274. Memorandum of a Conversation Between the Secretary of State and British Foreign Secretary Macmillan, San Francisco, June 20, 1955, 4:45 p.m.1
Mr. Macmillan raised the question of China. He said he felt that Menon was messing things up and perhaps giving the Chinese Communists the feeling that some precise formula could be arrived at, and that if it did not work out that way, then they might feel that the alternative was to resort to force. I said I agreed that Menon had [Page 606] not helped the situation. We had seen him because Nehru had written both the President and me urging that we should do so2 and also Sir Anthony had done the same.3 He has certainly crossed wires with the UN in his efforts on behalf of the 11 prisoners, and I felt that situation had slipped backwards as the result of Menon’s meddling.
Mr. Macmillan asked what I had in mind for the future. I said the only thought I had about the prisoner situation was that possibly we might have, either directly or through third countries, an exchange of commissioners, one from each side; that our commissioner would go to China with a view to getting out the Americans, both military and civilian, and the commissioner from the Communist side could come here to check up on the Chinese students and be sure that the ones who wanted to return had authority to leave the country. It had occurred to me that this exchange might serve to save the face of the Chinese. I said this was just a vague idea, and it had not been cleared in any way in the Department. Mr. Macmillan thought that this idea had merit. He suggested that anything we did along these lines could better be done through the British than through the Indians. He did not think the Indians were very reliable and that they talked a great deal without accomplishing anything.
He then asked as to the other aspects of the matter. I said I thought that there was nothing to be done but to wait [for] the processes of evolution, that it might be a five-year matter before we knew whether the Chinese Communists would really maintain their hold on the country or possibly break down; or on the other hand, whether they were going to adopt standards of conduct such that they could be received into decent society. The processes of time would also have a bearing upon the Formosan situation. At the present time, Chiang had to speak in terms of using his army to recapture the Mainland because otherwise it was difficult to hold their loyalty. However, as those who came from the Mainland were gradually replaced by Formosans, their interest would shift more to defense and away from offense. No one could know just how the future would evolve. The main thing was to give it a chance to evolve without war. Mr. Macmillan said that one of the troubles was that they were so close together, and he spoke of Quemoy and Matsu. I said that I was sure it was not feasible to bring about any [Page 607] evacuation of these islands at the present time. I said that if it was apparent that there was not going to be fighting, there might be a reduction in the size of the Chinese Nationalist forces on the islands, but that I thought that evacuation must be regarded as out of the question at least for the time being.
Mr. Macmillan said it was very interesting for them to know how our mind was working on these matters, because they could accommodate themselves to our thinking if they knew what it was.4
[Here follow two paragraphs concerning subsequent unrelated discussions and a paragraph describing a brief conversation with Chinese representative Tsiang concerning a possible visit to Washington by Foreign Minister Yeh.]
- Source: Eisenhower Library, Dulles Papers, General Memoranda of Conversation. Secret; Personal and Private. Drafted by Dulles.↩
- For text of Prime Minister Nehru’s message to the President, see Document 259; regarding his message to Dulles, see footnote 3, Document 260.↩
- An undated message from Prime Minister Eden to the President, sent with a covering note from Ambassador Makins, stated that Menon’s main idea was to find ways of reducing tension in the Far East without discussing any particular solution to the problem of Formosa and expressed the hope that Eisenhower would see him. (Eisenhower Library, Whitman File, International Series)↩
- Macmillan comments on this conversation in Tides of Fortune, 1945–1955 (New York: Harper & Row, 1969), pp. 613–614.↩
- The source text bears a typed signature.↩