Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

129. Memorandum of a Conversation, Paris, April 21, 1955¹

Paris, April 21, 1955

PARTICIPANTS

• Nguyen De, Director of Bao Dai’s Cabinet
• William M. Gibson, First Secretary of Embassy
• David Bane, Second Secretary of Embassy

Nguyen De called yesterday to deliver an urgent message from Bao Dai whom he had just left in Cannes.

He opened the conversation by restating the observations made during our last interview reported in Embtel 4497 repeated Saigon as 664.² He described Bao Dai’s reaction to the proposal that a National Assembly be formed in three months by some form of universal suffrage as impossible to carry out on practical grounds. Bao Dai described it as “madness” (une folie). Bao Dai was now more convinced than ever that before any long-term plans, no matter how meritorious, could be put into effect, the immediate problem of dealing with the present crisis must be faced. In his opinion all other considerations must be cast aside for the moment if the battle against Communism in South Vietnam is to be won. The first step is the all important one of dealing with the present crisis. There is no longer any time to lose for the sects are enforcing their positions and becoming more intransigent. Any further procrastination will drive them underground and eventually into the hands of the Vietminh.

Bao Dai agrees that power must be removed from the hands of the Binh Xuyen but considers it impractical to do so in one fell swoop since it would be impossible to maintain order afterwards and civil war would really result. He is aware of Diem’s qualities as often cited but regards his present position as untenable. The problem is now, Bao Dai says, how to deal with the present crisis in removing Diem from his present position without losing U.S. aid. Without U.S. aidVietnam would cease to exist and it is unthinkable to plan her future without both U.S. and French friendship.

In considering the plan for dealing with the crisis which is set forth below, Bao Dai wishes to make a categorical statement that he will do nothing regarding this plan or otherwise without prior U.S. and French approval.

Bao Dai’s suggested solution is that Diem must be removed from the scene for the time being. The problem is how to do this without antagonizing the U.S. and precipitating the withdrawal of U.S. aid. Whatever Government is in power must have not only the representation of all leading Vietnamese religious and political factions but must have true responsibilities for governing. Under the present system the Government is divided roughly into three parts: (1) The Chief of State (Bao Dai), (2) The Government itself with its Cabinet and (3) The “Provisional National Council” (National Assembly, etc.—not yet formed). The role of the Chief of State is presently that of arbitrator and catalyst in getting things done. He provides legality for the exercise of true powers which are held by the Government. The first prerequisite of any future Government is that it have a degree of stability which can only be attained if its members agree to retain their offices as long as the Prime Minister remains in power. This is unenforceable, of course, but an attempt should at least be made to have members of Cabinet accept such a moral obligation.

In his proposed plan, Bao Dai advocates that in addition to a Government with a Prime Minister and Cabinet of approximately 12 men, there should be a “Supreme Council of National Union”. This latter body would form the third element of a three-part Government in place of the non-existent provisional national council. It would participate with Bao Dai and the Cabinet in the exercise of real and not advisory powers. Its main distinction from the Cabinet itself would be that it would include representation of all factions including sects, religious groups, army, peasantry and trade unions. In this connection, De remarked that at the present time, the peasantry and syndicates—in which category he would include skilled labor—represent about 95% of the population and now have no representation in the Government. On the other hand, the Cabinet would be made up of leading “notabilities” who would be men who need not necessarily belong to any political or religious group but who would, as a sine qua non, have universal responsibility and the confidence of the country as a whole. It is intended that the Council of National Union would be a temporary body which would disappear as soon as constituent and legislative assemblies were formed. It is suggested that its membership should be between eighteen and twenty. It is contemplated that Bao Dai would direct and advise it in regard to its functions without participating in it directly. On the other hand, the “notabilities”, who would make up the Cabinet, should have both technical, political and moral qualifications but need not be active members of political or religious groups.

It is suggested that when the Supreme Council of National Union is formed its main political premises should be fixed in advance. Its powers would go beyond these minimal guidelines but would never contradict them. Included in the minimum program would be the following political principles: (1) Alignment with the West; (2) Strictly anti-Communist and (3) Furtherance of democratic principles, et cetera.

De then returned to the question of how to replace Diem without “antagonizing the U.S.” He stated that Bao Dai was opposed to any return to past ills in the form of Vietnamese statesmen who had already participated in post-war Governments and had failed, and that no indication be given to the sects that in the present crisis it is they who have won and Diem who has lost. A man must be found to be Prime Minister and in Bao Dai’s opinion the best candidate is Pham Huy Quat. It is suggested that Quat be approached in a confidential manner after U.S. approval is obtained and be asked to come to Cannes, together with two or three other leading personalities. Once there, he and Bao Dai would undertake the choosing of ten or twelve men who might take part in the proposed new Government. Negotiations on such participation would proceed without delay. Convocation of Quat would only take place with prior U.S. and French agreement. Once the step of Quat’s convocation is taken, discreet steps would be taken to convoke Diem, steps having been taken in advance to give the impression that Diem is in agreement with this whole matter which, Bao Dai claims, can be arranged. He would then take part in negotiations for a new Government and might actually participate himself. However, that would be determined during consultations and negotiations here and in Saigon.

If the U.S. agrees to this plan (and presumably the French), Bao Dai states categorically that he can put it into effect and can obtain Quat’s full concurrence (Quat is aware that “he is in Bao Dai’s eye”) and guarantees (1) that he can persuade the sects not to take part in the Government but only in the Council and in a limited manner; (2) that he will obtain agreement of the sects to incorporate all their forces into the National Army, and (3) that the Binh Xuyen will agree to give up all its control of “national security” including, of course, the police in Saigon. The entire operation, however, must be done as one move with each step following rapidly upon the other. Bao Dai is confident he can carry it off and will engage his personal prestige with the U.S. in doing so, but he will not undertake the plan unless he has full prior U.S. agreement including a firm understanding that under no circumstances will the U.S. take any action or make any statement which will indicate to the Vietnamese that Quat is “a U.S. man” and that he will in no sense be acting under U.S. influence as Prime Minister. Bao Dai emphasizes the importance of the fact that Quat, who already enjoys considerable prestige and following, and who will receive all that of Bao Dai and of other factions in Vietnam, whom Bao Dai can influence to support him, must not be suspected as being a tool of the West and particularly of the U.S.

In reply to our question as to how and when the French were to be brought into this plan, De stated that it is for us to determine that it would presumably be at an early stage. He claimed that Quat could not succeed on his own but that he could with his present following and that which he will undoubtedly receive once Bao Dai “gets the wheels moving.”

De reported that Bao Dai presents this as the last and possibly only plan left for dealing with the present crisis. It is not to be confused with any other plans which may be attributed to Bao Dai. Ambassador Chuong was not informed of it when he called on Bao Dai prior to returning to Washington and is not, therefore, au courant with it. Ngo Dinh Luyen is still cooling his heels in Cannes as Bao Dai has refused to receive him while this plan was being presented to us. De incidentally informed us that Ngo Dinh Luyen has told Bao Dai in seeking an audience that he was informed by U.S. officials that they supported his plan and that Bao Dai must consider it immediately. This is totally untrue as far as this Embassy is concerned as we have had no contact with Luyen. Needless to say, Bao Dai strongly favors this plan and states “that if the U.S. opposes it and obliges the Vietnamese people to continue to accept Diem as Prime Minister, Bao Dai will give in to U.S. views because Vietnamese national interest does not permit Vietnam to do otherwise and because U.S. aid is the prerequisite to her survival, but he will do so on conviction that we are mistaken and in full conscience that it will lead to a national disaster.” In that case he feels obliged to inform us that he will no longer be able to take any responsibilities for the present Government in Vietnam.

We asked how prepared if at all Quat was to go along with such a plan and De stated that he (Quat) was already aware that he was being considered and that Bao Dai guaranteed that he would come to Cannes immediately as soon as summoned. Finally, De said that he would remain in Paris until he received an answer from us which he would take to Bao Dai immediately. He closed again reiterating the importance of prompt action.

William M. Gibson³

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2155. Top Secret. Drafted by Gibson.
2. In this telegram, dated April 16, the Embassy had reported that it had that morning, as instructed in telegram 3678 to Paris, April 15, informed Nguyen De that the United States hoped Bao Dai would give favorable attention to a compromise to be based on a formula put forward by Diem, according to which elections would be held for a constituent assembly in 3 months, after which the assembly would choose a government. In the meantime, Diem would form an interim government. “While De assured us he would faithfully present Dept’s views to Bao Dai, he made no secret his personal opposition to formula as outlined. He emphasized at length his fundamental opposition to the holding of general elections in South Vietnam in the near future for reason Communist elements would be only beneficiaries and, in any event, he said, no really effective interim govt could be formed so long as Diem headed it.” (Ibid., 751G.00/4–1655 and 751G.00/4–1555)
3. Printed from a copy which bears this typed signature and an indication it was signed.