Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

283. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 1, 1955, 4:10 p.m.¹

Washington, July 1, 1955, 4:10 p.m.

SUBJECT

• Far Eastern Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Krishna Menon
• Ambassador G. L. Mehta, India
• The Secretary
• Mr. George V. Allen—NEA

After inconsequential remarks lasting perhaps five minutes, during which each participant gave the other full opportunity to begin discussions of substance, the Secretary remarked that one of his chief difficulties was to decide who, among five or six people who had indicated to him that they could speak with authority as to Chou En-lai’s views, did in fact have such authority. He said that some responsible individuals presented quite different and even contrary views from others. He mentioned that Prime Minister U Nu of Burma had just given him some new thoughts. He was beginning to wonder whether Peking had many lines out, hoping to reap the best advantage it could from the reports which all these people brought back.

Mr. Menon said that there was no trick. It was up to the United States, of course, to draw its own conclusions, but he himself had not heard any divergence in the presentation of Chou En-lai’s position.

The Secretary referred to the competition which seemed to be building up with regard to handling the question of American prisoners in China. He did not believe that a half dozen people working on this problem could accomplish as much as one person charged with full responsibility.

Mr. Menon asserted that he had no desire whatever to enter into any competition, that Mr. Hammarskjold could say and do what he liked on the subject.

The Secretary pointed out that there was a domestic problem inside the United States regarding the prisoners. Their relatives had appealed to members of Congress, many of whom were demanding strong action. He had taken the position before Congressional committees that the primary responsibility for obtaining their release rested with the UN, at least in the first instance. He asked Mr. Menon if the latter thought we should now say that the UN had failed. This would be a serious decision since demands for punitive action by the US would undoubtedly become stronger.

Mr. Menon said he did not think the UN should withdraw from the matter and he did not believe that several persons working on it did any harm.

As regards the larger problem, Mr. Menon said the question was to determine whether there existed a basis for negotiation leading to a relaxation of tensions. He did not think that negotiation could take place while serious fighting was going on. A climate must therefore be created for the cessation of violence. Since practically the only violence now taking place was around Quemoy and Matsu, those two islands seemed to be the crux of the immediate problem. If the Chinese Communists tried to take the islands by force, the United States would either have to intervene or suffer a loss of prestige. Both he and his Prime Minister were anxious, he said, to avoid such loss of prestige by the United States. He was aware that no actual talks about the islands or anything else could take place while the American prisoners were in jail, but the basis for the talks could be discussed.

The Secretary said that it was not necessary for the prisoners to be released in order to enable talks to take place. He pointed out that in his statement, following the Bandung Conference, expressing willingness to negotiate with Peking, he had attached no conditions. He agreed that the conversations would be carried on in a much more favorable atmosphere after the prisoners were released, but he had never demanded their release as a prior condition.

Mr. Menon asked how a state of non-violence could be achieved until the question of the islands was settled. The Secretary asked what islands he had in mind. If Mr. Menon took the position that coastal islands off China had to be turned over to Peking in order to achieve peace, what about Hong Kong. It was geographically, ethnically and economically as close to China as Quemoy and Matsu. He pointed out that the Chinese Communists had occupied the mainland for five years, 1950–1954, without fighting for Quemoy and Matsu. Why had they suddenly become so excited about them? Perhaps it was because they had been waiting for the buildup of their air bases nearby in order to take them by force. The use of force could not achieve peace in the Far East any more than in any other area of the world. Force could only be met with force. “The United States not only will not but cannot now bring about the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu”, he said.

Mr. Menon asked, “Then, what is your idea of the future?” The Secretary said that the present situation should be accepted, since the problem was one which could only be solved by time. If a solution were sought by force, the only answer would be by the sword. He said he could not understand the sudden demand for an immediate solution since now there was no solution to the basic problem except war.

Mr. Menon referred to the buildup of military strength on the islands. The Secretary said there was also a buildup on the mainland opposite. If a different trend could be started in one area, it also might be achieved in the other.

Mr. Menon said he could see no backdown by the other side (i.e. Peking) if the coastal islands remained as they were. He felt that there must be some possibility for a peaceful settlement. The Secretary said he sincerely hoped so. “We are doing everything in our power to prevent the use of force to achieve unification of Korea, Germany and Vietnam. Why should the Chinese Communists be the only ones to use force to achieve unification?”, he asked.

Mr. Menon referred to the use of force by Formosa. The Secretary said we were trying to avoid the use of force by both sides.

Mr. Menon said that the Secretary could win debater’s points but what was needed was a peaceful settlement. “Then we agree”, said the Secretary. He repeated that he could no more discuss the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu than he would expect Mr. Menon to discuss withdrawal of the Communists from the mainland. He emphasized that time and time alone was the only answer. If the Communist Chinese took the position that a solution must come now, they would have to take the consequences.

Mr. Menon asked whether Quemoy and Matsu were a part of China. The Secretary asked again whether Hong Kong was a part of China. He agreed that Quemoy and Matsu were geographically a part of China but said they were not politically a part of Red China any more than Hong Kong was. He declared that if a person does not love peace enough to let time have its curative opportunity, that person was not a very devout lover of peace.

Mr. Menon remarked that in the beginning of the conversation the Secretary had questioned his right to speak for the Chinese Communists. He declared that he had never tried to do so. If anyone had different views regarding the position of Chou En-lai, he would be interested to learn them. The Secretary said he could not divulge what others had said in confidence, but that he had received four or five reports. Some people, for example, thought that the best means of finding a solution would be through direct talks between Chiang Kai-shek and Mao.

Mr. Menon asked whether the Secretary was saying to him in polite but frank terms, “Thank you for nothing”. The Secretary said he was not. He said he was merely pointing out that he did not know who really represented the views of Peking. On the question of prisoners, he said he hesitated to negotiate behind the back of the UN. Mr. Menon said he was not “negotiating” regarding the prisoners or regarding anything else. The Secretary said Secretary General Hammarskjold might have a different opinion on this subject. If the Chinese Reds thought they could get something out of us through Mr. Menon or someone else, they would never talk to Mr. Hammarskjold.

Mr. Menon remarked that Mr. Hammarskjold had gone to Peking and had had his say. The Secretary asked “Is it your position that the UN has failed? If so, what do I say to the United States Senate?” Mr. Menon said he thought, with all respect, that the Secretary could say that both the UN and others were active on the prisoner question. The Secretary said that four or five channels could not be pursued effectively.

“If our efforts have been harmful”, Mr. Menon replied, “we can withdraw”. He asked whether the Secretary felt that India’s efforts had been harmful. The Secretary said that he did not think the intent had been harmful—quite the contrary. He was confident that the Indian motives had been the best, but the result had been that Hammarskjold’s efforts had been nullified. Mr. Menon commented that Mr. Hammarskjold represented an organization of which the US was a party. He said the messages which President Eisenhower and the Secretary had sent to his Prime Minister had not indicated any feeling that India was interfering. He declared that it was extremely embarrassing to him that Mr. Hammarskjold took a contrary view. He thought that if one side took the position that one particular channel had to be used, the talks might not progress favorably.

The Secretary said that he was willing to look at the question from every angle. It might, in fact, be that Hammarskjold’s efforts had been harmful. If so, they should be called off. Mr. Menon said he did not think so. The Secretary then asked him directly “Do you think the UN efforts have been harmful or not?”. Mr. Menon said he could not answer that question. The Secretary said he understood that Mr. Menon did think the UN efforts were harmful. Mr. Menon said he should not be required to answer that question. As for himself, he could not discuss the general situation in Peking without also talking about the prisoners. The Secretary said that all he could say about the prisoners was that their release would improve the atmosphere, but he was not willing to bargain for their release. He said he had presumed that Peking wanted to obtain international recognition to get into the UN and to achieve relaxations and peace. Perhaps he was wrong. If so, we must face the consequences.

Mr. Menon said that he had not pressed the prisoners question but that it had been pushed forward by public opinion in the US. He thought the American public had an incorrect idea of Communist China. He said China was quite different from Russia, and asserted that different political parties exist in China today. He was confident that Peking wanted good relations with the US because it was not happy to remain dependent on the friendship of only one great power.

The Secretary said he had seen no evidence of such a desire on the part of Peking. It was entirely within the ability of Red China, within the next few years, to achieve recognition by the US and membership in the UN, but they were certainly not acting now in a manner to achieve those ends. They could not shoot their way into the UN. If anyone wished to join a club, he should not go about it by insulting the members of the Admissions’ Committee.

The Secretary emphasized that negotiations at this time designed to bring about a quick solution to the entire problem could be very dangerous because they would be more likely to end in war than in peace. If negotiations could deal with marginal aspects of the question and were very carefully handled, they might be helpful, but if matters were brought to a head now, the results might be catastrophic. He emphasized once more that he could not negotiate the evacuation of Quemoy and Matsu.

The discussion terminated with an expression by the Secretary of his belief that the discussions with Mr. Menon had been useful and a readiness to receive any further thoughts Mr. Menon might have regarding marginal subjects which might be discussed without precipitating a crisis.

Mr. Menon asked when he might see the Secretary again. The Secretary suggested July 6 at 11:00 a.m.

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/7–155. Secret. Drafted by Allen. The time of the meeting is from Dulles’ appointment diary. (Princeton University Library, Dulles Papers) The source text bears a notation which indicates it was seen by the Secretary.