Office of the Historian

290. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson) to the Secretary of State1

Washington, July 8, 1955.

SUBJECT

  • United States Support for GRC Reserve Training Program

George Yeh spoke to you at San Francisco2 about the Chinese concern over delays in implementing a United States-supported program for nine reserve divisions. The United States is not at fault in this matter.

Working level agreement between our MAAG and the Chinese Ministry of National Defense was reached in April on a reserve training program.3 While both JCS and CINCPAC support a reserve program in principle, the plan submitted from Taipei to Defense was inadequate in several respects. As submitted, the plan could and probably would be construed by the Chinese as committing the United States to equip nine “reserve” divisions in addition to the twenty-one now supported by us. These nine divisions would tie down much costly equipment. An indication that the Chinese are thinking in terms of standing forces rather than a genuine reserve training program is furnished in Taipei’s 953 of June 28 (attached)4 [Page 640] reporting that President Chiang has urged the immediate equipment of three reserve divisions. The divisions to which Chiang has reference are believed to be three non-supported units, already in being, to which the Chinese have already diverted much MDAP equipment, contrary to the understanding with which aid was furnished and to United States military recommendations.5

I believe that Defense is continuing to work for the modification of the reserve training plan into something more in accord with sound doctrine and the needs of Taiwan, and will be prepared to go ahead with such a modified program, if and when it can be worked out.

  1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.5–MSP/7–855. Secret.↩
  2. Sebald’s memorandum of Dulles’ June 21 conversation with Foreign Minister Yeh, cited in footnote 2, Document 276, records no discussion of this subject.↩
  3. The working-level agreement was described in despatch 252 from Taipei (see vol. iii, Document 83) as follows: “The bargain was more or less struck that the U.S. military authorities would agree to the formation of nine reserve divisions, to train on a one-month basis per year, with the understanding that the personnel of the various non-supported units was to be transferred to these nine reserve divisions, so that the non-supported units would, in fact, disappear. The United States was to furnish training equipment for one division. These recommendations were subject to higher approval in Washington, as was made clear not only in the talks themselves but also in a personal letter from Ambassador Rankin to Foreign Minister Yeh.” The letter from Rankin to Yeh has not been found in Department of State files.↩
  4. Telegram 953, not found attached to the source text, reported that at the interview with General Chase reported in telegram 952 from Taipei (Document 279), President Chiang had “reviewed his continuing interest in having three reserve divisions in training” and had urged that the United States provide the necessary equipment. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/6–2855)↩

  5. Telegram 030119Z from CINCPAC to CNO, May 2, stated that in addition to the ground forces for which U.S. military assistance had been approved, the Nationalists had a number of units not approved for U.S. assistance, with a total personnel strength of approximately 55,700, including many ineffective personnel kept on the rolls for political reasons. It also reported that, while critical shortages of equipment existed in many units approved for U.S. support, including some deployed on Matsu and Kinmen, equipment which had been programmed and delivered to meet those very deficiencies was being diverted to non-supported units. The telegram concluded as follows:

    “It is recommended that representations be made to Department of Defense to the effect that ChiNat government be approached by appropriate high US officials and strongly induced to take necessary steps in conjunction with initiation of NGRC reserve program. As approved by US, to remove US provided equipment from hands of ChiNat units not approved for US support, to utilize all US provided equipment to fill those ChiNat requirements for which it was intended and to reassign ineffectives currently on military roles to appropriate non-military support tasks.” (JCS Records, CCS 381 Formosa (11–8–48)

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