260. Telegram From the Ambassador in India (Cooper) to the Department of State1

1874. Eyes only George Allen. Menon and Pillai,2 at Pillai’s request came to see me 5 p.m. today (May 27). Menon opened conversation saying Prime Minister Nehru had asked them to call. Pillai then said that he had come at Prime Minister’s request, emphasize GOI support of Menon’s statements.

Menon then said that at early hour today Prime Minister Nehru had sent messages to President and Secretary3 which he read to me. Messages were sent to Indian Ambassador Washington for delivery.

With respect to GOI announcement of sending and content of messages, Menon said no announcement would be made by GOI, until his press conference Monday4 afternoon when he would announce fact. Until that time GOI would respond all inquiries with answer, “There is no official announcement”.

Menon said he had talked this morning to Middleton and Williams, Acting High Commissioners UK and Canada, and informed them that messages had been sent by Nehru to Eden and Pearson. When I asked if he had told them of messages to President and Secretary, his answer was “No”.

They said purpose of visit was to request me inform US Government that subject matter and scope of Menon’s conversations with Chou; Menon’s impressions; atmosphere of meetings, were so difficult to convey by messages that conversations at Washington were necessary if progress was to be made.

Commenting on substantive matters, Menon said one concrete result obtained was agreement of Chinese Communists to release four US airmen of “Fischer Group”.

He said that announcement release would be made by Chinese Communists May 30 and he would also make statement at his press conference New Delhi same day. When I asked why not all prisoners released, Menon replied that he had found Chou had to deal with public opinion and there was much news there of US-Chinese Communist air fight off Korea; and US negotiations Cambodia5 which [Page 577] made release difficult. Further that it was opening step by Chinese Communists. Menon said flatly he was sure all airmen would be released if relatives permitted to visit them, visits being interpreted by him as moderator of “public opinion”. Said he felt sure Chinese Communists willing reach settlement respecting release all US nationals in China. His comment on this not clear but I understand it was settlement in connection Chinese nationals in US which could be restatement of old Chinese Communist position.

Only other comment bearing on substance was that he felt sure there would be no initiation of hostilities Formosan Straits by Chinese Communists during time subject of possibility of negotiations being discussed.

He said he had talked six times Chou, averaging three hours each talk, on subject negotiations. In addition, had talked once with Mao and several times with other officials on subject. Chou had expressed no enmity to “American people”, atmosphere of talks had been good, and he was convinced Chinese Communists wanted peaceful solution of issues.

At this point, Pillai made his single comment during hour talk, saying it was belief of GOI that Chinese Communists wanted peaceful solutions.

Menon again citing importance of “Chinese opinion” said it important his view that:

(1)
Release of four US airmen would not result in US “hard” statements or demands that would cause Chinese Communist statements and reactions which would make progress difficult. Said this very important and he hoped US Government would exercise restraining attitude. Also urged strongly that US statements and action on whole subject of negotiations be moderate.
[(2)]
Without elaboration suggested that a method of negotiations had been opened in his talks. On this point said “While Chinese Communists must continue to say they will not discuss ‘ceasefire’ because there is no firing between Communist China and US—nevertheless it is possible to discuss subject”.

Menon said he wanted his comments to be taken as reporting of facts, and not as an argument “for or against” Chinese Communist or US positions whether they were right or wrong, that he had acted at direction of Prime Minister Nehru, he had not reported to him until his return, and he had made no statements on substance of talks to anyone else but Nehru.

Menon asked me my personal views on possibility negotiation.

I responded by giving US position based on Department messages. I suggested that he would have opportunity talk to Secretary at San Francisco. He said impossible talk there, as satisfactorily and fully as required, and that was reason put in Nehru message. Said he [Page 578] would leave for New York in seven to ten days as if on way San Francisco and any meetings with Secretary at Washington could be handled without undue notice. Said his attitude and that of GOI was not to act in way which could be interpreted as putting pressure on US or making consultations difficult.

His attitude throughout hour talk was courteous, reasonable, apparent frankness, desire to talk with President and Secretary indicated throughout conversation. Have no doubt that he convinced Prime Minister Nehru of necessity of talks at Washington to present full impression of his talks with Chou, and also convinced him necessity of Prime Minister sending messages to secure fullest consideration by US.

Today, Vincent Sheean6 informed Hall7 and sent me note saying that Prime Minister had sent messages to President and Secretary. When I asked Pillai and Menon about this leak to Sheean, both denied any leak from GOI. Sheean had told Hall that Matthei, one of Nehru’s secretaries had told him of sending of messages, but nothing about content. I believe Pillai and Menon had no knowledge of the leak.

After talk, Pillai sent me copies of Nehru’s messages. Verbatim text follows:

[Here follow the texts of Prime Minister Nehru’s messages to President Eisenhower and Secretary Dulles.]

Cooper
  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2755. Secret; Niact; No Distribution.
  2. N. Raghavan Pillai, Secretary-General of the Indian Ministry of External Affairs.
  3. For text of the message to the President, see supra. The message to the Secretary, similar in substance, was transmitted in a letter of May 27 from Ambassador Mehta to Dulles. (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/5–2755)
  4. May 30.
  5. A military assistance agreement between the United States and Cambodia had been signed on May 16; for text, see 6 UST (pt. 1) 995.
  6. An American journalist.
  7. Counselor of Embassy Graham R. Hall.