396.1–GE/4–654: Telegram
The Secretary of State to the Embassy in Korea
secret
priority
priority
Washington, April 7, 1954—3:40
p.m.
792. Your 982 and 985.1 Secretary wishes you acknowledge his receipt Pyun’s letter April 6 and convey in writing to Pyun earliest opportunity following:
- 1.
- Views in April 6 letter were subject several exchange letters between Secretary and Pyun and President and Rhee. Secretary believes previous responses questions Pyun raised earlier fully presented Secretary’s views on points now raised.
- 2.
- There will be no neutrals in discussion of Korean question at Geneva.
- 3.
- Korea and Indo-China questions will be treated independently. Participants Indo-China phase not even decided yet.
- 4.
- Participants in Korea Conference identical those contemplated by Rhee and Secretary in conversations last August, providing a [Page 76] clear-cut Conference between two sides involved in fighting. Procedure on invitation demonstrates two-sided nature Conference. Soviet Union not “sponsoring power” so far as ROK and nations with forces under UNC concerned. Important to U.S. and ROK that Soviet Union be present at Conference fully sharing responsibility for progress and outcome—a principle ROK, U.S., and Allies stood for at Panmunjom.
- 5.
- Defendants at Conference are Communist aggressors and not ROK. Secretary made that clear publicly.
- 6.
- Purpose of Conference to obtain by peaceful means political unification of long suffering people whose country divided by intransigence Communist aggressor. This is the position U.S. will take at Conference.
- 7.
- Although Conference two-sided in fact, rather than round table, Secretary emphasizes strongly no nation represented our side bound by any decision it does not fully endorse. Each nation has complete freedom decision. U.S. could take no other position at this Conference and would not expect contrary of any other nation.
- 8.
- Regret in final period before Korean Conference U.S. and ROK not combining take lead in working out with Allies Conference organization, tactics and strategy. Many questions now arising on which ROK should express views with 16. On battlefield U.S. and ROK stood shoulder to shoulder in repelling aggressor, against greater odds and with larger risks than face at Conference. Now, in diplomatic field, ROK silence difficult for free world understand and compels U.S. proceed in firming up position on Korean question without chief partner. Hope not much longer without assistance from Korean friends through close partnership in seeking Korean independence and unification at Conference. Solidarity in support of ROK demonstrated by U.S. and UN whose nations gave up lives in recent bloody past deserves ROK confidence at Conference.
- 9.
- As to assurances of means counterbalance enemy buildup, President’s reply Rhee’s letter made clear U.S. position.2 As President then stated “The real sanction against Communist aggression in Korea is the knowledge which is conveyed in the 16 power joint policy declaration and our Mutual Defense Treaty when it comes into force”. President also reemphasized to Rhee our “readiness and capacity to react instantly if the Communist forces renew hostilities”.
- 10.
- ROK must make its own decision as to participation in Conference. President and Secretary both indicated hope ROK would [Page 77] attend this Conference in which ROK has so much at stake. Secretary assures Pyun that U.S., whether ROK attends or not, will go Conference, determined press consistently and vigorously to achieve agreement on common objectives of U.S. and ROK—the independence and unity of a free Korea.
- 11.
- U.S. views on the ROK request for military buildup will be available by early next week.
For your information: While far from meeting ROK demands NSC decision on matter may afford ROK at least some slight modicum of satisfaction, when all factors fully explained ROK.3
Dulles