Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/4–1454: Circular Telegram

The Acting Secretary of State to Certain Diplomatic Offices¹

secret

Washington, April 14, 1954—3:43 p.m.

362. At meeting April 13 of countries that have accepted invitation participate Geneva Conference, group was given briefing on current military situation in Korea, including estimate Communist capabilities, and intelligence estimate overall Communist objectives. Unlikelihood of Communists accepting any proposals dislodging them from Korea emphasized.

Recalling bases from Geneva Conference in Armistice Agreement and Berlin Communiqué, Johnson expressed confidence allies agreed primary purpose Geneva to seek Korean unification on terms that would not result in turning over Korea to Communists, thus losing at Conference what we fought so long to prevent. He emphasized following objectives:

(1) maintain position of strength and stability in free Korea taking account ROK fear of abandonment, not causing confusion, weakening of morale or strong public opposition within ROK; (2) maintain constitutional framework ROK state and, to greatest extent possible, validity of past UN resolutions; (3) maintain united front at Conference, despite mechanical difficulties of coordinating position in fastmoving conference situation with number of participants, which would require study; (4) determine whether Communists willing surrender control over any part Korea, or if not, unmask Communist intentions; (5) emerge from Conference in strong moral and political position by presenting proposals commending themselves to world opinion and which, if rejected by Communists, will demonstrate Communist responsibility for Conference failure.

Basic considerations underlying allied position at Conference enumerated:

(1) Communists would do utmost broaden discussions on deceptive lines (e.g. general Far East security pact) and allies must keep Conference to basic issues; (2) allied proposals must take into consideration fundamental interests and position ROK in future unification since without ROK endorsement and support, proposals or agreements will be ineffective and invalid; (3) ROK is sovereign independent state, not pawn; (4) any proposals put forward must (a) preserve framework of legitimacy, sovereignty and integrity ROK State in principle, (b) emphasize interrupted UN efforts since 1947 establish Korean independence and unity, (c) give voice to views of overwhelming majority Koreans, and (d) not equate ROK with North Korean regime. Johnson emphasized substantial differences between Korean situation and Germany so that German unification plans not rigidly applicable as precedent for Korea.

US believed proposals in general spirit UN plans for Korean unification (GA Resolutions Nov 14, 1947; Dec 12, 1948;² Oct 7, 1950; Dec 1, 1950; and Aug 28, 1953) should be submitted at outset. Principal points those resolutions were:

(1) frequent UN attempts assist Koreans in reestablishing their freedom; (2) reestablishment national independence Korea and withdrawal foreign forces thereafter; (3) elections on basis of adult suffrage by secret ballot, numbers of representatives from voting districts proportionate to population, and elections to be observed by international commission with freedom observe and consult throughout Korea; (4) ROK is only lawful sovereign government in Korea so far as UN concerned; and (5) UN has in existence Commission to carry out terms of reference Korean unification established in Oct 7, 1950 GA resolution and agency to rehabilitate unified Korea.

Johnson noted two unification plans generally suggested: (1) carry forward plan within existing UN framework; or (2) start from scratch by holding elections throughout Korea for constituent Assembly to form new government. US favored position conforming to UN resolutions. This would mean elections under international observation in those parts of Korea where UN not previously able observe elections and within framework ROK constitution. Such a plan would not necessitate destroying present ROK constitutional structure and would avoid misunderstanding, turmoil and administrative disorganization within Korea. Johnson cautioned that in considering initial allied position at Geneva important that group not now bargain proposals down between selves to point no flexibility remaining for negotiation with Communists at Geneva. In plan such as US favored, he envisaged phased withdrawal troops from both sides under international supervision but withdrawal would not be completed until after elections held and unification implemented. Important no withdrawal begin until performance at least started by other side. In answer to questions he agreed possible bargaining range within above position lay in extending elections from only North Korea to all Korea, while still preserving ROK constitution. Also pointed out that of course new all-Korean Assembly could amend ROK Constitution.

Johnson said our estimate success achieving this proposal not very high, depending naturally upon whether Communists willing see non-Communist Korea. If they are, formula can be found; if not no formula can overcome this fact.

UK representative expressed view his government would largely agree with above proposal, putting great deal stress its flexible aspects. Several mentioned importance avoiding impression North Korea would be placed under South Korea.

In answer inquiry re probable ROK attitude Johnson said US assumed ROK would want (1) complete withdrawal CCF forces; (2) extension ROK administration North Korea; (3) elections NK to fill vacant seats ROK Assembly.

Group also discussed alternative methods sharing allied costs. Several emphasized importance separating Korean from Indochinese expenses. Johnson said US continued favor plan by which US, UK and France would share 50%, and other thirteen would divide remaining 50% equally. Several expressed preference for adoption UN scale, which Johnson said unacceptable to US since would mean US pay approximately 56%. No decision.³

Smith

1. Sent to the Embassies in Addis Ababa, Ankara, Athens, Bangkok, Bogotá, Brussels, Canberra, London, Manila, Moscow, Ottawa, Paris, Seoul, The Hague, Tokyo, and Wellington; the Legation in Luxembourg; the U.S. Mission at the United Nations in New York; and by air pouch to Geneva and Capetown, with the following added for Capetown only:

   “South Africa was not invited to meeting in order avoid embarrassment with ROK, neither country having accepted invitation to Geneva Conference. However in subsequent interview same day with South African Ambassador, Johnson covered above material.”

2. Text in Yearbook of the United Nations, 1948–49, p. 290.
3. On the same day, the Department of State suggested that the Embassy in Ankara inform the Turkish Foreign Ministry of the acceptability to the 16 nations of Adnan Kural as Secretary General of the Allied side at the Geneva Conference (telegram 1150 to Ankara; 396.1–GE/4–754). Kural was a Director General in the Turkish Foreign Ministry, and the United States had taken the initiative in proposing him for the position.