Office of the Historian

130. Telegram From the Secretary of State to the Department of State1

Bangkok, February 25, 1955—3 p.m.

Dulte 9. For Hoover. Reference: Dulte 2.2 In my discussion with Eden last night I read him following memo and permitted him make copy:

Begin text:

The US has exerted itself to create conditions which would end active military hostilities in the Formosa area.

1.
We made a treaty with the Republic of China which excluded from the treaty area all positions held by the Republic of China except Formosa and the Pescadores, which we committed ourselves defend as against armed attack.
2.
We negotiated an agreement with the Republic of China whereby it agreed (A) not to carry on offensive actions from any territory held by it (i.e. Formosa, Pescadores, and the coastal positions) except in agreement with the US, and (B) not to weaken the defense of Formosa by the diversion and expenditure elsewhere of elements of power contributed to it by the US.
3.
We contributed essentially to evacuation by the Republic of China of its forces from the Tachen group of islands and their surrender to the Chinese Communists. We anticipate a similar evacuation from Nanchi. We have repeatedly restrained the Republic of China from attacking offensive build-ups on the mainland.
4.
We limited the Congressional resolution giving the President authority to use armed forces so that it applied only [to] Formosa and related areas deemed important to the defense Formosa.
5.
We made clear the acceptability to us of a UN “cease-fire” resolution and we secured the acquiescence of the Republic of China in this move, despite strong objection to what it thought would blight its future.
6.
We have resisted powerful popular and Congressional pressures to take retaliatory action against the Chinese Communists for their flagrant offense to the US in imprisoning our airmen captured in the Korean war.

In the face of this temperate action by the US, the Chinese Communists have become more intemperate. They have made increasingly [Page 311] official and formal determination to use force to take Formosa; they have treated the islands surrendered by the Republic of China as new facilities to take Formosa by force; and they are making ready a circle of airfields along coast opposite Formosa.

Under the circumstances we feel that we have gone as far as is prudent in making concessions. If the Chinese Communists, while retaining their claims to Formosa, would give assurances that they would not seek a verdict by force, then situation might be different. But as matters now stand, we are compelled conclude the Chinese Communists intend seek take Formosa, probably by a combination of attempted invasion and internal subversion; or at least that they intend probe our intention to the point of finding out whether the US is prepared fight. They would readily sacrifice much manpower in this experiment.

At the moment, [to] pressure the Republic of China into surrender of Quemoy and Matsu would (1) importantly increase attacking capacity of the Chinese Communists by making more available Amoy and Fuchow harbors, the natural staging grounds for a sea attack; (2) greatly weaken morale of the Republic of China on Formosa and increase opportunity of Chinese Communists subversion; (3) probably increase the Chinese Communists’ intention probe our resolution by putting it to the test of action.

In other words, further retreat would, in our opinion, both weaken the defense capability Formosa and increase the risk that that capability will be put to the test of battle.

Dulles
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/2–2555. Top Secret; Priority; Limited Distribution. Received at 8:06 a.m.↩
  2. Document 123.↩