Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

128. Diary Entry by the President’s Press Secretary (Hagerty)¹

Washington, February 24, 1955.

. . . . . . .

In the afternoon went with Roy Howard² to see the President. Roy is leaving in a few days for a trip around the world. After visiting Honolulu he is going to the Philippines to see his old friend Magsaysay and then to Formosa for a visit with Chiang Kai-shek and Madam Chiang. He then expects to go to Hong Kong, Karachi, Afghanistan, to the Near East and then home by way of Paris. In many of these areas of the world Roy has good friends among the local people and the President was considerably interested in his trip.

Howard asked the President if there was anything he could do for him and for our country while he was travelling, and the President said that while he realized that Howard was going as a newspaperman and had to remain completely free to operate as a newspaperman he would think that Howard could be helpful in Formosa if in his friendly, informal conversations with the Generalissimo he would stress the following: “Someone—and it could be you—has got to get Chiang to see several things clearly. The first of these is that in holding Formosa and the Pescadores for the free world he must not permit his position to become a fixed one, one which is linked closely to those offshore islands. Secondly, he must realize that he is in a position of great opportunity and that he must keep up his Army and be ready to move if the Communists, as I expect they will sooner or later, make an attack either in Korea or in Indo-China. Then Chiang is in a position to attack and to attack hard the center. That’s the only way he’s ever going to get back to the mainland and someone should tell him this.”

The President discussed at great length with Howard the position of Quemoy and Matsu. In both instances he admitted that these islands were good for defensive purposes—that Quemoy controlled the harbor of Amoy and Matsu controlled the harbor of Foochow. But it would be extremely difficult since they were just off the mainland to defend them against an all-out Communist attack. Such an attack would endanger American fleet units which would have to be moved in close to the China Mainland. The President said he was not saying that we would not defend Quemoy and Matsu, that he could think of many conditions where we would—but what he was impressing on Howard was that Chiang should not center his whole question of the morale of his people on those two islands. “If he does that and loses that eventually, he will be in exactly the same position as the French were when they tried to defend Dienbienphu, an impossible position, and then lost it. At that time we urged the French not to make a stand, that it could not possibly be defended—but they paid no attention. Chiang must not make the same mistake”. As to the position of opportunity which Chiang now holds the President said that he hoped that Howard, in talking to him, would try to get it around so that this idea was Chiang’s idea and not Howard’s. He said that the Chinese Communists were getting arrogant and were being supplied with material of war by the Russians. We, in turn, are building up Chiang’s forces, are building up their air force and are giving matériel to them. The President said that sooner or later he expected that the Chinese Communists would move either south or north and that that was the time when Chiang’s great opportunity would come. “If he keeps up the morale of his troops, if he keeps up his Army, he will always be a threat to the Chinese Communists. You know full well that he has 400,000 troops trained and equipped. Now, while Matsu and Quemoy are defensive positions, they certainly would not be used in an offensive by Chiang against the Mainland. In an invasion of a mainland, you don’t land on an island because if you do, you just have to get off of it and go forward. When I was in command during the war, we didn’t land at Brest or LeHavre; we went around to the beaches of the mainland. That is what Chiang is going to have to do and that is the only way he is ever going to get back to the mainland.”

The President also asked Howard if he was going to stop in India. Howard said he was not, that he did not particularly like Nehru and that he had no plans to do so. The President said that was all right but if he was writing stories from that area, to please not knock down the Indians too much. “After all, India is a vast continent of 350 million people. If they are ever added to the great populations that the Communists now control, the free world will be up against it, not only in the East but throughout the world. I don’t trust Nehru. He thinks he is a kingmaker. But we have got to keep them at least on the neutral side if we can. So please, Roy, don’t go slamming the Indians in any stories that you write.” Howard promised not to do this and also promised to have a series of talks with Chiang, with Madame Chiang interpreting.

The President told Howard that if he could get Chiang to believe this way, he would really be doing a service to the free world.³

1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Hagerty Papers. Extract.
2. Roy W. Howard, chairman of the executive committee of Scripps-Howard Newspapers.

3. According to notes prepared in the White House of a telephone conversation on March 10 between the President and Secretary Dulles, the latter said that on his return from the Far East he had seen Roy Howard, then on his way to Taipei, and that Howard had given Dulles the impression that he was on a special mission from the President. The notes record the President’s reply as follows: “President did see him, but does not recall anything special—just the usual suggestion to convey his personal greetings, good health & wish them well.” (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, DDE Diaries) Telegram 532 to Taipei, March 10, for Rankin from Dulles, sent shortly afterward, stated that although Howard had seen the President in Washington and talked to Dulles in Honolulu, “you should understand these were merely normal talks and that he is not entrusted with any mission from either the President or me.” (Department of State, Central Files, 911.6293/3–1055) Rankin reported Howard’s visit in telegram 655 from Taipei, March 23, which reads in part as follows:

   “Roy Howard described to me March 19 what he intended tell President Chiang. It was in line with philosophy of free China’s existence and future which you outlined to Chiang during March 3 conversation and I encouraged Howard to go ahead.

   “Last night Howard told me he spent 8 hours with President which he described as most satisfactory talks with Chiang he had ever experienced. Essential points were covered in news story he sent his papers with instructions to forward copy to you. Chiang apparently convinced Howard that Kinmen and Matsu would be defended with or without direct US aid. (Foreign Minister assures me Chinese Government unanimous on this point which I am inclined this time to accept as true.)” (Ibid., 793.00/3–2355)