Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, The Geneva Conference, Volume XVI

396.1–GE/4–2054

Memorandum of Conversation, by Elizabeth Brown of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs

confidential

[Washington,] April 20, 1954.

Subject:

• Special Briefing Meeting, April 20, 1954

Participants:

• Australia—Ambassador Spender
• Mr. Allen, Second Secretary
• Belgium—Ambassador Silvercruys
• Mr. Muller, Second Secretary
• Canada—Ambassador Heeney
• Mr. Campbell, Second Secretary
• Colombia—Ambassador Zuleta
• Dr. Chaves, Counselor
• Ethiopia—Ambassador Deressa
• France—Mr. deJuniac, Minister
• Mr. Pelletier, Second Secretary
• Great Britain—Ambassador Makins
• Mr. Scott, Minister
• Greece—Ambassador Politis
• Mr. Cavalierato, Counselor
• Korea—Mr. Han, First Secretary
• Netherlands—Ambassador van Roijen
• Mr. van Baarda, First Secretary
• New Zealand—Ambassador Munro
• Mr. Laking, Minister
• Mr. Wade, First Secretary
• Philippines—Mr. Abello, Minister
• Thailand—Ambassador Sarasin
• Mr. Snidvongs, Second Secretary
• Luxembourg—Mr. Le Gallais, EE and MP
• South Africa—Ambassador Jooste
• Mr. Hamilton, Counselor
• Turkey—Ambassador Erkin
• Cambodia—Ambassador Nong Kimny
• Laos—Mr. Souvannavong, Minister
• Viet Nam—Ambassador Van Kha
• Mr. Tran, Second Secretary
• United States—Mr. Dulles, S
• Mr. Johnson, Geneva Coordinator
• Mr. Key, UNA
• Mr. McCardle, P
• Mr. Robertson, FE
• Mr. Young, NA
• Mr. Jones, NA
• Mr. Van Hollen, S/S
• Mr. Capella, FE
• Mr. Allen, EUR
• Mr. Henkin, UNP
• Mr. McClurkin, NA
• Mr. Fierst, UNA
• Mr. Sisco, UNA
• Miss Brown, UNP

The Secretary said that he very much appreciated this opportunity to meet to discuss the problems of the Geneva Conference in relation both to Korea and Indochina. He explained that he was planning to leave later in the day for Paris for a meeting of the NATO Ministerial Council and planned to go to Geneva April 24.

Mr. Dulles began by pointing out a number of practical problems which would have to be resolved at the outset of the Conference. These involved such matters as seating arrangements, chairmanship, languages and a mass of similar procedural problems that had not yet been settled and which he supposed would not in fact be settled until the very eve of the conference.¹

The Secretary recalled that at the Berlin Conference many such problems remained unsettled until just before the session actually convened when he had spent a few minutes alone talking with Mr. Molotov and agreement was reached. He pointed out that of course it was not as difficult to reach an agreement at Berlin because only four countries were involved, and although Berlin was technically not a CFM meeting, certain CFM practices could be followed. The Geneva Conference would be much more complicated.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the Soviet Union had manifested a certain tendency in the preliminaries to try to shape Geneva up as a five-power conference and to insist upon physical and other arrangements reflecting this position, thereby placing the other participants in a subordinate capacity; these efforts would have to be countered. He recalled that this had been one of the main disputed issues at Berlin. Just such a Soviet proposal had been stoutly opposed, and the USSR finally accepted the Western objections with the result that the communiqué containing the invitation to the Geneva Conference was devoid of any suggestion of a five-power conference. That communiqué, the Secretary pointed out, made clear that every state invited would participate on the same level. If the USSR intended to reopen this question on the threshold of the conference, it could cause serious difficulties. Moreover, if the Berlin Agreement were to be thrown over, the general question arose as to whether it was worthwhile to reach agreements at all with the Communists. Mr. Dulles emphasized that this might become a question of considerable importance.

Subject to this qualification, however, he thought that the practical details would probably be worked out. For example, he understood that there was general acceptance of the idea that the seating arrangements would be of the auditorium variety rather than around a table which would create difficult questions as to where different participants would sit. Another difficult problem was the chairmanship. Possibly a chairman might be drawn from some neutral nation, perhaps Switzerland itself. It had also been suggested that Mr. Hammarskjold might serve in his personal capacity as distinguished from his role as UN Secretary–General.

The Secretary said that it would be necessary to make contact between allied governmental representatives at Geneva quite early and also to arrange a meeting at a fairly high level with the Communists to settle these practical matters. It was our experience that they were never settled at a low level where the Soviet representatives were inclined to dig in on extreme technical positions.

Mr. Dulles believed that the Communists wanted the conference to proceed and did not want another Palais Rose situation at Geneva.² He commented that if they intended to have that kind of conference, it would have to be without him.

The Secretary requested suggestions or comments on the technical and procedural matters involved in the Korean phase of the conference.

Referring to the five-power conference issue, Ambassador Politis (Greece) said that he had thought that once the other participants were invited this question was over once and for all. He asked whether the US had any information that the USSR might raise this issue again. Mr. Dulles replied that the Soviet technical representative at Geneva had stated that his instructions were to work out arrangements for setting up a five-power conference.

Turning to substantive aspects of the Korean phase of the Conference, the Secretary said that he was pleased that the ROK would be represented at Geneva, observing that it would not be possible to have an effective conference without ROK representation. He expressed the hope that the ROK would take an active and leading part in the presentation of its case since after all it was the country primarily concerned in this matter, representing as it did the only lawful government recognized by the UN and having 75–80 percent of all the Korean people.

The Secretary stated there was one matter of substance which he knew had been considered in previous meetings and which he had discussed in London with Mr. Eden. It went very much to the fundamentals. It was the question whether this conference should be regarded as one which we would try to make succeed in achieving the unity and independence of Korea, or whether as a conference in which we more or less concede in advance that our objective is impossible of achievement and, therefore, look upon it as a conference for propaganda utterances by the two sides.

Mr. Dulles said that the US was disposed to the view that our side should make a really earnest effort to bring about the unity and independence of Korea at this conference. Of course he recognized that the chance of success was not great, and if he were making up a book, he would have to give considerable odds against a successful conference. The ROK, he noted, felt even more strongly on this point. On the other hand, the United States did not feel that the situation should be looked upon as utterly hopeless. We should at least begin the conference with the genuine desire to make it succeed.

In this connection, the Secretary noted a certain gain at Berlin in getting the Soviet Union to agree to include in the resolution constituting the invitation to the conference, the statement that the independence and unity of Korea would be a step that would increase the likelihood of peace and the relaxation of tension generally. In this way the principle of the unity and independence of Korea had already been established in the resolution which was the Charter of the Geneva Conference; in his opinion that represented a substantial advance. Mr. Dulles did not mean that the USSR would necessarily try to bring this about, but it was a step in the right direction; the conference could start out with a concept of recognition on the part of those who extended and accepted the invitation that the unity and independence of Korea is important in the relaxation of tensions and the cessation of fighting elsewhere in Asia. Mr. Dulles noted also the implict, if not explicit relationship between the unification and independence of Korea to the end of the fighting in Indochina.

The practical significance of approaching the conference on the basis of trying to bring about unification, the Secretary indicated, was that we should not put forward our final position first. He explained that trading with the Communists was a painful type of proposition, and that it was necessary to have some possibility for compromise or exchange if we expected to get results.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that the general position which the United States had in mind at the beginning of the conference would reflect the fact that the United Nations had already established a program for the unification and independence of Korea that would do precisely what the Berlin communiqué said should be accomplished. In 1950, the General Assembly had set up a commission to take the necessary steps to achieve unification. Because of the Chinese Communist intervention it had not been practical for the UN Commission to proceed with its task. It therefore seemed logical to suggest, now that the fighting was over and when it was incumbent upon Communist China to purge itself of wrongdoing, that the interrupted UN program should be carried forward.

That program, Mr. Dulles continued, was sound and entirely moral, and it also included certain elements about which we could bargain later if it seemed necessary or desirable to do so. It would mean holding elections in the area not yet covered by UN elections, and in that way completing the task that the United Nations began in 1948.

He appreciated that there were a number of governments, perhaps including his own, who recognized that probably a finally acceptable solution would not be achieved. However, if we were to start out by having traded down our position among ourselves to what might be our final best position, we would have nothing to trade with the Communists later. Our experience with them, Mr. Dulles said, pointed to the desirability of proceeding on a trading basis rather than putting forward a final, ideal position to which we would have to stick. If the conference were solely a propaganda exercise, of course we should begin with a generous, liberal position which the world would regard as fair. If, however, we started on that basis with a non-trading position, we must also assume that the conference could not succeed in achieving Korean unification. It might still succeed as a good propaganda demonstration, but we had to choose between the two theories. Faced with this choice, the United States considered that we should go into the conference with a position that is on the one hand entirely moral, but on the other hand, on which it might be possible to make some concessions.

Mr. Dulles went on to say that he had discussed this general position in London with Mr. Eden who had indicated that the position seemed sound to him. He repeated that we should begin the conference with a vague and general approach and not burn our bridges behind us until we find out what moves and proposals the other side has in mind.

The Secretary cautioned that what he had said was subject to further discussions with the ROK Delegation at Geneva; there was of course no possibility of accomplishing the desired result except in terms acceptable to the ROK. The conference could not impose a settlement on the ROK which is rejected. As the subject of the conference, the views of the ROK were entitled to carry a great measure of weight.

[Here follows the remainder of the briefing which dealt with Indochina and is printed on page 535.]

1. Agreement had already been reached on some procedural questions. On the previous day, the Department of State informed the Embassy in Seoul of certain of the arrangements that had been made: (1) documentation on the Allied side was to be translated only into English and French; (2) documentation prepared on the Communist side would be translated by the Allied secretariat into English and French—translations into Korean would be the responsibility of the Korean Delegation; (3) costs of services provided by the U.N. for the conference as a whole, such as heat and light, would be shared equally by all 19 participants; (4) costs of services provided by the Allied secretariat for the 16 nations would be shared on a formula not yet determined. (Telegram 843, Apr. 19, to Seoul; 795.00/4–1954)

   On the last mentioned point, the Allied side subsequently agreed on a cost-sharing formula for the Allied secretariat based on a proposal by Hughes Le Gallais, Luxembourg’s Minister in Washington, which called for the United States to pay one-third of the costs with the remaining countries paying according to the U.N. formula. The United States had objected to use of the U.N. formula without some adjustment since this would have meant the United States would have had to pay 56 percent of Allied costs. The agreed formula apportioned the Allied costs according to the following percentages: ROK .26; Australia 4.51; Belgium 3.56; Canada 8.5; Colombia 1.06; Ethiopia .26; France 14.82; Greece .54; Luxembourg .15; Netherlands 3.22; New Zealand 1.24; Philippines 1.16; Thailand .46; Turkey 1.68; U.K. 25.25; U.S. 33.33. (795.00/4–1454; 396.1–GE/4–2354, 4–2954)

2. For documentation on the four-power exploratory talks at the Palais Rose, Mar. 5–June 21, 1951, see Foreign Relations, 1951, volume iii.