State-JCS Meetings, lot 61 D 417
Memorandum of the Substance of Discussion at a Department of State Joint Chiefs of Staff Meeting1
[Extract]
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Ridgway Proposals for Handling the POW Issue
(A draft Army message was circulated which replied to General Ridgway’s incoming message outlining the course he proposed to take in negotiations on the POW issue.)2
General Collins: The major point at issue is whether, if time permits, the rescreening should be done before we put our final position up to the Communists. We might find ourselves in some difficulty if we gave the Communists a round number of 70,000 who would be repatriated, and if subsequently a recheck turned up 90,000 who would be willing to be repatriated. In these circumstances the Communists could make a lot of hay propaganda-wise. They could say that the whole process had not been any good and that all their POW’s would have returned if the screening had been properly done. It seems to me that the timing question [Page 156] is all important. There may not be time to do the rescreening. For this reason we do not believe that we should direct General Ridgway to do it but should merely stress our view that it would be desirable if it is possible.
Mr. Johnson: I believe the matter is beginning to come to public attention. I heard over the 8 o’clock news this morning a reference to the segregation of prisoners on Koje Island.
General Collins: I heard that same report at 8 o’clock but only caught part of it. It was reported that the POWs on Koje were being segregated. I guess this cat is getting out of the bag.
(The meeting then took up a detailed revision of the draft Army message.)
Mr. Johnson: We have one question concerning General Ridgway’s paragraph e. It is not clear to us whether the rescreening he proposes is to be done before or after the armistice comes into effect. There is an implication that it is to be done before the armistice takes effect. Our outgoing message recommended a post-armistice rescreening. It probably doesn’t make much difference as far as the Communists are concerned whether the rescreening is done before or after the armistice—assuming that they are willing to accept the situation at all. We believe that we might get into a great deal of trouble if the rescreening is done before the armistice. The Communists could use it for propaganda and to delay the coming into effect of an armistice.
Mr. Bohlen: We might get into the same difficulties that General Collins just referred to.
(At this point General Eddleman entered the meeting.)
Mr. Johnson: We have some draft language on this point which we might circulate.
(The State Department draft3 was circulated and discussed. The propaganda point was deleted and the language was simplified in various respects. The emphasis was thrown on the point that a pre-armistice screening might seriously delay the coming into effect of the armistice.)
Mr. Bohlen: What worries me the most about this is that it might provide the opportunity for the Communists to put additional emphasis on the POW issue as the outstanding issue.
General Collins: I take it that you mean increased pressure on the U.S. public to get our POW’s back.
Mr. Bohlen: That and an opportunity to make use of the rescreening to throw doubt on the whole process.
[Page 157]General Collins: I doubt whether it is necessary to give all the arguments contained in this message. I think that General Ridgway can read them all in.
Admiral Duncan: How important is it in your opinion whether this rescreening is done before or after the armistice?
Mr. Johnson: It seems quite important to us, especially from the point of view of the time element, that is, the time when an armistice would come into effect.
Mr. Bohlen: If we have another screening before an armistice there will be a good opportunity for the Communists to make trouble in the camps. The Communists can threaten reprisals against the families of those men who elect to stay. We could easily find ourselves in a real mess. Furthermore, the Communists can throw doubt on the whole screening that we have done. The situation would be quite different if the armistice was already in effect.
General Collins: If the Communists do not accept a settlement on this basis and if the armistice talks collapse, it occurs to me that we may want to have a third screening in order to get more POW’s to say that they will not return. I don’t think we need to interject this issue now but we may want to have a third screening under the auspices of the International Red Cross if only to show that the job was honestly done to begin with.
(Turning to the other chiefs) Are there any other comments on this?
I am very doubtful about your last paragraph. Why do you want all this information on the procedures which were followed in the screening?
Mr. Johnson: We want it simply for background purposes. As soon as this thing breaks in the press we are going to have to explain what has been done to our allies and probably also to the U.S. public.
General Collins: In that case, I think you ought to say why you want the information and say that it is in order to brief the allies and for press purposes here. Otherwise, General Ridgway may wonder whether we are about to walk out on him.
Admiral Duncan: I think this point ought to be covered in a separate message.4 It is not really germane to the rest of the message.
(This was agreed.)
General Collins: I think we might run together our two draft messages with the revision that we have considered. We might take our [Page 158] paragraph as the first paragraph and follow it with your two paragraphs, closing with an approval of his plan of action subject to the qualifications contained in these messages. This will give him authority to go ahead as he outlined if it is impossible or impractical for any reason to accept our recommendation. I will have clear copies run off so we can read it and look at it once more.
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A note on the title page read as follows: “State Draft. Not cleared with any participants.”
Chief of Staff General Collins and Vice Chiefs of Staff General Twining and Admiral Duncan attended for the JCS. Matthews headed the Department of State contingent and General Ruffner attended for the Department of Defense, while Lay represented the NSC. Korea was one of four topics discussed; the others were Japan, Yugoslavia, and Germany.
↩ - This draft, after revisions and combination with a Department of State draft, was sent to Ridgway as JCS 906539, infra. The message from Ridgway under reference was CX 66953, Apr. 15, p. 153.↩
- This draft, after the revisions indicated in the memorandum, was combined with the Department of the Army draft and was sent out as JCS 906539 to Ridgway, infra.↩
- The separate message referred to was DA 906549, Jenkins, G–3, to Ridgway, Apr. 17, 1952. In it Ridgway was asked for a summary of the screening operation, including sample questions asked and the method by which these questions were put to the POWs. The telegram also requested information on the persons used in the operation and whether the ICRC carried out any visits to the camps during the screening period or observed any part of the screening process. This information was needed, Ridgway was informed, so that the Department of State could have background information to brief allies and to counter false accusations (795.00/4–352).↩