Office of the Historian

200. Memorandum From the Director of the Policy Planning Staff (Bowie) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, April 9, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • Comments on Proposed Offshore Island Solution2
1.
The proposed solution for the offshore islands is based upon the implicit conclusion that the U.S. should not participate in their defense and that militarily and politically both the U.S. and the ChiNats would be better off if their prestige were not committed to the defense of the islands. The solution calls for disengagement of U.S. and ChiNat prestige through persuasion of Chiang to regard the islands as expendable outposts.
2.
Chiang recognizes that his only hope of achieving his paramount ambition of return to the Mainland lies in large-scale U.S. military involvement with the Chinese Communists. To Chiang the offshore islands are important not so much for defense of Taiwan or for demonstrating Nationalist military prowess but because they offer the most likely means for involving the U.S. in hostilities with the Chinese Communists which could expand to create his opportunity for invasion. To treat the islands as expendable outposts would forfeit the prospect of such U.S. military involvement. Consequently, Chiang can hardly be persuaded to do so unless he is completely convinced that the U.S. has no intention of participating in their defense. And only a forthright public statement to the effect would be likely to convince him.
3.
Moreover, under the proposed course of action, in order not to impair its own prestige and the confidence of its allies and the free world, the U.S. would have to make publicly clear in advance its intentions regarding the coastal islands. Even if the U.S. succeeded, without a public statement, in persuading Chiang to treat the islands as outposts, U.S. intentions toward the islands would not be clear to U.S. or free world opinion. If in such circumstances the Communists were to attack the offshore islands, the proposed action would [Page 474] appear to reflect timidity, irresolution or weakness. U.S. opinion would be torn between the belief that participation in defense of the islands was not in the national interest and the feeling that we should not desert, under fire, an ally who might have had some reason to expect our assistance. Free world loss of confidence in U.S. resolution would be acute and the neighboring countries would suffer considerably greater shock to their morale than if the U.S., prior to an attack, had made clear its intention not to defend the islands. Moreover, failure to clarify our position in advance of an attack would forfeit the chance of solidifying our allies in support for our defense of Taiwan.
4.
Thus a U.S. public statement of its firm intention not to participate in defense of the islands will be required both to persuade Chiang to regard them as expendable outposts and to prevent damaging effects upon free world support for U.S. objectives and upon U.S. opinion.
5.
From the point of view of avoiding U.S. dictation of Chiang’s actions it would be preferable to leave to Chiang a choice as to whether, with no expectation of U.S. defense, he would prefer to hold the islands as outposts or to withdraw from them. From the point of view of U.S. interests, however, it would be preferable if Chiang decided to withdraw. Nationalist withdrawal would preclude the possibility that Chiang, even though agreeing to regard the islands as outposts, would continue to work to improve the prospects of subsequent U.S. involvement. Nationalist withdrawal would avoid the unsettling effects upon U.S. opinion inherent, even with a prior U.S. statement that it would not intervene, in standing by if the Communists should actually attack. Nationalist withdrawal would maximize the possibilities of securing broad international support for U.S. protection of Formosa and the Pescadores.
6.
In presenting Chiang the choice between withdrawing from the islands and regarding them as outposts, the U.S. should offer to provide military cover for an orderly withdrawal if such should be his choice. Protection with strong U.S. military forces of a Nationalist withdrawal could, moreover, be valuable in maintaining U.S. prestige despite the withdrawal.
7.
Accordingly, to implement the proposed offshore island solution Chiang should be privately informed that:
(a)
For the reasons set forth in the analysis from which the proposed solution is derived the U.S. has decided that it is not in the interests of either the United States or the Republic of China for the U.S. to participate in the defense of the offshore islands;
(b)
Because of the world-wide damage that might otherwise accrue to the U.S. and Chinese Nationalist position it will be necessary for the United States shortly to make its decision publicly clear;
(c)
The United States believes that in these circumstances Chiang should not commit the prestige of his government to all-out defense of the islands but should choose either to regard them as expendable outposts or to withdraw from them;
(d)
If Chiang elects to withdraw the United States will provide military cover for an orderly withdrawal of Nationalist forces;
(e)
In either case the United States is prepared to accelerate its assistance to Nationalist China and to station U.S. forces on Formosa.
RRB
  1. Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, White House Memoranda. Secret; Personal and Private.↩
  2. See Document 194.↩