795.00/7–2153: Telegram

The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State

top secret
niact

46. Repeated information Pusan 24, CINCUNC. Department pass Defense.

This morning I called on Prime Minister Paek at his request, Pyun also present, and listened to attack on General Harrison’s alleged references to Republic of Korea at Panmunjom, followed by threat to denounce armistice unless satisfaction (as described below) is received from US Government.

Their point of departure was Communist statement made at 36th Panmunjom meeting on July 19 last,2 quoting answers attributed to General Harrison in reply to Communist questions. The Ministers’ objections primarily concerned Harrison’s alleged statements regarding maintenance of armistice by UNC if armistice violated by Republic of Korea, and concerning NNRC (Indian troops in South Korea). Pyun did most of talking but on all substantive points Prime Minister supported Pyun. In substance they demand “immediate clarification by General Harrison” of points to which they object in abovementioned Communist statement, plus information and/or assurances concerning the following:

1.
Information whether Robertson has obtained from President Eisenhower assurances sought by Rhee “of moral and material support for effort with our own armed forces to repel aggressors from Korea.” Quotation is from Rhee letter on July 9,3 Paek stating that although Robertson informed Rhee that US Government is unable go beyond assurances in US July 2 aide-mémoire4 that on withdrawal of US and Korean delegations from political conference “thereafter US Government would consult” with Republic of Korea to determine what next, Robertson had nevertheless informed Rhee that latter’s desire for additional [Page 1405] more specific assurances would be discussed with President Eisenhower. Rhee now desires to know whether any assurances will be forthcoming from President Eisenhower on this point. Parenthetically, Department will recognize that Harrison’s alleged statement to effect that UNC will not support Republic of Korea army in violation of armistice, to which alleged statement Pyun and Paek object, is closely related to Rhee’s desire for assurances of US support precisely in the circumstances of violation of armistice by Republic of Korea Government after withdrawal from political conference. This was stressed by Prime Minister and Pyun as “most important point of all,” implication being that unless US commitment to help Korea go back to fighting is now forthcoming, Rhee government will tear up results of RheeRobertson conversations.
2.
Mutual Defense Treaty. Paek declared Robertson promised to find out whether “Rhee draft” that is, text accompanying Rhee’s letter of July 9, would be acceptable to US. In that connection I reminded them of statement in Robertson’s letter of July 11 [10]5 that it would probably be better to follow draft which had already been shown to and had received support of Senate leaders. Nevertheless, two Ministers said Rhee “prefers his draft” and they desire to know whether further discussion in Washington can encourage Rhee to expect favorable results.
3.
Activities of NNRC and Objection to Entry of Indian Troops Into Republic of Korea. According to aforesaid Communist July 19 statement, General Harrison was quoted as stating that NNRC would function in accordance with armistice agreement and that “any personnel thereof authorized to enter Republic of Korea in conformity with armistice agreement will be protected.” Two Ministers desire clarification by General Harrison to make clear NNRC will not enter Republic of Korea, but that prisoners will be sent to demilitarized zone. They also complained that letter from General Clark (referred to in numbered paragraph 4 of Robertson’s letter of July 8)6 has not been received with reference to Korean and Chinese anti-Communist prisoners.
4.
Economic Aid. Prime Minister made lengthy statement complaining that Tasca mission recommendations have not been implemented and that with Congress shortly adjourning no appreciable aid will be forthcoming. Paek implied that is in contravention of US commitments.

As Department will readily understand, atmosphere of meeting was far from pleasant and Pyun’s remarks on several occasions appeared deliberately insulting with respect Robertson’s good faith and latter’s alleged statements to Rhee. Pyun’s threats to torpedo armistice were unequivocal and reflect not only his deep-seated opposition to armistice [Page 1406] per se but his apparent eagerness to engage in reckless last-minute attempt make armistice impossible. Unfortunately, this morning it was Pyun rather than Prime Minister who was calling shots although latter finally agreed that public Republic of Korea statement (which Pyun and OPI director Karl Hong-ki were apparently drafting on my arrival) repudiating Rhee commitment not to obstruct armistice would be deferred until reply received to their four-point inquiry. They also wish to know whether “clarifications” will be made by Harrison.

I did not permit Pyun’s statements to go unchallenged and I likewise sought to bring Prime Minister to realization of where following Pyun is likely to lead Republic of Korea Government and people. Throughout most of the conversation however, Pyun seemed to have upper hand over Prime Minister and at end of meeting which lasted 90 minutes they went to call on Rhee, who is reportedly indisposed.

Briggs
  1. Received at 3:31 a.m. on July 21.
  2. A text of that statement is in telegram ZX 37213, Clark to JCS, July 19, 1953, not printed. (Matthews files, lot 55 D 413)
  3. Ante, p. 1357.
  4. For text, see Army message 021750Z from Seoul, July 3, p. 1312.
  5. Not printed, but see footnote 3, p. 1374.
  6. Transmitted in telegram 31 from Seoul, July 8, p. 1352.