Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

103. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, February 10, 1955, 2:08 p.m.¹

Washington, February 10, 1955, 2:08 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Farewell Call: The Prospects for the Government of the Republic of China and the Chinese Communist Regime.

PARTICIPANTS

• The Secretary
• Dr. George Yeh, Chinese Foreign Minister
• Dr. Wellington Koo, Chinese Ambassador
• Mr. Robertson, Assistant Secretary for Far Eastern Affairs (last half of conversation)
• Mr. McConaughy, Director, CA

Dr. Yeh said he had called to say goodbye and to express his gratitude for the great contribution the Secretary had made to the important negotiations which had recently come to fruition. He felt that no success could have been achieved without the efforts of the Secretary.

The Secretary commended Dr. Yeh on the large and constructive role he had played in the negotiations.

Dr. Yeh said that he would travel to Taipei via Manila, where he expected to discuss with Magsaysay and Garcia² the Philippine legal restrictions on aliens in the retail merchandising trade, which had put Chinese merchants out of business in the Philippines. This law had strained relations between China and the Philippines. He felt he could negotiate successfully with Magsaysay, who was a better man to deal with than Quirino³ had been. He said that Magsaysay knew he had made a mistake in signing the law, but had done it for political reasons. He understood that a joint committee of officials and Congressmen had been set up at Manila to study the law and consider the case for revision.

Dr. Yeh said he felt it was a matter of urgency for the U.S. and Chinese military authorities to begin joint consultations as to the strengthening of the defense of Quemoy and Matsu. Such consultations could take place quietly so as not to cause any public flurry. They were an imperative necessity since there was much to be done in a little time. The Chinese forces must not be caught in a state of unpreparedness if the Communists should strike unexpectedly.

In answer to a question from the Secretary as to the garrison on Matsu, Dr. Yeh said it was something less than 10,000. He said there was also a small naval station there. He confirmed that Matsu was within range of heavy artillery emplaced on the Mainland. It was not as close in as Quemoy.

The Secretary indicated that he did not have any objections to private military consultations between American and Chinese military representatives.

Dr. Yeh thought that a beginning might be made by sending small joint survey parties to look over the ground. He said that Admiral Radford would undoubtedly have some idea as to the best way to begin joint planning. He would hope to consult him.

Dr. Yeh recalled that it was a classical Chinese custom for a traveler who was saying goodbye to a friend to ask that friend for advice. He wished to ask the Secretary if, out of the wealth of his wisdom and experience he had some advice to tender.

The Secretary said he had not anticipated a request for advice. However it was very good of the Foreign Minister to solicit his views and he would take advantage of the opportunity to set forth extemporaneously some thoughts which recently he had been turning over in his mind. He said that he believed more thought needed to be given to the role which Free China should play in the situation now confronting us. It might be important to prepare the people of Free China for a more realistic and long range view of the situation. The people must be getting a little disillusioned with hearing every year from the Generalissimo and other Government leaders that they would march back to the Mainland in the course of the coming year. When year after year went by without this happening, some cynicism and disbelief must surely be engendered which might tend to discredit the Chinese Government.

The Secretary said the Minister should not think for a moment that the U.S. wanted or expected to see Free China chained to the island of Formosa forever. That small island must not become a prison for Free China. But no one could say with confidence that non-Communist China will expand beyond Formosa this year or next year. As long as there were 10 times as many soldiers on the Mainland as on Formosa, and as long as these Communist troops remained loyal and disciplined, it would be suicidal for the forces of Nationalist China to undertake to win back the Mainland unaided. The resources available to Nationalist China alone were not adequate for the purpose. It was not realistic to talk in those terms. The Secretary felt that a Government cannot go on fooling its people year after year. There was no idea among the American people in general, and certainly no idea in this Administration, of confining the Chinese Government to Formosa, but no time table could be fixed. The Chinese Government would have to wait for an opportunity and be prepared to recognize and seize it when it came. It would be necessary to wait for the forces of disintegration which are certainly at work in Communist China to have some effect. At some point the structure would be likely to crack. There will be unrest. When people are ruthlessly deprived for a long period of those things which they inately seek, they eventually react.

The Secretary said he could envisage off-hand at least three contingencies which might bring about a crisis for the Chinese Communist regime. He could probably think of more if he had a little more time for reflection:

1. A split among the rulers of the regime. Dissensions might crop out which would have an extremely disruptive effect. The Chinese Government might be able to intervene then with weighty effect. It might wield the balance of power.

2. There might be an upsurge of popular unrest. Forces from below in this case would upset the Communist dictatorship at the top even though the dictatorship remained unified. The ruthless exploitation of the people might lead to an upheaval. In such event the Chinese Government again might be able to intervene so as to affect decisively the power balance.

3. Finally, the possibility of large-scale hostilities could not be ruled out. We earnestly hoped this would not occur. But the contingency could not be dismissed. If the Communist leaders of China should precipitate war, the U.S. would expect the Chinese Communist forces to be hit from many directions—from the South, from Formosa, from Okinawa, and from Korea. The Chinese Government and its forces would have a vital role to play in this situation.

The Secretary said he thought it was important to think in these long-range terms. He was not criticising the Generalissimo for the specific short-range predictions he had felt constrained to make. The Generalissimo of course was the best judge of the requirements of his own situation. He felt that the Generalissimo was a wise man and a farsighted statesman. He had respect for his qualities of greatness. He thought the Generalissimo might wish to consider beginning to condition the Free Chinese people to this longer range and less specific, but more realistic approach.

The Secretary mentioned the very bad conditions undoubtedly existing in Russia. The Soviet Union had been subjected to very heavy demands. Undoubtedly the Soviet Union was overextended. The Soviet Union was trying to match U.S. military power with an industrial base only one-third or one-fourth that of the U.S. Communist China was undoubtedly pressing the Soviet Union hard for more military and industrial assistance. Through the Chinese Communists, the North Korean and Viet Minh regimes were making large demands. The military requirements in the European satellite countries were heavy. The economy of the European satellite countries had been squeezed. The satellite peoples were squirming under the demands made of them. They were restive. The whole Communist domain was overextended. The Soviets were trying to solve the problem by getting tougher. This might serve as a stopgap measure. But in time it could aggravate the situation. If the Soviet Union was overextended, Communist China undoubtedly was more overextended and an eventual crisis in Mainland China could be anticipated. The importance of having a Free China ready to move into such a situation is tremendous. This situation might develop this year. We hope there will not be a long wait. But no one can be sure that the crisis will come soon. It might be some years away. The important thing is to be ready and patiently bide one’s time until the right moment comes.

Dr. Yeh said that some of the Chinese Government leaders have been thinking along somewhat similar lines. Unfortunately it has become traditional for the Generalissimo to make a ringing declaration on the “Double Tenth” every year. Like many senior military men, the Generalissimo likes high-sounding rhetoric. It has seemed to him necessary to hold out some fairly immediate hope of return to the Mainland in order to maintain morale.

The Secretary said that he considered Adenauer⁴ to be probably the greatest statesman active today. Adenauer wants desperately to reunite Germany, but he refrains from specific predictions and does not assert reunion will come about by force of West German arms. He does not say it will happen this year or next year. He believes the thing to do is to keep strong, cultivate the necessary alliances, and be prepared for the opportunity. The time will certainly come in both Germany and China.

The Secretary wondered if the Chinese Government would not find the German example worthy of consideration. There would seem to be a danger that skepticism and disillusion might set in if the people are led to believe that a successful invasion will occur in 1955. He felt the Chinese Government must accept the evident fact that it cannot establish itself on the Mainland by its own strength alone. The dislodgment of the Communist dictatorship would have to come about through a conjunction of events. The overextension of Chinese Communist resources probably would become more conspicuous because of the youthful fanaticism of the new Chinese Communist regime. Although the recklessness of the Chinese Communists might bring about a crisis earlier than now seems likely, it is still impossible to make predictions. The Secretary feared that the promises of the Chinese Government which were not fulfilled might actually lower morale. While no outsider could speak authoritatively of morale problems in another country, certainly in the U.S. promises which are exposed as a bluff have a negative effect. The Secretary said he would reiterate that this Government “regards the disintegrative process as inherent in the nature of a Communist dictatorship, and as inevitable.” The Communist regimes are bound to crack. The leaders will fall out among themselves, or the people will rise up, or both, or the excesses of the regime will eventually cause all the non-Communist world to agree that the Communist dictators must be driven out as enemies of mankind. The Chinese Government is irreplaceable in the array of free world resources. The Chinese Government must be ready for its role when the time comes. It would seem wiser to be reticent about predictions and to husband the strength of free China for the ultimate opportunity.

Mr. Robertson said that some of the Chinese statements probably represented a reaction to inaccurate and irresponsible reporting by press correspondents and columnists in this country. They had created so much confusion as to the real course of our China policy that it could be readily understood why the Chinese Government was confused. The people who have the responsibility for Far Eastern policy in this Government knew that many of the reports freely bandied about in the New York Times and the Washington Post, and in the columns of such men as Drew Pearson and Herbert Elliston are false. But people who do not have access to policy could not know this. No wonder they were confused and often discouraged.

Dr. Yeh said that he had discreetly used his influence for some time to discourage the Generalissimo from making exact predictions about returning to the Mainland. At one time the Generalissimo and K. C. Wu⁵ had vied with each other in fixing precise dates for the return. He thought the Generalissimo was now less addicted to naming an early date.

Dr. Yeh said that off the record he would like to mention certain characteristics of the Generalissimo. First, he was at times highly emotional and temperamental. This accounted for some of his impulsive acts and displays of temper. Second, he believed deeply in his friends. He could not believe that a friend of long standing could betray him or lie to him. This trait was often a good thing but sometimes was unfortunate. A good friend with sound judgment could talk very frankly to the Generalissimo and often influence his decisions in a very useful way. It so happened that among Americans, the Generalissimo had a special liking for Mr. Robertson and Admiral Radford. He liked them as individuals in addition to having confidence in their integrity and the soundness of their policy positions. They could talk to him with the utmost frankness without giving offense. And they could influence him. On the other hand, some of the Generalissimo’s Chinese advisers had been entirely unable to convince him that some of his old Chinese friends were unworthy of his confidence. Third, the Generalissimo had the great attribute of seeing clearly the only right course when a showdown came and a basic decision had to be made. Although he was loath to accept a course distasteful to himself when the chips were not down, he had the remarkable quality of being able to accept an unpalatable alternative if it was in fact the only one which would escape catastrophe. He perceived how certain courses would be disastrous when this was not apparent to lesser men. This was the mark of his greatness, as the Foreign Minister saw it.

Dr. Yeh said that the false and illfounded American press reports which Mr. Robertson had mentioned had a very unsettling and exasperating effect on the Generalissimo. All of the adverse rumors about alleged impending recognition of Red China, admission of Red China to the UN, surrender of the off-shore islands, creation of a “two-China” situation, UN trusteeship for Formosa, etc. were systematically cabled to the Generalissimo every day by the Central News Agency man in Washington, who was very diligent in digging up these reports, from mid-western and Pacific Coast papers as well as those of the eastern seaboard. These were usually read out loud to the Generalissimo every morning before breakfast while he was being shaved. Often they worked him up to a state of great agitation and he would call the Foreign Minister while still at the boiling point. The Foreign Minister would point out that most of these columnists were thoroughly discredited and should not be taken seriously. The Generalissimo would often reply that he knew this, but the writers must have some high level contacts who were talking along these lines. He could not understand how there could be no foundation whatever for such persistent reports.

Mr. Robertson remarked that Drew Pearson had been branded for years as an inveterate and malicious liar. Elliston was known to be animated by an almost psychopathic bias against the Chinese Government as a result of having been fired from a position as Advisor to the Generalissimo years ago. Mr. Robertson mentioned the outrageous falsehood perpetrated by Elliston a few days ago when he alleged that Mr. Dulles had had the Yoshida letter about Japanese relations with Nationalist China⁶ in his pocket at the time of the San Franciso Peace Conference in 1951.⁷ This letter was not written until several months later. It was a falsehood of the grossest and most flagrant character.

The Secretary said that he never read the columnists. It was not worth his while to pay any attention to them. If what they wrote about foreign affairs happened to be correct, he already knew about it and it was a waste of his time to read it. If they were wrong or misrepresented things, it simply made him angry without his being able to do anything about it. It was bad to get angry needlessly so he found that regardless of the circumstances it was better for him not to read the columnists.

Ambassador Koo referred to the earlier exchange of views about showing more patience in regard to the return to the Mainland. He asked if mischief makers among the press correspondents would not misinterpret a more restrained attitude as indicating the development of a “two-China” situation?

The Secretary said that there are two Chinas in the sense that there are two contending Chinese forces, and two rival Chinese Governments. There is still a civil war situation and it takes two to make a civil war. We recognize the existence of the Chinese Communist regime as a fact, just as we recognize the fact of the existence of Communist regimes in East Germany, North Korea and North Vietnam. But there is no diplomatic recognition. We do not recognize any of them as lawful governments. We hope, expect and plan for the unification of Germany, Korea and China under non-Communist Governments. We intend to help the forces of freedom and we believe they will prevail. But we are not trying to force unification by military means. We must be optimistic, awaiting with confidence the chance which will come. There is no implication at all in our awareness of the existence of a powerful Chinese Communist regime that we recognize it as the lawful government of China. We don’t recognize it diplomatically for any purpose.

Amb. Koo remarked that while the opportunity to strike is awaited, all the non-Communist countries must do everything they can to prevent the Communist regimes from increasing and consolidating their strength.

The Secretary said that he emphatically agreed. It was important to keep the Communist regimes under economic and other pressures. The pressures add to the strains which will lead to disintegration. He thought the current Soviet situation showed this. The pressures had resulted in failures of the Soviet high command to meet their objectives. They had thrown out Malenkov,⁸ the fellow who symbolized the failure. The Communist leaders were faced by a dilemma. They could not reduce their commitments, and they could not increase their resources fast enough to cover their commitments. This sort of dilemma tended to lead to a breakdown. Communist China must be in a worse situation. The Secretary said he believed in continuing to subject Communist China to all the stresses we could by applying pressures. Not all of our Allies agreed with us on the efficacy of a policy of pressures, and there were certain differences of opinion in this regard within the American Government. He could not guarantee that every act of the American Government would be consistent with this theory of pressures, but he thought that would be the general approach and he himself was convinced of the soundness of it. He said the evidence of the last few days from the Soviet Union in his view had afforded strong new evidence of the wisdom of keeping the pressures on the Communists. The program of the Communists requires exertions which are beyond their strength. A policy of pressures can increase the gap between their requirements and their resources. The Soviet leaders have just realized that the Soviet economy cannot provide both guns and butter. So they have cut out the butter. This tends to make trouble among the Soviet masses. This trouble will grow. The imminence of a crisis in a Communist dictatorship is never readily discernible. The recent upset of Malenkov took everybody by surprise, including the intelligence experts. There were a few straws, but they did not point to such an early development of a crisis. Many high Soviet officials were unaware that a crisis was in the making.

We must have faith that the dissolution of this evil system is gradually taking place even when there is no surface evidence. The Secretary quoted St. Paul: “Faith is the substance of things hoped for, the evidence of things not seen.” We must know in our hearts that Communism contains the seeds of its own destruction. External pressures hasten the destructive process.

The Secretary said the danger in vigorous application of a policy of pressures was that a totalitarian regime when near the point of break-up may lash out recklessly in order to avoid or postpone an internal crisis. He believed that World War I was brought about more because of such a lashing out by the Austro-Hungarian and the Russian autocracies, which were near the break-up point in 1914, than by Prussian militarism.

Amb. Koo said he would point out the importance of continuity of pressure. If pressure was applied intermittently, the effects were dissipated.

Dr. Yeh inquired if the British were supporting a plan for a Formosa cease-fire conference outside the UN?

The Secretary said the British had not proposed any such conference as far as he knew. He had informed the British Ambassador that this Government would not take part in any conference as to Formosa at which the GRC was not represented.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–1055. Secret. Drafted by McConaughy. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers)
2. Ramon Magsaysay, President of the Philippines. Carlos P. Garcia, Vice President and Foreign Minister of the Philippines.
3. Elpidio Quirino, former President of the Philippines, 1948–1953.
4. Konrad Adenauer, Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany.
5. Governor of Taiwan, 1949–1953.
6. Reference is to a letter of December 24, 1951, from Shigeru Yoshida, then Japanese Prime Minister, to Dulles, who was then Consultant to Secretary of State Acheson; for text, see Foreign Relations, 1951, vol. vi, Part 2, pp. 1466–1467.
7. Reference is to the Conference held at San Francisco, September 4–8, 1951, at which the Japanese Peace Treaty was signed.
8. Georgiy M. Malenkov had been replaced as Soviet Premier 2 days earlier by Marshal Nikolai A. Bulganin.