Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

148. Memorandum of Discussion at the 246th Meeting of the National Security Council, Washington, April 28, 1955¹

Washington, April 28, 1955

Present at the 246th Council Meeting were the President of the United States, presiding; the Vice President of the United States; the Secretary of State; the Secretary of Defense; the Director, Foreign Operations Administration; and the Director, Office of Defense Mobilization. Also present were the Secretary of the Treasury; the Acting Director, Bureau of the Budget; the Director, U.S. Information Agency; General J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam (for Item 5); the Assistant Director for Telecommunications, ODM (for Item 2); the Acting Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff; the Director of Central Intelligence; the Deputy Assistant to the President; Mr. Robert R. Bowie, Department of State; Mr. Paul J. Sturm, Department of State (for Item 5); Mr. Kermit Roosevelt, Central Intelligence Agency (for Item 5); Messrs. Anderson and Rockefeller, Special Assistants to the President; the White House Staff Secretary; the Executive Secretary, NSC; and the Deputy Executive Secretary, NSC.

There follows a summary of the discussion at the meeting and the main points taken.

[Here follows discussion of items 1. “Status of United States Programs for National Security as of December 31, 1954: The Mobilization Program”; 2. “Electro-Magnetic Communication: Effectiveness of U.S. International Broadcasting”; 3. “Significant World Development Affecting U.S. Security”; and 4. “U.S. Position on an Austrian State Treaty”.]

5. Developments in Vietnam (NSC 5429/5, par. 10–a;² NSC Action No. 1316³)

General Collins, accompanied by Mr. Paul J. Sturm of the State Department, entered the Cabinet Room when Item 5 came up for discussion. Mr. Allen Dulles also asked permission for Mr. Kermit Roosevelt of the Central Intelligence Agency to be present while Mr. Dulles briefed the Council on the latest developments in Saigon.

Mr. Dulles explained that last night serious street fighting had broken out in the city of Saigon. A mortar shell had landed on the Presidential Palace, the residence of Prime Minister Diem, at 1:15 p.m. After two further shells had landed in the Palace grounds, Diem had telephoned General Ely and stated that he was ordering counterfire by the Vietnamese national forces. Eleven rounds of such counterfire had been counted by three o’clock in the afternoon. While there had since been rumors that a cease-fire had been arranged, Mr. Dulles doubted the validity of these reports, and said it seemed that Prime Minister Diem had ordered all-out action against the Binh Xuyen. In other words, Diem was proposing to force a showdown. It was not easy, continued Mr. Dulles, to say which side had actually been responsible for precipitating last night’s events, but the real trouble had begun on April 26, when Prime Minister Diem had ordered the removal of the Chief of Police of Saigon, who was a member of the Binh Xuyen gangster group.

In a showdown fight, continued Mr. Dulles, and if the Vietnamese National Army remains loyal to the Prime Minister, there was little doubt that the Army could drive the Binh Xuyen forces out of Saigon. The difficulty was that such an attempt would almost certainly result in disturbances and civil war throughout South Vietnam. In addition, the street fighting might very well result in atrocities against French civilians living in Saigon. Finally, said Mr. Dulles, Diem has advised that he now intends to form a complete new Cabinet, and that he will announce its members tonight.

The President promptly inquired what General Ely was likely to do in the face of the situation which Mr. Dulles had described. General Collins replied that he believed that General Ely would do nothing unless a threat should develop to foreigners resident in Saigon. General Collins then produced a map of the city of Saigon and adjacent areas, and rapidly described the chief features of the city and the deployment of the Binh Xuyen and the National Army forces.

The President then asked General Collins whether the French were likely to interfere with American resupply of Prime Minister Diem’s forces. General Collins thought that the French would not so interfere, and pointed out that the French have already offered an ammunition depot in Saigon to the Vietnamese forces.

At this point Mr. Dillon Anderson reminded the Council of the decision with respect to U.S. policy toward South Vietnam which the Council had made in January of this year. While he was doing so, the Executive Secretary handed out a draft record of action prepared in the Department of State, which State suggested should be adopted in lieu of the earlier Council action of January. Secretary Dulles pointed out that the chief difference was that the earlier action had pinpointed Prime Minister Diem as the individual whose government the United States should support.

Secretary Dulles said that he would like to comment in general on the situation in which we found ourselves respecting South Vietnam. In his view, the present difficulties had two fundamental causes. First, the limitations of Prime Minister Diem as the head of a government. While Diem’s good qualities were well known and need not be elaborated, it was a fact that he came from the northern part of the country and was not very trustful of other people, perhaps for good reason. Furthermore, he was not very good at delegating authority. Despite these shortcomings, Diem might have proved adequate to the situation if it had not been for the second fundamental limitation—namely, the lack of solid support from the French. While the top leaders of the French Government, such as Mendes-France, Faure and General Ely, have gone along with Diem reluctantly, French colonial officials on the scene in Vietnam have done their best to sabotage him. These two fundamental limitations in conjunction have brought about a situation that has finally induced General Collins to conclude that we must now look for a replacement for Diem.

As a matter of fact, continued Secretary Dulles, we have been telling the French for a considerable period that we would be prepared to consider an alternative to Diem if they could come up with one. They haven’t as yet done so. Moreover, the mechanics of effecting a change at this time would be very difficult. A change of Premier would necessarily involve recourse to Bao Dai, and we have always felt that Bao Dai’s influence would be invariably exerted in favor of the Binh Xuyen, which supplies his ample funds. We haven’t therefore, been inclined to look with very much favor on a new South Vietnam government appointed by Bao Dai. On the contrary, we have felt that it was really essential that a showdown occur between Bao Dai and the rebellious sects. Such a showdown both Bao Dai and the French have consistently tried to avoid.

Late yesterday afternoon, however, we in the State Department dispatched a complicated series of cables to Saigon outlining ways and means of replacing Diem and his government.⁴ However, in view of the developments and the outbreak of last night, we have instructed our people in Saigon to hold up action on our plan for replacing Diem. The developments of last night could either lead to Diem’s utter overthrow or to his emergence from the disorder as a major hero. Accordingly, we are pausing to await the results before trying to settle on Quat or Defense Minister [sic] Do as possible replacements. Secretary Dulles confessed that he was not much impressed with the Defense Minister. On the other hand, unless something occurs in the Saigon disorders out of which Diem will emerge as the hero, we will have to have a change. This is the view both of General Collins and General Ely, and Ely has played an honest game with us in this whole affair.

Secretary Dulles then pointed out that Bao Dai had actually threatened to take the matter in his own hands and establish a new government himself. Indeed, we are not absolutely sure that we can restrain him from so doing, since he so to speak represents the only existing source of legitimate governmental authority. Thus we find ourselves obliged to work with him and through him to some extent, until we are in a position to devise some alternative source of authority.

At the conclusion of his statement, Secretary Dulles asked General Collins to present his views. General Collins began by reminding the National Security Council of his earlier appearance before it prior to his departure for Saigon, and of the position he had taken at that time—namely, that there were five major factors on which the future of Free Vietnam would depend. He said that he would briefly run over these same five factors now.

(1) The possibility of an overt attack on Free Vietnam by the Vietminh. Of this General Collins stated there was very little danger at the present time.

(2) The loyalty of the Vietnamese National Army to Diem. General Collins emphasized that to date the Vietnamese National Army had been loyal to Diem, but that loyalty would almost certainly not extend to supporting the Prime Minister in a civil war. The Army violently disliked the Binh Xuyen, but it also disliked the prospect of engaging in a civil war in South Vietnam which would also include the Hoa Hao and the Cao Dai sects, which were quite strong in the southern portions of Free Vietnam. The great danger of trying to drive the Binh Xuyen from their strongholds in Saigon, said General Collins, was precisely the danger that such an attempt would end in widespread civil war.

(3) The problem of the sects. General Collins pointed out that we have feared all along that efforts to cut down the size of the private armies of the sects and to dry up their financial resources would cause trouble. This was probably inevitable, whether Diem or anyone else made the effort. On the other hand, General Collins insisted that Diem’s handling of the problem of the sects had been anything but astute.

(4) The attitude of the French. General Collins said that since this had been thoroughly covered by Secretary Dulles, he would add no more except to point out that there could be no doubt of the loyal role played with him by General Ely.

(5) The personality of Diem. On this point General Collins said that as early as the end of his first week in Saigon he had come to entertain very serious doubts as to Diem’s ability to govern. Diem betrayed no political knack whatsoever in his handling of men. His ineptitude in this respect was responsible for the series of resignations from his Cabinet. It was no mere matter of rats quitting a sinking ship. General Collins felt that it was a particular misfortune to lose Minh, the young Secretary of Defense, and Do, the older Secretary of Foreign Affairs, whom General Collins considered to be a man of very good judgment. If, said General Collins, Diem makes good on his statement that he would name a new Cabinet, this Cabinet would almost certainly consist of unknown individuals who had no public standing.

All this induced General Collins to conclude that Prime Minister Diem’s number was up. Nor had he ever felt that Diem was the indispensable man. Accordingly, even without Diem the program adopted by the Council for South Vietnam could and should go forward without interruption, even though its estimated costs would be $40 million more this year than previously estimated. General Collins emphasized that he still felt that this U.S. policy and program was a gamble worth taking, although certainly a gamble. A long-term solution of the sect problem was vital to the success of the program. It was likewise vital to take control of the police away from the Binh Xuyen. Finally, it was essential to get genuine French support for the policy and program, no matter who was the Vietnamese Prime Minister.

The President commented that it was an absolute sine qua non of success that the Vietnamese National Army destroy the power of the Binh Xuyen. Otherwise any new government was bound to fail. To this General Collins replied that the attempt to destroy the Binh Xuyen by military action would almost certainly produce civil war in Vietnam. The Binh Xuyen, if removed from Saigon, would take to the Maquis and raise hell for years to come. Accordingly, General Collins said he personally preferred a political solution. He had wished Diem to form a genuine coalition government. He doubted very much whether Diem could be prevailed upon to try it, but such a political solution seemed most likely to bring success.

Secretary Humphrey inquired how far the Communists were behind the disorders and outbreaks in Saigon. General Collins replied that there could be no doubt that they were stimulating and exploiting the disorders that existed.

At this point Mr. Anderson read the proposed record of action. The President inquired if there were any objections. There being none, the President observed that the proposed action sounded all right to him, and that he could not see what else we could do at this time.

At the close of the discussion, Mr. Allen Dulles commented that if it were any comfort to the Council, there was quite a good deal of evidence that the Vietminh were encountering considerable difficulty in their part of Vietnam.

The National Security Council:⁵

a. Noted and discussed an oral briefing on the latest developments in Saigon by the Director of Central Intelligence.

b. Noted and discussed the oral report by General J. Lawton Collins, Special Representative in Vietnam, and the comments of the Secretary of State on the present situation in Vietnam.

c. Agreed that the United States should:

(1) Continue its support of South Vietnam, while recognizing that the composition of the government might have to be changed and keeping the situation constantly under review.

(2) Continue to press the French Government to provide more effective support for the Government of South Vietnam.

(3) Continue the military and non-military programs for South Vietnam for the time being.

Note: The action in c above, as approved by the President, to supersede NSC Action No. 1316–b, subsequently transmitted to the Operations Coordinating Board as the coordinating agency for NSC 5429/5, to provide guidance in the implementation of paragraph 10 thereof.

S. Everett Gleason

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, NSC Records. Top Secret. Drafted by Gleason on April 29.
2. Paragraph 10–a of NSC 5429/5, “Current U.S. Policy Toward the Far East”, December 22, 1954, reads as follows: “Make every possible effort, not openly inconsistent with the U.S. position as to the armistice agreements, to defeat Communist subversion and influence, to maintain and support a friendly non-Communist South Vietnam, and to prevent a Communist victory through all-Vietnam elections.” For text of NSC 5429/5, see Foreign Relations, 1952–1954, vol. xii, Part 1, p. 1062.
3. See footnote 11, Document 28.
4. Documents 140, 141, and 142.
5. The following paragraphs and note constitute NSC Action No. 1389, a record copy of which is in Department of State, S/S–NSC (Miscellaneous) Files: Lot 66 D 95.