Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

115. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Embassy in Vietnam¹

Washington, April 11, 1955—7:59 p.m.

4466. Eyes only Collins from Secretary.

1. Your 4452² received and your proposals and comments being carefully considered. I greatly appreciate the clarity of your views and the comprehensiveness of your replies to our comments and questions. In considering the decision to take on your proposal there are several questions as to timing and form.

2. As to timing we would appreciate your views on the following:

a) How soon is a final decision by the US Govt. required?

b) How many days do you visualize each of the first six steps would take outlined in part one of your 4448?³

c) It is strongly felt here that the US should make no final decision with the French unless and until we have received explicit assurances from them on the central government taking over control of the national police and a time and means for doing this with the clear stipulation of French moral and logistic support. In addition we do not wish to make commitment in principle on replacement before we are certain candidate acceptable to us can be agreed upon. This is a condition prerequisite to our informing the French of our final decision. Will other assurances be needed? Since this affects the timing of your proposals we would like your comments on this aspect. In addition there may be leaks as soon as the French are informed of an affirmative decision by us, thus Diem might learn of the proposal and take some counter action.

d) As a result of the above consideration we wonder whether any change should not take place until after the Bandung Conference. It may not be possible to carry out the program before opening of the conference in any case. If Diem should learn of a French-US decision regarding his replacement, there might be some danger in his exploiting this development at the conference itself.

e) Another question of timing involves the elections for the provisional National Assembly on May 15. If the steps you have outlined in your 4448 were commenced after the conclusion of Bandung Conference it might be that the selection of a successor would take place at about the same time of the assembly elections. This might create an additional complication with respect to the reaction of the assembly and their inability to participate in a new government.

f) When a firm decision is made and dependent upon your answers to the above points, do you feel that our response should be given to the French in Paris or by you in Saigon?

3. As to form, it might be worth while considering how to continue to make use of Diem’s assets and how to make the mechanics of a change-over seem Vietnamese inspired.

a) We have had in mind an intermediate solution which would not kick Diem completely out of the picture or keep him in his present status with full powers, which you have so tellingly indicated now appears impossible. Instead might not a transitional arrangement be envisaged which, if possible, would retain Diem in some general capacity as chairman of a new council to make use of his good qualities and general standing as a Nationalist, while delegating detailed administration of the program to Quat or Do who you believe have the personal capacities to direct and handle men in the Vietnamese environment. At an interim stage it would be anticipated provisional National Assembly convocation in June might lend a more permanent character to Vietnamese political institutions and personalities. It may be that a strong centralized government under the direction of one man is impractical as long as there is no really strong personality to cope with contending groups. Hence, it might be better for several reasons to blur the shift from Diem to another man and to spread power and responsibility among several of the most competent Vietnamese available. We are in no position here to suggest the mechanics or the forms for carrying out this line of approach, but would like your suggestions.

b) We are also concerned that mechanics you suggested in paras. 2, 3, and 4 of your 4448 may give the impression that the decision and manner of the change-over would appear to come largely from the Vietnamese themselves. If Diem meets such personal and political resistance from his own people that he alone cannot form a new setup or carry on, as you emphasize is the case, then the conditions for change would be less harmful to our position in Asia and more conducive to effective succession if the Vietnamese proposed the new government.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1055. Top Secret; Niact. Although Young is represented as the drafter of this telegram and Robertson the clearer, the two previous draft telegrams (Documents 112 and 113), and the related telephone conversations described in footnotes attached to them indicate that this telegram was discussed at a much higher level. The fact that this telegram is greatly different from the previous drafts as revised by Eisenhower and Dulles leads to the conclusion that at the 5 p.m. meeting on April 11, referred to in footnote 1, Document 113, the decision was made to delay authorizing Collins to proceed with plans for replacing Diem. No record of report of the 5 p.m. meeting has been found, but a memorandum by Young to Robertson, April 11, indicates that Young was not in favor of replacing Diem at that time. Young’s memorandum reads as follows:

   “We can accept Collins’ recommendation in principle. But I do not believe we should go along with his black-white formula. We should not discard Diem so abruptly or completely. There are several intermediary combinations worth exploring.

   “The attached telegram is along these lines.

   “Also I think Collins’ mechanics for the change-over put obvious [obviously] a French and American label on the new prescription and the new injection.” (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–1155)

   The draft telegram to which Young referred was not found attached to his memorandum.

   Apparently there were two draft telegrams discussed at the 5 p.m. meeting on April 11. The wording of the telephone conversation between Robertson and Dulles quoted in footnote 1, Document 113, supports this: “Young is with R[obertson], and he has a cable. … The Sec. has redrafted the cable.” Italics added. If this is the case, then at the 5 p.m. meeting the decision was made to send a telegram based on Young’s version rather than the draft revised by Eisenhower and Dulles.

2. Document 110.
3. Document 108.