396.1–GE/3–2554: Telegram
The Ambassador in Korea (Briggs) to the Department of State
priority
940. Repeated information priority Tokyo 574. Tokyo pass CINCUNC. Substance Deptel 756, March 25,1 conveyed to President Rhee and Foreign Minister Pyun this afternoon at meeting which featured lengthy restatement by President of ROK position. This concluded by Rhee’s asking me thank Secretary on his behalf and to say ROK’s attitude toward Geneva attendance still undecided. As to possibility mentioned Department’s telegram that Rhee perhaps unfamiliar Secretary’s March 17 letter to Pyun,2 it quickly became apparent that President fully informed both as to contents Secretary’s letter and of Pyun’s further letter March 23 (Embtel 930).
Following my presentation of contents Department’s telegram Rhee asked if I would provide him and Pyun with memorandum confirming certain statements made. Memorandum based on fact [last?] two paragraphs Deptel 756 has accordingly been furnished.
As to pre-conference consultation, Rhee and Pyun now understand we are not prepared engage therein until ROK has decided attend conference. This useful point to clarify. It also paves way for us to begin discussions with other allies without further delay should we desire do so. As to Pyun’s going to Washington (assuming affirmative ROK decision on attendance), Pyun remains reluctant and unconvinced, and he reiterated matters ought to be susceptible of handling by discussion through Embassy Seoul. (Please see Embtel 931, March 24; memorandum based on Deptel 756 will I hope be useful in this connection).
Rhee then made long, somewhat rambling, statement recapitulating his letter March 11 to President3 after which he characterized President’s reply as rejection of Korean views in almost every particular and hence “terribly disappointing.” He noted one exception was statement US still studying Korean alternative proposal re additional ROK divisions; Rhee said that while that pending it might be difficult for him make up his mind on what to do. He declared Korea faces tragic future with no assurance of support by her allies in event of Geneva Conference failure. (What Rhee apparently means is this. He doubts whether conference will unify Korea; we have declined give him assurance of support in seeking unification by forcible means following failure of conference; he regards truncated [garble] possible [Page 56] situation and hence [garble] defeat; therefore he discounts value of assurance to come to his support, that is rescue, only if attacked.)
As to “saving Asiatic perimeter” as Rhee put it, he spoke pessimistically in regard to future of “Korean free world foothold in Asia”, of Japan, and of Indochina which he declares “free world is now losing”. Finally Rhee referred several times to “US mistake” in not fighting Korean war to victorious conclusion. For him armistice still remains root of evil from which he continues doubt any good can grow.
At conclusion of meeting [Rhee?] stated he and Pyun would discuss situation in light of information I had conveyed to them but for present he unable say whether his government will attend Geneva Conference.