Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Vietnam, Volume I

49. Telegram From the Chargé in France (Achilles) to the Department of State¹

Paris, March 1, 1955—8 p.m.

3654. Re Deptel 2956.²

1. President’s letter to Bao Dai delivered by hand Embassy officer this morning as instructed reference telegram. Bao Dai appeared genuinely pleased by President’s letter and gesture. He read letter but made no comment other than that he would respond President’s letter as soon feasible.³ With respect to publication President’s letter, Bao Dai stated that he would telephone to his Directeur du Cabinet at Paris and ask him to coordinate its release to the press with us. This will be subject separate telegram.⁴

2. We said we wished take advantage occasion to express regret regarding statements attributed to Secretary in Paris-Presse article (Embtel 3590⁵) which we said were without foundation. We said we wished underline that neither Secretary nor US Government wished derogate in any way from his internationally recognized role and legal authority as Chief of State Vietnam etc. (along lines para 3 Embtel 3590), and that we continued rely on substantial support we knew he could contribute to strengthening Vietnamese Government. Bao Dai expressed appreciation saying he had never had any doubt but that article inexact and did not correctly reflect Secretary’s views.

3. We orally expressed General Collins’ concern regarding recent activity Binh Xuyen as well as Hoa Hao along lines Saigon’s 976⁶ and evoked as one possibility of attacking problem the revocation of decrees vesting control police and Sûreté in Binh Xuyen and phased turnover those powers to Vietnamese Government. Bao Dai’s reaction was unenthusiastic as expected; however our suggestion if nothing else served break through his attitude oriental calm. Bao Dai then proceeded make abundantly clear to us that he did not think such a move likely contribute to an improvement in political situation South Vietnam and that on contrary he thought such a move would lead to a further deterioration in political situation there. He went on to say that he was seriously concerned over political situation in South Vietnam which he thought nearing civil war with religious overtones. He added this connection that he thought he perhaps had more objective view situation South Vietnam than many of those at Saigon who too close scene. Bao Dai brushed aside idea of revoking decrees and taking away police and Sûreté from Binh Xuyen saying that while this could be done easily and while he would have no qualms in doing so said revocation of decrees would only raise question whether Diem had men capable taking over these responsibilities. Bao Dai thereafter left no doubt in our minds that he did not think Diem could take over these responsibilities. In any event Bao Dai said he did not think this way approach problem. He said he only too well aware problem of sects since he had had to contend at times with opposition emanating from these quarters as well as from Catholics. Unfortunately everyone in South Vietnam seemed to have lost sight of Viet Minh menace and absolute necessity all working together if Free Vietnam to survive. Bao Dai clearly implied that he thought Diem had failed to a considerable extent in the latter respect. This despite fact he regarded Diem as the most honest straightforward Vietnamese that he knew. He said he also recognized importance having Prime Minister in whom United States had full confidence. Bao Dai said he had given Diem full powers and freedom of action to choose means to achieve basic objective countering Viet Minh subversion and developing strong Vietnam capable resisting Viet Minh attraction.

Bao Dai then said he wished we would convey message to General Collins that he hoped General Collins could convince Diem of necessity of trying to get along with the various elements Vietnamese political life in effort achieve government national union. Bao Dai made clear he did not think Diem drawing sufficiently on men available who were capable contributing to national effort, nor that Diem was making sufficient effort reconcile differences between respective elements Vietnamese political life. He emphasized that Diem must avoid giving impression he establishing dictatorship and he must avoid precipitating religious war. Bao Dai repeated several times that Diem must place country above self and must not sacrifice national interest in attempting consolidate his personal position and that of Catholic element at expense of rest of country. He appreciated anti-Viet Minh force represented by Catholic element but nevertheless Catholics represented only small fraction total Vietnamese population and Diem must try get along with other elements political life and be tolerant other religions. He emphasized that he thought Diem alienating Vietnamese political and religious elements who could help—and whose help Diem needed if internecine warfare to be avoided—at time when all Vietnamese in Free Vietnam must pull together if they to survive. We said would make known his views to General Collins and to Department.

4. In response our inquiry as to whether he had any other views he might care to express Bao Dai replied in negative.

Achilles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–155. Secret; Limit Distribution. Repeated for information to Saigon.
2. See footnote 2, Document 45.
3. In his reply dated March 5, Bao Dai stated that he had been “happy to learn that General Collins considered that the action of President Diem and his government held out serious chances of Vietnam remaining free.” He assured Eisenhower of his gratitude for U.S. support and assistance and concluded by emphasizing that he had made known to the Vietnamese people that their first duty was to obey their government. (Translation from the original French transmitted in telegram 3754 from Paris, March 8; Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–855)
4. The letter was made public on March 3.
5. In this telegram, February 25, the Embassy reported that Paris-Presse carried a story from Bangkok in which Dulles reputedly implied that Bao Dai was a negligible quantity and “the only legal authority in Vietnam” was the government of Ngo Dinh Diem. (Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/2–2555)
6. Document 45.