Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

180. Telegram From the Special Representative to Vietnam (Collins) to the Embassy in France¹

Saigon, May 9, 1955—9 p.m.

1323. Tosec for Young. Ref Paris tel sent Saigon 717 rptd Dept Dulte 9.²

A. Reference Faure’s suggestion that FEC might be withdrawn shortly.

1. There are three military reasons why FEC should remain in Vietnam, at least until July 1956:

a. If FEC should be withdrawn from Vietnam, a strategic military vacuum would be left in this area which could be dangerous. As it stands now, France has accepted major strategic responsibility for the defense of Vietnam, Laos and Cambodia, under the broad aegis of the Manila Pact. I doubt if the US, British Commonwealth, or India is prepared to step in now and assume this responsibility.

b. As long as ICC is functioning in Vietnam, I feel there is no danger of Viet Minh launching an attack across 17th parallel. If for any reason ICC should disband, or if about time scheduled for elections under Geneva Accord Viet Minh become convinced that they cannot win such elections or that elections may not be held, there may be danger of Viet Minh attack. Only real safeguard against this latter contingency lies in declaration of Manila Pact powers. It appears quite clear that only military action, if any, that might be taken by Manila Pact powers, would be to employ air and naval action against Viet Minh. I assume the application of this power would not be limited to North Vietnam, but might be extended to China if there were clear indications that Viet Minh attack was being supported by China. However, in addition, in my judgment, there would have to be naval and air action in South Vietnam against the Viet Minh in order to prevent the latter from overrunning all of South Vietnam. Such overrunning could not be prevented by naval and air action alone, as was clearly demonstrated in Korea. It would be necessary to have some land forces which could fight delaying actions from 17th parallel to defensive positions covering the vital Saigon–Cap St Jacques area and to conduct defense latter area. Vietnamese army alone could not provide effective forces for this purpose. Aside from the technical skill required to conduct delaying actions, a force trained in coordinating and directing the application of air power in connection with ground operations would be essential. The FEC alone is competent to perform such operations and such coordination.

c. Second military reason for desiring retention of FEC is that under the Geneva Accord limiting the introduction of additional foreign military personnel, the FEC is an essential element in reorganizing and training Vietnamese armed forces. FEC will furnish bulk of instructors and, for some time to come, many of the technical advisers. In addition, the FEC still provides almost complete logistical support for Vietnamese forces. FEC could possibly leave behind only the essential supply and depot troops necessary to handle supply installations until Vietnamese army is ready to take them over. Similarly, a French training mission could be retained under our Chief of MAAG

2. In addition to the strictly military questions involved in retaining FEC in Vietnam, there are also closely related political questions. I recognize that presence FEC, in recent weeks particularly, has lent itself to propaganda that “colonialists” were using this military force to resist the will of the “people” to liquidate Binh Xuyen, repudiate Bao Dai, consolidate Diem regime and constitute popular assembly. Whatever elements of validity there may be in this criticism, I believe we must not lose sight of fact that FEC may have prevented more dangerous elements, with or without Viet Minh complicity, from overwhelming Diem and paving way for eventual Viet Minh takeover. Whether or not FEC should be retained on purely political grounds can be reasonably debated on affirmative and negative sides. On balance, however, is clear that presence of FEC exerts desirable moderating influence.

B. Reference Secretary’s question regarding risks faced by French nationals if FEC were quickly withdrawn.

1. If FEC were withdrawn precipitately under present conditions, that act would set official seal on basic break between French and Vietnam. Consequences which would follow would depend on manner in which FEC were withdrawn:

a. The FEC might be withdrawn in a calm and measured manner, with the minimum of friction and ill-feeling and with some French expression of confidence in security of the situation they were leaving, or

b. Withdrawal might be made in petulant and aggravating manner which would create great deal of ill-feeling and sense of insecurity.

2. a. Under conditions 1a. above, there would probably be no great danger to French or other foreign community although isolated incidents might occur. Certain evacuations of French women and children have already taken place without event.

b. If condition 1b. develops, as might be the case in present French mood, there could be serious disturbances which might lead to panic, particularly if the withdrawal were precipitate. The present violent anti-French campaign being waged by certain elements in Vietnam would be inflamed by French action and could lead to serious outbreaks. Viet Minh could be counted on to stimulate such troubles.

3. An important element to consider would be effect of FEC withdrawal on economic situation in Vietnam. French business interests play a most important part in Vietnamese economy.

a. If FEC withdrawal were under condition 1a. above, we believe there would be no major exodus of French business firms and that those which wished to remain could do so and successfully conduct their business.

b. If, however, withdrawal should be under condition 1b., wholesale evacuation of French commercial and business interests might well follow. This could create such conditions of economic chaos that the entire US effort in Vietnam, both military and economic, would be brought to standstill. This is because the commercial community, largely in French hands, generates the piasters which pay for these programs.

4. We believe it unlikely French would actually carry out a total voluntary evacuation of the FEC. French business interests are unable under present conditions to withdraw their sizeable remaining elements. We think it probable that they would be able apply sufficient political pressure on French Govt to ensure continued presence of at least minimum military protection.

[

Collins

]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/5–955. Top Secret; Limit Distribution. The source text is the copy repeated for information to the Department of State for Robertson.

2. Telegram 717 from Paris to Saigon, May 8, reads as follows:

   “Would like your reaction on Faure’s concluding remarks re FEC contained in our telegraphic summary reference telegram [Secto 8]. Saturday trilateral session on Vietnam. Also your evaluation what risks facing French Nationals if FEC withdrawn quickly.” (Ibid., 751G.00/5–855)