies and on many sections of American opinion. It would be construed as a decision to follow our own policy at the expense of the coalition in case a choice were necessary.

9. Within the NATO alliance the reactions are likely to be as follows:

a. The U.K. could be expected to use all of its influence to modify our course. Failing success, she would in all probability cast in her lot with ours with reluctance and bitterness. Canada would surely follow Great Britain in that case, and might align itself with us even if Great Britain refused.

b. The Netherlands, Belgium, Luxembourg, France, Italy and Norway would be of doubtful reliability, but would all be importantly influenced by the British reaction.

c. Turkey could be expected to remain staunch, as Greece probably would.

d. Iceland would weaken in its willingness to afford us base rights but might hold if the U.K. and Canada stood firm.

e. Denmark is the weakest member in morale and would probably withdraw from NATO de facto if not de jure.

f. Portugal would be largely influenced by the position of Spain and the U.K.

10. a. Germany, unarmed and with a weakened NATO, would likely seek strenuously to modify our course; its final position would be difficult to predict since so much would depend on how the Soviets exploited the situation.

b. Yugoslavia might recede from its developing ties with the West and move toward a more neutral position.

c. Spain would raise its price but would probably stand with the U.S. if promised protection and substantial and prompt shipments of end-items.

11. Finland, Sweden, Ireland and Switzerland would remain neutral, but might well tend toward more benevolence toward the Soviet Union.

12. Australia might oppose the action less than the other dominions. New Zealand would probably follow the British lead. The Union of South Africa would be highly doubtful.

13. In summary, it would appear probable at best that NATO would suffer losses on its northern flank, neutralist sentiment everywhere on the Continent would be gravely increased thereby weakening public support for such governments as decided to stand with the U.S., and in the key country, Great Britain, the Labor Party could be expected to gain heavily, with Bevan’s chances for gaining its leadership notably enhanced.

Reaction of Other Allied and Associated Nations

14. The use of Japanese bases for air attacks, particularly atomic attacks, will raise in Japan considerable concern over their being subject to retaliatory attacks. While the present Yoshida government would probably desire to support whatever policy the U.S. adopted, the government has a very slender and shaky working majority and it is difficult to predict what the ultimate political results in Japan would be.

15. The Philippines could be expected loyally to support the U.S. action.

16. No significant opposition need be expected from Latin America.

17. The ultimate effect on the Free World is difficult to predict. If the action did not provoke large-scale Soviet reaction and the United States obtained a quick victory, there would be much greater likelihood that the sharp cleavages among the Allies could be patched up. However, the factors stated in paragraph 8 would be likely to leave permanent scars. The Allies and neutrals who felt that our action showed that we were prepared to create serious risks for their security in going our own way would doubtless be more chary of our leadership in the future. Of course, if our judgment was sustained by success, the effect would be somewhat mitigated by showing that the risk or danger was not as great as they had anticipated. Even so, the experience would probably make the Allies much less willing to rely on us to take account of the interest of the coalition as a whole as contrasted with our own views. In other words, the bitterness and doubt created by the dispute would not be wholly dissipated even under the best outcome. And, of course, if the action was protracted or the Soviet reaction violent, especially in a different area, the consequences on the coalition would be even more marked.

Soviet Reaction

18. During the preparatory period, the Soviets would exploit to the maximum, psychologically and diplomatically, any and all emerging signs of divergence between the Free World Allies. They could be expected to carry such exploitation to the point of serious risk of precipitating general conflict in an effort to frighten those Free World elements susceptible thereof and to weaken the alliance against them to the point of disintegration.

19. The Soviet reaction to the action itself would no doubt be importantly affected by their appraisal of Western intentions. As already indicated, it would not be possible to conceal from them the necessary build-up, but they might well be uncertain as to the scope and purpose of the action. If the Soviet Union knew that the purpose of the action was limited, it may be presumed that its reaction would be commensurately tempered. On the other hand, the combined effect of the feints and diversionary actions, the weapons, and the surprise in so far as achieved might mislead them as to our intentions. For example, they might consider the move as an opening step toward the liberation of the whole of China. Such an evaluation might greatly magnify the scale of the Soviet reaction.

20. Factors which would induce the Soviets to react strongly to such an action include:

a. The proximity of the operations to Soviet frontiers and Vladivostok;

b. The special compulsion on the new Soviet leaders not to be less forceful in defendng the Soviet Empire than Stalin;

c. The Sino-Soviet Treaty of Mutual Assistance which provides for the Soviets to go to the assistance of China in the event of attack on the latter by a power allied with Japan; and

d. Soviet special interest in Manchuria.

21. Soviet reaction might take several forms and would not necessarily be confined to the Far Eastern theater.

22. It is believed the Soviets would not consciously decide to embark on general war. However, their reaction would undoubtedly be sufficiently vigorous to create a major risk of initiating a spiral of action and reaction which could result in world-wide conflict.

23. In the Far East, the Soviets might well react by direct Soviet military intervention; probably, initially at least, air and naval (submarines). As a minimum they might make airfields inside the Soviet Union available to the “Chinese”. If considered desirable to preserve further the fiction of Soviet government non-involvement Soviet air “volunteers” might be openly engaged and be utilized throughout the whole range of operations.

24. In Europe, Soviet thinking accords primacy to Germany. The Soviets would be aware that direct Soviet military action there would involve conflict with U.S. forces and would thus involve maximum risk of precipitating general war. They might estimate, however, that increased involvement of the U.S. militarily in the Far East plus the weakened situation of the Western European alliance arising from the stresses and strains incident to this development created conditions suitable for the exertion by them of serious new pressures against the Western position in Germany, particularly in Berlin.

25. The situation in Iran and the isolation and weakness of Afghanistan also suggest possible fields for Soviet diversionist reactions.

26. On the other hand, there is a possibility that knowledge of the build-up, whether accompanied by notification or not, could induce the Soviets to agree to terminate Korean hostilities.

Reaction of Communist China

27. It is just possible that knowledge of the build-up for the action might lead the Chinese Communists to attempt to conclude an armistice along the lines of the present draft armistice. Allied pressures to agree to such an armistice at that time would be very strong and the U.S. would therefore be faced with the decision as to whether at that point it would still be willing to agree to such an armistice.

28. Once the action has begun the Chinese Communists would recognize that the action, if successful, would involve at the minimum a severe deflation of their political and military prestige both at home and abroad. They would, therefore, react to the maximum of their capabilities and increase their demands upon the Soviets for aid. Particularly if the hostilities develop adversely from their viewpoint, they would attempt to invoke the Sino-Soviet Mutual Assistance Treaty of 1950.

29. If within their military capabilities, the Chinese might attempt offensive counteraction such as against Southeast Asia, particularly Indochina, as well as against Hong Kong.

30. The action would greatly intensify the strain upon China’s slender military industry and transportation potential. This would exacerbate the economic difficulties faced by the regime. It is impossible to predict the effects this might have in terms of the ability of the regime to continue to exercise effective control over their country. However, the regime could be expected to exploit to the maximum the xenophobia of the Chinese people to maintain its control.

Reaction of Asian Neutrals

31. If it appeared to them that enlargement of the scope and scale of hostilities was entirely at the initiative of the United States, Asian neutral reaction would probably be strongly adverse. U.S. relations in particular with Indonesia, Burma and India as well as with other countries of the “Arab-Asian bloc” would be very strained until the action was successfully completed. In particular they would react severely to offensive use of Chinese Nationalist forces and to any indications that the intent of the U.S. was to restore the Chinese Nationalists to the mainland and bring about a renewal of the Chinese civil conflict with the objective of overthrowing the Chinese Communist regime.

32. However, if the action were quickly successful, Chinese Communist prestige in the area would be greatly diminished and fear of Chinese Communist military aggression reduced. U.S. prestige would correspondingly be increased and, with careful handling, U.S. influence in the area enhanced.

1. In a covering note by Bowie to Smith, dated June 5, the Director of the Policy Planning Staff noted that this annex had been approved by Matthews, Merchant, Barbour, Johnson, and MacArthur. After approval by Dulles and Smith—an initialed marginal notation in Smith’s handwriting read “Noted & approved”—it was to be sent to the NSC A note in an unidentified hand on this covering note by Bowie indicated that the annex was sent to the NSC
2. For NSC Action No. 794, see the memorandum of discussion at 145th meeting of the NSC, May 20, p. 1064.
3. Reference was to the Appendix to a JCS memorandum of May 19, p. 1063.