Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Eisenhower Library, Eisenhower papers, Whitman file

Memorandum of Discussion at the 156th Meeting of the National Security Council Thursday, July 23, 1953¹

top secret
eyes only

July 23, 1953

Present at the 156th Meeting of the Council were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Deputy Secretary of Defense; the Director for Mutual Security; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Secretary of the Interior (for Item 1); the Secretary of Commerce (for Item 1); the Secretary of the Navy (for Item 1); the Director, Bureau of the Budget; the United States Representative to the United Nations (for Item 5); the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; Mr. Cutler, Special Assistant to the President; Mr. Jackson, Special Assistant to the President; Col. Carroll, Acting White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants. Also present, for Item 1 only, were: J. A. La-Fortune, Petroleum Administration for Defense; W. G. Donley, Petroleum Administration for Defense; Robert B. Murray, Jr., Department of Commerce; Louis S. Rothschild, Maritime Administrator; Commander J. J. Mooney, Maritime Administration; Robert L. Finley, Office of Defense Mobilization.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion on items 1. “A National Petroleum Program”, 2. “Continental Defense”, and 3. “Significant World Developments Affecting U.S. Security”.]

4. The Situation in Korea

General Bradley briefed the Council on the changes in the military situation in Korea. He noted particularly, in concluding his briefing, that it was difficult to assess the significance of the recent Chinese Communist attacks in strength against United Nations forces.

The President then said he wished to discuss the possibility of a general offensive by the Chinese Communists. He felt that U.S. forces in Korea and in Japan should be reinforced at once. If we continued the U.S. build-up in the Far East, all we could lose would be the cost of transporting the reinforcements, and we might save a good deal if the Chinese Communists decided to attack.

Secretary Dulles said we would be in trouble if we didn’t move reinforcements fast, because the armistice would probably be concluded in 24 or 48 hours, and thereafter we would be unable to reinforce our armies in Korea. He was worried about the situation because the Chinese Communists could so easily provoke an incident, even after the armistice, and could launch a strong attack against us. Secretary Dulles added that if there is no armistice, the fighting will continue; if there is an armistice, fighting may be resumed, so that in any event it would be to our advantage to build up our military strength in the Far East.

General Bradley said that ships were being assembled for moving a Marine division from the United States.

The President said that we should start the Marines for Japan and other reinforcements for Korea this afternoon if possible. He said he would put two divisions in Japan right away. He thought it would be foolish to pinch pennies in a matter of this kind. He added that we might ask the British to send an additional brigade from Suez to the Far East.

Secretary Kyes asked whether the President was under the impression that the Department of Defense did not want to send reinforcements to the Far East. The President answered in the affirmative.

The President then turned to the question of sending an airborne division, and asked, what do we have troops for?

General Bradley said he would be opposed to taking the 82nd Airborne out of the United States. He said other divisions in the United States were under strength, and it would be difficult to maintain rotation if they were sent.

The President felt we should send at least one of the under-strength divisions, on the theory that the fighting will stop and that the training of that division could be completed in the Far East. He also felt that the period of service before rotation should be increased after the fighting stops.

Mr. Cutler said that the record would show what the President was directing.

The President said he was not directing anything; he detested the idea of a person twenty thousand miles away running a war. However, he did think the armistice might be a dangerous hoax, and he felt we should tell General Clark that the Marine division would proceed to the Far East immediately, and that another division would be embarked soon. We should also tell General Clark that in our view he should, without violating the terms of an armistice if one was achieved, have the strongest possible force deployed in South Korea or make his forces in Japan ready for prompt transfer to Korea. General Clark could be relied upon to do the rest.

Secretary Kyes inquired about publicity in connection with these moves.

The President said it would not be necessary to announce these moves, because the newspaper men could find it out for themselves.

Secretary Kyes and Mr. Stassen then asked about a build-up in air strength in the Far East.

. . . . . . .

Secretary Kyes agreed that our atomic capabilities must be used against the Chinese Communists if the armistice is violated.

Mr. Allen Dulles said that recent intelligence supports the President’s apprehension as to the possibility of a Chinese Communist offensive.

The Secretary of State said that the Chinese Communist build-up which had been observed could be for any one of three purposes: One, to strengthen the Chinese Communist position in the armistice negotiations; two, to enable them to attack if the armistice is not signed; three, to enable them to attack later on the basis of a manufactured incident if they so desire. However, Secretary Dulles’ conclusion was that the Chinese Communists would probably sign the armistice and not attack just now.

Both Secretary Kyes and Mr. Allen Dulles noted that some intelligence indications pointed to August 26 as the date of a general offensive by the Chinese Communists.

The President said he had not heard anything like this before.

Secretary Humphrey asked whether U.S. reinforcements en route to Korea could continue to their destination if an armistice was signed.

General Bradley said if they did continue to their destination the Chinese Communists would maintain that we had violated the armistice.

The President said the best course might be to get our reinforcements in Japan ready to move to South Korea in case of need.

The National Security Council:²

a. Discussed the subject in the light of an oral briefing by the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, on the military situation in Korea.

b. Noted the President’s desire that the Commander in Chief, United Nations Command, be informed of:

(1) The Council’s apprehension as to possibilities of an enemy offensive if an armistice is not promptly achieved or of incidents leading to further hostilities in the event of an armistice.

(2) The Council’s view, in the light of (1) above, that General Clark should, without violating the terms of an armistice if one is achieved, have the strongest possible force from his command deployed in South Korea, or make his forces in Japan ready for prompt transfer to South Korea.

(3) The reinforcements which are being dispatched to the Far East from the United States.

(4) The President’s request for a general estimate of the situation by General Clark, with especial reference to any required augmentation of forces.

c. Noted the President’s view that we might attempt to obtain an additional British brigade for Korea.

d. Noted the President’s desire that there be no publicity regarding the above actions.

Note: The action in b above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of Defense for implementation. The action in c above subsequently transmitted to the Secretary of State for information.

5. Additional United Nations Forces for Korea (Memos for NSC from Executive Secretary, same subject, dated June 1, June 15³ and July 17, 1953;⁴ NSC Actions Nos. 759–b and 835⁵)

Mr. Cutler introduced the subject by presenting a report prepared by the Special Committee constituted pursuant to NSC Action No. 835–c, with the assistance of Ambassador Lodge. Mr. Cutler noted that the report contained a new formula for reimbursement for logistic support, but that the Department of Defense has entered a dissent and proposed an alternate formula.

Ambassador Lodge said the new formula proposed by the Committee was entirely satisfactory provided it was implemented enthusiastically. He agreed with the Department of Defense view that the military units sent to Korea should be effective units, but felt that many of the Defense arguments were unsound. He believed U.S. troops fighting in Korea should get as much support from other nations as possible.

In answer to the argument that the present policy was already broad enough, Ambassador Lodge remarked that nothing had happened; that is, we had not obtained enough troop contributions from other members of the United Nations. As a result, the United Nations as an organization was being subjected to severe criticism in certain quarters in the United States.

The President felt that paragraph 3 of the new formula should refer to nations not able to provide for logistic support rather than to those not willing to provide for logistic support.

Mr. Cutler asked, what if a nation is able but not willing to provide for logistic support?

The President said that such nation would not be doing its duty under the UN Charter.

Secretary Dulles asked whether the new formula was to be applied retroactively.

The President said he would not mind applying it retroactively if the problem was thereby simplified. However, we might have protests from some nations if we made the new formula retroactive.

Mr. Cutler suggested that State, Treasury and Defense might decide whether the new formula would be retroactive in such case, and might also establish the effective date of the new formula.

The President said he would ask the Attorney General for a legal opinion, in accordance with paragraph 3–b of the reference memorandum of July 17. However, the President wanted the Attorney General to find legal support for the new formula after the conclusion of a treaty of peace in Korea, and also in the period between an armistice and the conclusion of such a treaty of peace. He did not want a legal opinion which said that we couldn’t do anything under the new formula. He did not want other UN forces to be pulled out so that we would be compelled to put additional U.S. troops in Korea as replacements.

With reference to paragraph 4, on page 4 of the Special Committee’s report, the President noted that Ambassador Lodge would have no means of determining the capabilities of troop units which other nations might furnish. His job would be to needle people. The President also felt that the Department of Defense should have the principal responsibility for determining the desirability of a troop contribution which another UN member proposed to make. All we have to do is say to Defense, “Don’t be hardboiled; there is a little flexibility in this policy.” The President also felt that the last sentence of paragraph 4–c was unnecessary and should be deleted.

Secretary Dulles said that consultation between the Departments of State and Defense would be necessary on the desirability of proposed troop contributions, and the President agreed with this view.

The National Security Council:⁶

a. Discussed the subject in the light of the reference memorandum of July 17, 1953.

b. Adopted the following new formula regarding reimbursement for U.S. logistic support of other UN forces in Korea:

• “1. The United States desires to obtain and retain the maximum contributions of effective manpower from the nations allied with it in the effort of the United Nations to repel aggression in Korea.
• “2. In principle, each such nation should, to the extent that it is able, either equip and supply its own forces or pay for such military equipment, supplies and services as may be furnished to it by the United States.
• “3. The overriding consideration, however, should be the maximum contribution of effective manpower. When any such nation is willing to contribute effective manpower but not able to provide for logistic support, the Department of Defense should furnish to such nation military equipment, supplies, and services; without requirement of payment to the extent that the Department of State, in consultation with the Departments of Treasury and Defense, may determine such nation cannot be reasonably expected to pay.
• “4. A nation capable of contributing money beyond the support of any forces furnished by it, should be encouraged also to contribute toward the logistic support of the forces of other nations.
• “5. Except when the manpower furnished by any such nation is additional to forces already furnished by it, the contribution should be in effective military units as determined by the Department of Defense.”

c. Agreed that the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense should jointly fix the effective date of the above new formula and decide whether it should be made retroactive in any case.

d. Noted the President’s desire that Colombia should not at this time be pressed for payment for U.S. logistic support furnished to date.

e. Noted that the President would request the Attorney General for a legal opinion in accordance with paragraph 3–b of the reference memorandum of July 17, 1953.

f. Adopted the procedures for implementation of the new formula contained in paragraphs 4–a and –b of the reference memorandum of July 17, 1953, and revised the procedure proposed in paragraph 4–c to read as follows:

“When a nation has signified the contribution of military forces which it considers itself capable of making, the desirability of such troop contribution will be determined by the Department of Defense in consultation with the Department of State.”

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently circulated by memorandum to the Council and referred to the appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.

6. Savings in Defense Expenditures in the Event of a Korean Armistice

Mr. Cutler read a report by the Department of Defense, dated July 10, 1953,⁷ which indicated that $1.2 billion in Defense expenditures might be saved during the twelve months following a Korean armistice. These savings were divided as follows: Personnel, $125 million; Maintenance and Operation, $500 million; Procurement (mostly ammunition), $565 million. These figures, it was indicated, were very rough estimates.

Ambassador Lodge hoped that no publicity would be issued on the money saved and the men not drafted as a result of a Korean armistice.

The President agreed, and went on to indicate that he was opposed to any attempt by Congress to reduce expenditures by one billion or a half billion dollars because our expenses in Korea would be less after an armistice. He hoped to get through Congress a resolution authorizing the President to use any savings resulting from the Korean armistice for mutual security expenditures. The President said that we must get the Korean people to believing in us and not quite so much in Mr. Rhee.

The National Security Council:⁸

Noted a report by the Department of Defense, July 10, 1953, as read by Mr. Cutler, stating a rough estimate of annual financial savings which might result from a Korean armistice.

7. Strengthening the Korean Economy (NSC 156⁹ and NSC 156/1;¹⁰ NSC Action No. 828¹¹)

Mr. Cutler introduced NSC 156/1, consisting of recommendations by the NSC Planning Board based on the appended report by a special committee on the Tasca Report.

Mr. Stassen said that the Department of Defense and MSA could probably cooperate in providing funds for the expanded program of economic assistance to Korea recommended in NSC 156/1.

Secretary Kyes thought it was important to get moving at once on this problem.

The President said he would like to use any money actually saved in Defense expenditures as the result of an armistice, to expand economic assistance to Korea. He remarked that all the world would be watching Korea after the armistice, so we should set a purposeful objective for ourselves, quit dallying, and go forward rapidly.

Mr. Stassen suggested that the President might go to Congress and ask for the authority to use savings resulting from an armistice for the purpose of expanding our assistance to Korea.

The President said this was a good idea. Moreover, he would like to start distributing food in Korea immediately upon the signing of an armistice.¹²

Secretary Dulles said he would like to be able to tell President Rhee that President Eisenhower would recommend to Congress, immediately upon the conclusion of an armistice, the initiation of an expanded program of economic assistance to Korea along the lines of the Tasca Report. The President said this was OK.

Mr. Stassen asked whether we intended to support 20 ROK divisions or 14. He asked this question because the number of Korean divisions had an important impact upon the Korean economy.

The President said that in view of the need for military strength in the Far East, he thought we should aim for 20 ROK divisions, although, of course, if confidence grew after a period of time, this number might be reduced. But for the present, he said, it would be indefensible to send more U.S. troops to the Far East and not obtain the maximum number of Korean divisions.

The National Security Council:¹³

a. Adopted the recommendations contained in paragraphs 5 through 7 of NSC 156/1.

b. Agreed that the Director for Mutual Security, the Secretaries of State, the Treasury, and Defense, and the Director of the Bureau of the Budget (utilizing the Special Committee established under NSC Action No. 828–b), should work out the legislation and financing to carry out these recommendations within currently projected appropriations for FY 1954, including:

(1) A Presidential request, immediately following an armistice, for Congressional authority to utilize savings resulting from the armistice for an expanded program of economic assistance to the Republic of Korea.

(2) A plan to provide for the immediate distribution of food to the Republic of Korea in the event of an armistice.

c. Noted that the President authorized the Secretary of State to advise the President of the Republic of Korea that the President will recommend to Congress, immediately upon the conclusion of an armistice, the initiation of an expanded program of economic assistance to the Republic of Korea along the general lines of the recommendations of the mission headed by Mr. Henry J. Tasca.

Note: The above actions, as approved by the President, subsequently referred to the appropriate departments and agencies for implementation.¹⁴

[Here follows discussion on items 8. “Transfer to the Chinese Nationalist Government of Light U.S. Naval Ships”, 9. “Project Solarium”, and 10. “NSC Status of Projects”.]

Marion W. Boggs

1. This memorandum was drafted by Marion W. Boggs, Coordinator, NSC Planning Board Assistants, on July 24.
2. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 857, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.
3. Ante, pp. 1129 and 1177, respectively.
4. This memorandum transmitted the report of July 17 by the Special Committee constituted by the NSC; for text, see p. 1394.
5. For NSC Action No. 759, see the memorandum of discussion at the 139th meeting of the NSC, Apr. 8, p. 892; for NSC Action No. 835, see paragraph 1 of the report of the Special Committee, p. 1395.
6. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 858, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.
7. Not printed.
8. The following paragraph constituted NSC Action No. 859, a record copy of which can be found in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.
9. NSC 156 is attached to a note by Lay to the NSC, June 23, p. 1244.
10. Dated July 17, p. 1384.
11. In NSC Action No. 828, June 25, 1953, the Council noted the Tasca Report, referred it to the NSC Planning Board for preparation of recommendations based upon study by a Special Committee, and agreed that implementation should be deferred until the situation in Korea was clarified. (S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95)
12. According to a letter from Dulles to Stassen, July 25, 1953, Mutual Security Program funds of $9 million (to be subsequently repaid by Defense) were to be earmarked to provide emergency food relief in South Korea, thus covering any gap between signature of the armistice and enactment of legislation on aid to Korea by Congress. (895B.49/7–2553)
13. The following paragraphs and note constituted NSC Action No. 860, a record copy of which is in S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) files, lot 66 D 95.
14. In telegram 58 to Seoul, July 23, 1953, Dulles (who drafted the message) asked Briggs to advise Rhee that he had just come from a conference with President Eisenhower and his principal advisers where it had been agreed that, immediately upon signature of the armistice, Eisenhower would ask Congress for authorizations necessary to get started along the lines of the Tasca Report. Dulles anticipated favorable Congressional action before adjournment. (895B.00/7–2353)