153. Telegram From the Chargé in Vietnam (Kidder) to the Department of State1

4929. 1. At 1530 April 29, British Ambassador Stephenson and I met with Ely at his request. Ely asked about my conversation during morning with Diem (Embtel 4926, Paris 12702). I outlined high points which Diem subsequently included in press release (Embtel 4916, Paris 12683). He asked me what line I had taken with President Diem and I informed him that Diem had not asked my advice and I had not proferred it, but had restricted myself to commenting that if he should not obey Bao Dai’s instructions, he would be taking on his shoulders a very grave responsibility indeed. I added that I had informed Diem also that I hoped everything would be done to avoid needless bloodshed. In reply to Ely’s query I said that I had not advised Diem to seek cease-fire, nor had I made any mention of possible illegality as result Diem not complying Bao Dai’s instructions.

2. Ely then reiterated that Diem’s refusal obey Bao Dai put him in illegal position. I commented that I had not seen actual text Bao Dai’s instructions; that Bao Dai had not removed Diem as PriMin, and that I thought it could be fairly argued that Diem as PriMin had right at least to reply to Bao Dai giving his estimate of situation and reasons which influenced Diem not respond immediately to Bao Dai’s bidding. I said that when it came to question of illegality, it seemed to me that it had been Bay Vien and Lai Van Sang who had been acting illegally. (Ely then gave me text Bao Dai message to Diem, Embtel 4928 rptd Paris 1271.4)

3. Stephenson said that if Ely and I agreed he would be willing see Diem, but that he would be able go no further than I had gone. Stephenson has always taken viewpoint that he would see Diem only [Page 320] when it would be of help to French and Americans in their cooperation in support of Diem. Ely and I agreed that it might be helpful if he saw Diem. (On leaving Ely, Stephenson commented that he thought I had taken only possible line of action vis-à-vis Diem.)

4. Ely, I believe, had hoped he could get American and British support in a démarche to Diem for cease-fire. He stated he would have to act unilaterally and would probably do so afternoon April 29. Comment: Unevaluated eyewitness report indicates French North African troops active in area central market and observed moving toward Boulevard Gallieni, for what purpose we do not know.

Kidder
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2955. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to Paris.
  2. Supra.
  3. Dated April 29, not printed. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/4–2955)
  4. See footnote 2, Document 150.