Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, Korea, Volume XV, Part 2

Matthews files, lot 53 D 413: Telegram

The Commander in Chief, Far East (Clark) to the Joint Chiefs of Staff

top secret
emergency

Tokyo, July 25, 1953—1:35 a.m.

CX 63963. Refs: A. CX 62932.¹ B. C 63854.² C. DA 91688.³ D CX 63926.⁴

1. Harrison reports that all outstanding matters have been settled with the exception of the signing procedures.⁵ During the Liaison Officers meetings yesterday and today concerned with the signing procedures, the Communists have proposed as counter proposals to our method contained in ref A three different methods of accomplishing this signing. Each of these Commie proposals is listed below as a course of action:

a. Course A—The essential elements of this course are:

(1) After all versions of the armistice agreement are ready, they are delivered to Supreme Commanders of both sides to be signed at their respective headquarters.

(2) The signed documents are sent to Panmunjom where the senior delegates of both sides preside over the signing and countersign the documents.

(3) This completes all procedures for signing the armistice agreement.

b. Course B—The essential elements of this course are:

(1) The commanders of both sides authorize their senior delegates to hold the signing ceremony first.

(2) The documents will then be delivered to the commanders of both sides for their signatures at their respective headquarters.

(3) The armistice will become effective 12 hours after the signing of the agreements by the senior delegates at Panmunjom.

c. Course C—The essential elements of this course are:

(1) To have the signing performed at Panmunjom with the commanders present under the following restrictions:

(a) That no ROK representatives be present.

(b) No press witness the signing other than 10 official photographers from each side, although press could be in the immediate area outside the building.

(c) 100 official observers from each side.

(d) Not to exceed 350 people from each side in the conference site area. This total would include press.

(2) Although there is no expressed agreement to this effect, in the record of today’s Liaison Officers meeting the implication is clear that the Communist commanders will be present if the above listed conditions are met and Murray (Senior Liaison Officer) and Harrison accept it as a fact.

2. My comments on course A follow:

I commented on this procedure in para 3 of ref B. Course A, when compared with the other two, would delay the cease-fire 24 hours to 48 hours (time required to move documents back and forth on UNC side; time required for Communists not known), resulting in inexcusable casualties and additional time for Rhee to attempt to obstruct the armistice. When compared with course C, however, it has the distinct advantage of allowing the press to observe, witness and report the signing of the necessary documents. In addition, it permits the press, subject to final concurrence by the Communists (and I do not consider objection likely) to observe the countersigning of the documents at Panmunjom. As the press interest in the signing is tremendous, the press reaction to the course of action would be highly favorable.

3. My comments on course B follow:

a. Advantages:

(1) Could be effected in consonance with instructions contained in para 1c and d of ref C.

(2) Would permit signing of armistice with an absolute minimum of delay, thereby preventing needless UNC casualties and elimination public criticism that would arise out of casualties suffered during longer period required by course A.

(3) Would reduce the possibility of Communist propaganda implying that the UN commander was forced to journey to Korea to ask the Commies for a cease-fire, with resulting loss of prestige for the UNC and the United Nations throughout the world and particularly in Asia.

(4) Though this has not been determined the Communists would probably offer no objection to complete coverage of original signing of documents by senior delegates at Panmunjom. The press interest might be sustained and the world wide interest continued by the additional press coverage of the CINC, UNC, actually signing the documents in Tokyo, thus making them official and binding. However, this latter signing will be somewhat an anticlimax as it will occur after the signing on which the cease-fire is based and may not evoke much press interest.

b. The disadvantages of this course of action are somewhat similar to those listed under course A and include:

(1) Reasons given by the Communists are extremely weak and insufficient to escape the moral obligations of the commanders to sign in person.

(2) Denies the UNC and the world the opportunity to witness Communist commanders signatures to this vital document thus leaving in doubt the legality of the signatures of these commanders.

(3) It is an indication that they still have mental reservations concerning the definite assurances given them.

(4) The document to be signed is of such importance that it warrants simultaneous signing by the commanders themselves.

(5) The absence of the senior commanders would preclude attendance by Senior Military Representatives of national components of the UNC, since the latter would prefer not to participate in a signing ceremony where the Communist participants were junior to them.

4. My comments on course C follow:

a. Before considering this course, it was necessary that I first determine whether Pres Rhee desired to have a ROK observer present to witness the signing. Failure to give Rhee an opportunity to express his desires in this matter would provide him with an opportunity to castigate the UNC with charges of non-confidence and non-cooperation which would be difficult to refute and which would find considerable acceptance in the United States and elsewhere.

b. Therefore, in order to determine Rhee’s desires, I had Taylor contact him in Seoul this evening. Taylor informed me that, after considerable delay, Rhee declined the invitation to send a representative to the signing ceremony, alleging that he had not received from Washington answers and assurances which he considers satisfactory. A major obstacle to course C was thus removed as Harrison reported that the Communists were adamant in their demand that no ROK representatives be present.

c. Course C is generally in accordance with the principles advocated by the UNC and has the following advantages:

(1) It would indicate complete sanction and whole hearted support by the opposing commanders who must assume the moral responsibility for carrying out the terms of the armistice.

(2) Would result in no delay in the signing and effective date of the armistice, thereby preventing casualties which could give rise to public criticism. This has the added advantage of shortening the time during which Rhee could implement many of the obstructive tactics of which he is capable prior to the signing of an armistice, and which we hope will be largely dissipated once an armistice is presented to him as a “fait accompli”.

d. Course C has the following disadvantages:

(1) The absence of ROK representatives at Communist insistence will enable Communists further to exploit in their propaganda the differences they allege exist between UNC and ROKG and accentuate the actual existing differences.

(2) It will place UNC in the disadvantageous position of having once again accepted Communists conditions in order to achieve an early armistice.

(3) It will lay us open to strong protest and criticism from entire press corps. This course of action will provide no press coverage whatever except such pictures as photographers may shoot of official participants entering and leaving conference hall, and short statements they could extract from participants outside the conference hall and a few color stories. Press has anticipated this as biggest story of war and has assigned additional personnel and equipment. Press corps has been informed, although with qualification that all plans are subject to modification depending upon agreement between the two sides, of extensive arrangements made for press coverage, including special military communications facilities. An attempt will be made to justify this course of action with the press by emphasizing that: First, the Commies have insisted upon it as a condition to an immediate signing; second, that by accepting this condition and signing immediately, rather than insisting upon course A, above, which would entail a delay of at least two days while fighting continues, lives undoubtedly will be saved and that certainly the UNC press would concur in any course of action which would save UNC lives. It is highly doubtful, however, whether above explanation will satisfy the press corps.

5. In the absence of information to the contrary, I assume that Rhee has received all the assurances that my government intends to give him. I also assume that there is no reason to delay signing the armistice for the reasons discussed in para 6 of ref D, your comments on which have not as yet been received.

6. In summary:

a. It seems to me, and Harrison concurs, that the best procedure to follow is course C. It is the course nearest to the one we have pressed the Communists to accept. It permits consummation of an armistice at the earliest possible date. It is the logical and natural course, for it permits the commanders to sit face to face around the table and sign this important document in the presence of the principal US commanders and United Nations military representatives.

b. In view, however, of the highly unfavorable press reaction which may result from course C, I am willing to adopt course B.

7. Would appreciate your comments immediately,⁶ for we should resolve this matter with the Communists Saturday morning, 25 July, if we are to meet target signing date of 1400I—26 (Sunday) July which Harrison feels the communists can meet. However, will delay this meeting until receipt of your reply.

1. This telegram, June 9, 1953, contained the UNC outline plan for operation Finale, arrangements for signing the armistice which envisioned signature by the supreme commanders of each side at Panmunjom. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
2. According to a summary of this telegram prepared by Scott for the Secretary and Under Secretary of State on July 21, Clark reported that the Communists had proposed course A (see paragraph 1, herein) on July 20 on the grounds that since Rhee had violated the POW agreement, the presence of the supreme commanders at the signing ceremonies was unsuitable. In Clark’s mind, the Communist argument was weak, the legality of the armistice should not be diminished, and its importance was such that the supreme commanders should sign it together at Panmunjom. Therefore, he instructed Harrison to reject the proposal. (795.00/7–2153)
3. In this telegram, dated Jan. 10, 1952, G–3 forwarded guidance, premature as it turned out, for concluding the armistice. (FE files, lot 55 D 128)
4. In this telegram, June 23, 1953, Clark expressed concern, inter alia, about possible second thoughts by the Indians on their role in the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission, but stated that he would go ahead with the signing unless informed otherwise. (Matthews files, lot 53 D 413)
5. The staff officers of both sides were able to settle three of the four outstanding details concerning the armistice. In the early morning of June 23, both sides agreed to a line of demarcation and the demilitarized zone. Two days later the two sides agreed upon a procedure for each side to turn over its nonrepatriate prisoners to the Repatriation Commission in its own half of the demilitarized zone. The functioning of the Military Armistice Commission was left to the Commission itself. In its first meeting, the day after the armistice was signed, the Commission would begin to determine its own method of operation. (Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, pp. 484–487)
6. In Telegram JCS 944601, a joint State–Defense message, dated July 24 due to the time difference between Tokyo and Washington, the JCS authorized Clark to agree to a signing procedure along the lines of course C, but with a strong effort to include members of the press as observers. If unable to obtain this modification, Clark should proceed to sign the armistice. (Matthews files, Lot 53 D 413)