60. Telegram From the Special Representative in Vietnam (Collins) to the Department of State1
3812. 1. I called on Diem 8th.2 I asked Prime Minister what importance he attached to manifesto issued last week by sects. He replied [Page 120] that only sect leaders now committed to coalition are Cao Dai Pope, Soai and Bay Vien; latter are supported at times by Hoa Hao leader Lam Tan Nguyen and representative of Ba Cut. Pope has illusions of becoming Chief of State, while Binh Xuyen and Hoa Hao are inspired by practical motives. Binh Xuyen wish retain control of police which they fear Diem intends remove from them, while Soai is seeking gain time to corner rice harvest in his own territories. Coalition would like set up triumvirate of which figurehead would be Cao Dai Pope.
2. According to Diem, Generals Phuong and Trinh Minh The have refused join sect coalition.3 They attended meetings in order find out what was brewing, and reported to him. Diem said both Phuong and The would like replace Cao Dai Pope, but have found no suitable replacement.
3. I asked Diem what sects intended do next. He replied that there is still major disagreement among leaders. However, Soai could destroy two or three important bridges. Binh Xuyen have been introducing some of their troops into police; they have acquired houses strategically located throughout metropolitan area to serve as posts, and they are continuing to recruit. Moreover, in addition to their regular armament, Binh Xuyen have three 75-mm guns and three 81-mm mortars which Diem said they secured from French. To meet Binh Xuyen threat Diem said he needed two squadrons of armor for which he has asked General Gambiez to supply the matériel. (MAAG will check on this.)
4. In addition to power in metropolitan area, Binh Xuyen have created wood and fishing monopoly along road to Cap St. Jacques, allowing no trucks other than their own to pass along highway with these products. Trinh Minh The now has small units along this highway and is prepared add two battalions if requested by general staff. Meanwhile, National Army has placed one small battalion back of Binh Xuyen positions on outskirts of Cholon.
5. In general, Diem appeared not greatly concerned by sect manifesto, although he recognizes certain local and immediate dangers may threaten government.
6. I asked Diem his opinion of communiqué issued by Imperial Cabinet on President’s letter to Bao Dai. He replied that people could read through communiqué. He said he did not believe Bao Dai had given orders letter should be used for his own advantage, but rather that Cabinet had used it to flatter him. Diem has had full text of President’s letter published here. He said he did not believe communiqué threatened his position.
[Page 121]7. With respect to military budget for February, I remarked that piaster equivalent of $108,000 was provided for Trinh Minh The and said this figure appeared high to me. Diem replied that 3,000 Cao Dai and 3,000 Hoa Hao forces have been incorporated into National Army under special formula whereby each unit retains own staff. I said we must be provided with military budget for whole year in order make proper plans, although disbursement will be on monthly basis. We would wish discuss military budget in detail as soon as certain studies now in progress are completed. Diem agreed.
8. I brought up subject of police forces saying we were concerned by cost, numbers of men and armament. I said we would like to have in written form a plan for provincial police similar to plan we have for national armed forces. Diem said he would assign [name and titled deleted] to work on this problem with my staff. I commented that plan must be completed within next few days in order that allocation for February military expenses can be made.
9. Diem said various provincial police units now total 43,000. His plan is to reduce this figure to 30/35,000.
If National Army functions efficiently in pacification field, it may be possible reduce this figure still further. In addition to 43,000 mentioned, government delegate for south has received 13,000 suppletifs from French in last two months. These forces are needed for time being, but objective is to suppress them completely. With reference to armament, Diem said he had that day sent two representatives to center with mission of collecting rifles in hands of police units in two provinces. All but very few of these rifles will be replaced by pistols.
10. I told Diem I was concerned by conflicting reports on success of national security action program. Reviewing history of program, Diem said Minh had originally proposed a certain Cung,4 former Vietminh major, to coordinate program. Feeling this program went beyond limits of Defense Department, Diem assigned [name and title deleted] to work on problem. [Name deleted] and Cung prepared statement for recent conference of province chiefs at which Defense Minister’s plan for pacification was explained. This plan, according to Prime Minister, called for expenditure of 280 million piasters and provided for virtual duplication of all government services in provinces concerned. Province chiefs expressed dissatisfaction with plan since it would appear rob them of responsibility and authority. After conference, grandiose scheme was abandoned.5 At present time Cung, with special commission from Prime Minister, is directing pilot [Page 122] project in south. [Name deleted] is not now active in pacification field. (MAAG is following up on this.)
11. I remarked to Diem we had indications things were not going well in center. There appears be conflict between government delegate and Prime Minister’s brother Ngo Dinh Can. President’s brothers generally are said to exercise functions outside their rightful sphere. Diem defended his brothers, saying they are not active in politics. He said he had often told people of center not to importune his brother Can for advice. Diem added that he was annoyed that people attached political importance to his family. He explained attacks on members of his family by saying that since he has no political party, those who must have an excuse for attacking him speak ill of his family. (We still feel he does use his brothers politically, with result many disadvantages, but have been unable to figure out how to stop this.)
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 751G.00/3–1055. Secret. Repeated for information to Paris.↩
- A memorandum of this conversation, drafted by Sturm on March 9, is in Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VIII, Memos for Record.↩
- According to Lansdale, Phuong and The joined the front, although they did so without realizing the significance of their decision; see In the Midst of Wars, pp. 246–247.↩
- Kieu Cong Cung. His activities are described ibid., pp. 207–213.↩
- In a memorandum to Collins dated March 8, Lieutenant Colonel John E. Dwan of Collins’ staff analyzed this plan. (Collins Papers, Vietnam File, Series VII, L)↩