Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

288. Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, July 6, 1955¹

Washington, July 6, 1955

SUBJECT

• Far Eastern Situation

PARTICIPANTS

• Mr. Krishna Menon
• Ambassador G. L. Mehta, India
• The Secretary
• NEA—George V. Allen

Mr. Menon said his Government felt it important that the Far Eastern situation should not be brought up “in a big way” at the forthcoming “Summit” conference at Geneva. He hoped we could give the impression there that the matter was being handled “on another track”. He said he had talked with Mr. Molotov along this line at San Francisco, and indicated that Molotov concurred.

The Secretary said that following his talk with Mr. Menon on July 1, he had been thinking the matter over, and one idea had occurred to him as a possibility. He wanted to throw this idea out merely as something to talk about, since the United States had reached no firm decision on it. His idea was that the direct contacts now being maintained between United States and Red Chinese representatives on a sporadic and low-level basis at Geneva might be raised to a higher level and the scope of the talks expanded. Mr. Menon said he thought Moscow or New Delhi might be a suitable location for such expanded discussions since the Red Chinese had responsible Ambassadors in both places. The Secretary asked what was wrong with Geneva, where the initial contact had already been established. The United States could send someone of higher rank to Geneva for the purpose.

Mr. Menon said he thought the success of such talks would depend on the subject matter to be discussed. The Secretary responded, in emphatic tones, that he had made it abundantly clear in public declarations as well as in private conversations that the United States would not negotiate behind the back of Formosa. If our position on this point was still not clear to Mr. Menon, he wished to repeat it again so there could be no doubt on the point or reason for raising it again. He said that there were a number of marginal things which could be discussed if the Red Chinese wanted to talk. For example, the press this morning had spoken of U.S. maneuvers around the Islands of Penghu.² If this disturbed Peking, we were quite ready to talk about it.

Mr. Menon said the question of general relations between the United States and Red China would have to be discussed sometime. The Secretary agreed, but again emphasized that timing was of the greatest importance. Moreover, he was confused regarding the subjects the Peking authorities wanted to talk about. He had received some information indicating that they did not want to talk with the United States about Formosa since they regarded Formosa as an internal matter. If conversations could be started at Geneva, we would soon find out what they wanted to talk about.

Mr. Menon characterized the Chinese as great compromisers and expressed the opinion that once talks were started, they would be willing to discuss many things. To make the talks fruitful, the question of the Americans in China and Chinese in the United States should be disposed of, in order to create an atmosphere conducive to favorable results. If it should happen that the Red Chinese released the American flyers, he thought the situation would be much better.

The Secretary agreed heartily. He could not guarantee that the American public would, even then, be enthusiastic about Red China, but at least a negative force would have been eliminated.

Mr. Menon asked whether it was possible for the Secretary to make a public declaration stating that all Chinese nationals in the United States were free to return to China if they wished. The Secretary said that if direct talks were to be undertaken, he would prefer to reserve such a public declaration until that time. He thought the Chinese Communists themselves might prefer to have any declaration grow out of the talks. He pointed out that the latest complaint we have had from Peking was not that we are holding Chinese in the United States but that we are pushing them back to China. Mr. Menon said this highlighted the need for machinery to handle the question, to satisfy both sides that their nationals were given adequate consular protection. He did not think that higher-level discussions would be adequate until a more favorable basis for them was established.

The Secretary asked whether Mr. Menon thought the Red Chinese wanted to talk with us directly or through intermediaries. Mr. Menon thought they were ready to talk directly with us, but he felt confident that in the meanwhile steps towards a relaxation should be taken. He mentioned the questions of prisoners of war and the embargo against trade with Red China were subjects on which progress might be made now.

The Secretary said that if all points of disagreement could be disposed of before-hand, direct talks would not be necessary. He emphasized again that if the Peking authorities did not want to talk, his suggestion should be dropped and no more time wasted on it. He asked Mr. Menon once more whether he thought the Chinese wanted to talk with us directly or through intermediaries. Mr. Menon repeated that he thought they wanted to talk directly, but commented that the level of the officials to carry on the talks would have to be considered. The Secretary said he was quite open-minded on this point and that if the Red Chinese did not like Geneva, some other place could be considered.

Mr. Menon returned to the question of trade embargoes and the American flyers. The Secretary pointed out that there were two kinds of restrictions on trade with Red China, the international restrictions imposed by a number of nations, and an additional embargo which was self-imposed by the United States. Mr. Menon thought it would be helpful if trade with China could be placed on the same level as trade with Russia. The Secretary replied that this was already true, in effect, since the trade which the United States voluntarily renounced did not hurt the Chinese Communists, who could buy the commodities from any one else they wished. We were merely losing business to Hong Kong. The only embargo which really hurt the Chinese was the international one.

Mr. Menon reverted to the question of Chinese in the United States, and asked whether the United States position was that they were free to go back to China. The Secretary said that his statement was correct. There might be one or two cases in which some question was still pending, but he did not believe we would insist on holding the individuals involved even in these cases. Mr. Menon mentioned that the Peking authorities thought that many Chinese in the United States wanted to return to China but were not able to do so. The Secretary said the Red Cross or somebody else could find out whether this was correct. Referring again to the Red Chinese complaint that we are forcing Chinese to leave, he said he would be very happy if the Chinese would reciprocate by putting “pressure” on Americans to get out of China. He thought that if Chou En-lai really wanted better relations with the United States, he would release all the Americans in China within twenty-four hours.

Mr. Menon said that Chou En-lai was a reasonable man and wanted good relations with us. The problem was to convince Chou that Americans reciprocated this desire. He asked whether Americans who wanted to visit China would be permitted to do so. (He probably had in mind American journalists but he may also have been thinking of relatives of the flyers.) The Secretary said that he did not think it made much sense for additional Americans to go to China as long as those already there were being held as prisoners. With reference to the Indian offer to assure that Americans visiting China would be treated properly, he said that the United States could not rely on third countries to protect American citizens.

Mr. Menon then asked directly, “Then, there is no likelihood of a relaxation to enable Americans to visit China?” The Secretary said he saw none at the moment.

Mr. Menon then said that the only concrete result of his several talks with the Secretary seemed to be the Secretary’s suggestion for a step-up in the level and scope of direct conversations. Was any progress possible on the question of a cease-fire? The Secretary said that the United States had stated many times that it desired a cessation of hostilities and declared that he was not impressed by people who were ready to agree to a cease-fire only if they got what they wanted without firing. Mr. Menon said that the shooting and threats of shooting were not only from one side. The Secretary reminded him that the United States had obtained a commitment from Chiang Kai-shek to avoid initiating hostilities without our consent. He then reenforced his previous statements that the use of force should be renounced by Peking. He had certainly expected India to support this position. He was therefore greatly surprised that Mr. Menon seemed to be supporting the Peking thesis, which openly avowed the use of force.

Mr. Menon answered, with considerable emotion “No, no, no! As recently as last week, my Prime Minister even pursuaded the Russians to join in a communiqué in Moscow condemning the use of force in settlement of the Formosa question”.³ Mr. Menon said India’s support for Peking extended only to the fact that China should be united. He recalled that India had supported this position when China was governed by Chiang Kai-shek. He declared that he had never said that Peking should take the islands by military action. He added that he was determined, above everything else, not to allow his conversations in San Francisco and Washington to affect United States-Indian relations adversely. He did not want India’s motives to be suspect by either side.

The Secretary said he had gained the impression that Mr. Menon thought Chou’s position was a reasonable one. Yet Chou’s avowed position was that if he could not get the islands by peaceful means, he would take them by force. If he had misunderstood Mr. Menon’s position, he would be glad to be corrected. Mr. Menon repeated that India had stated, in Moscow of all places, that it was wrong to use force. The Secretary said he was very glad that Mr. Menon was not endorsing Chou En-lai’s position.

Mr. Menon said he did not wish to see the United States become involved in the Chinese civil war. The Secretary pointed out that Soviet Russia had taken the position that the Korean war was a civil war, but the world knew that it was something much bigger. He said the problem of the unification of China was similar to that of Korea, Germany and Indochina and that the United States opposed the use of force in any of these situations. Mr. Menon repeated that his Government’s position in opposition to the use of force was well known. The Secretary said he had always thought that was India’s position. He did not believe that India would use force, for example, to take Goa. Mr. Menon said this was entirely correct. The Secretary said, “Then let Red China take the same position regarding Quemoy and Matsu”. He thought that until Peking began to see that there were moral principles higher than the use of brute force, they would probably not get along with the United States very well.

Mr. Menon, still excited by the Secretary’s implication that India supported the use of force, declared that in twenty years the United States would recognize the correctness of India’s position in the present discussions. He said his role was not to justify the attitude of either side. The Secretary said he did not doubt in any way whatsoever the Indian Government’s good intentions in undertaking to achieve a settlement. He repeated, however, that the World must be held together by some sense of principle. He remarked that he had fought for economic aid for India on a basis of principle, despite the fact that many people questioned this aid in view of India’s foreign policy. He had also supported aid for Yugoslavia even though, as he had pointed out in San Francisco, the United States Government differed from that of Yugoslav Government in every respect except one—the Yugoslav determination to defend its independence. The principle involved was the democratic one of allowing Governments to differ on foreign policy without affecting the United States attitude on the aid question. The renunciation of the use of force was another high moral principle that civilized nations should adopt.

Mr. Menon asked whether reconciliation was not also a high principle. The Secretary said it was, and that if India could help remove the concept of force from the minds of the Chinese Communists, steps towards reconciliation would be possible. Mr. Menon said that India had already used its strong endeavors in this direction. “If you could let us impress Peking”, he added, “that we had access to your mind, we could be more effective”. The Secretary said he had opened every possible recess of his mind to Mr. Menon during their several long conversations.

Mr. Menon said he was leaving for London tomorrow and would like to return to Washington to talk with the Secretary again on July 12 or 13, before the Secretary left for Geneva. The Secretary said he would be able to give very little attention to anything except the Geneva Conference during these days. He remarked that he had spent more time talking with Mr. Krishna Menon during the last three weeks than he had with any other foreign diplomat during a similar period since he had been Secretary of State. Mr. Menon protested that he was not a diplomat. The Secretary said, smiling, “Well, whatever you call yourself”. Mr. Menon said that in view of the Secretary’s schedule, it probably would be useless for him to return to Washington before Geneva.

When Mr. Allen was accompanying Mr. Menon to the elevator, Mr. Menon remarked in a tone of hopelessness, “Your Secretary has said to me in so many words: ‘Go away, you are not serving any useful purpose’”. Mr. Allen said that the Secretary had given him a very direct and simple task, which should be easy and agreeable for any Indian to carry out. His task was to persuade the Red Chinese to renounce the use of force. Mr. Menon said he could not go back to Peking without something more than this in hand.

Subsequently, Mr. Menon informed Mr. Allen that he planned to return to Washington July 24.⁴

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 790.00/7–655. Secret. Drafted by Allen.
2. According to notes of the Secretary’s staff meetings, Dulles asked at his July 5 staff meeting whether the United States was holding naval maneuvers near Penghu “as the Chinese Communists charged”. At the July 7 staff meeting, Robertson stated that he had been informed by the Pentagon that there was no basis for reports of U.S. naval maneuvers in the Taiwan–Penghu area. (Ibid., Secretary’s Staff Meetings: Lot 63 D 75)
3. Reference is apparently to a sentence in a joint statement issued on July 22 by Nehru and Bulganin at the conclusion of a visit by Nehru to Moscow expressing the hope “that it will be possible by peaceful means to satisfy the legitimate rights of the Chinese People’s Republic in regard to Taiwan.” For text, see Documents on International Relations, pp. 472–475.
4. Krishna Menon, together with Ambassador Mehta and Secretary Dulles, saw President Eisenhower at 4:15 p.m. on July 6, according to the President’s appointment diary. (Eisenhower Library, President’s Daily Appointments) No memorandum or telegraphic report of the conversation has been found in Department of State files or Eisenhower Library, but Eisenhower’s diary entry for July 14, 1955, states that Menon had visited him twice, in the company of Secretary Dulles, “to talk about establishing some basis of mediation between Red China and ourselves. I have bluntly told him, both times, that the American people will not consider using the lives and freedom of their own citizens as a bargaining material. Since Red China, in violation of her solemn word given in the Korean Armistice, unjustly held some of our men prisoners—men that China herself admits were in uniform when captured—we will not make important political concessions on the grounds that this would be recompensed by the return of some of these men. We maintain that China cannot be regarded by us as a civilized nation ready to work with us in good faith until after they have released these prisoners, such release to be without any promise of concessions on our part other than the assurance that all Chinese in our country are free to go back to China whenever they may desire. This Menon does not accept.” (Ibid., DDE Diaries)