Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

312. Outline Plan by the Operations Coordinating Board¹

Washington, July 20, 1955.

OUTLINE PLAN OF OPERATIONS FOR NSC 5503 WITH RESPECT TO FORMOSA AND THE GOVERNMENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF CHINA

I. Introduction

1. Reference: U.S. Policy Toward Formosa and the Government of the Republic of China (NSC 5503).

2. Present Situation: Although the Communists continue their military build up, including increases in air and ground capabilities, and although there is no renunciation of the Communist line of “liberating” Taiwan, there appears to be no immediate threat to our fundamental strategic objective with respect to Taiwan: that of keeping it from the Chinese Communists. However, successful Chinese Communist seizure of the GRC-held coastal islands and the elimination thereby of a significant portion of the GRC armed forces, would directly and indirectly result in a substantial weakening of the GRC position in Taiwan. Attempts are being made to cause the Chinese Communists to accept tacitly if not explicitly a renunciation of the use of force in pressing their claims respecting Taiwan. However, even should these efforts succeed, the security of Taiwan will continue to depend upon the United States determination to commit its own forces to the defense of Taiwan. Short of military attack, the Chinese Communists will continue their efforts to bring about the fall of Taiwan through the subversion or defection of the Nationalists, but these efforts are not likely to succeed in the foreseeable future.

The current situation does present serious difficulties in the way of the pursuit of other objectives of our policy. The maintenance of the international position of the GRC and the exertion by it of a strong political attraction as an alternative to the Communist Chinese regime are rendered more difficult by the growing international prestige of the Peiping regime, declining faith (particularly among the overseas Chinese) in the possibility of a Nationalist return to the mainland, and the growth of influences making for stagnation of the forces on Taiwan. Despite a heightened recognition among free world nations of the strategic importance of Taiwan, there is a discernible trend towards disregard of the importance of the GRC as a political entity. To a considerable extent the widespread desire for peace in the Far East has been mobilized behind unrealistic demands for concessions, all at the expense of the Nationalists—the abandonment of Nationalist-held off-shore islands, the admission of Communist China to the United Nations, or even the institution of a United Nations trusteeship over Taiwan. Until recently Communist China’s all-or-none attitude and its insistence upon the purely domestic character of the Taiwan issue had prevented it from deriving much benefit from these popular demands. Since the Bandung Conference, however, there have been signs that a more flexible tactical approach is in the making. The possibility is thus raised that Communist China might take the tack of expediency, heading for the eventual destruction of the GRC and the “peaceful liberation” of Taiwan via temporary furtherance of the “two Chinas” concept. Such a tack would not rule out local actions against the off-shore islands, however, and the progressive development of the Chinese Communist military capabilities and operations to establish air superiority over the Formosa Straits.

3. Timing, Emphasis, and Special Operating Guidance: Programs and measures underpinning a situation of military strength must continue to receive a high priority. At the same time more and more emphasis must be shifted to economic, psychological, and diplomatic programs and actions which can shore up the GRC’s defenses against the more subtle inroads of stagnation, erosion of morale, and frustration, and which can develop Taiwan as an attractive alternative to Communism.

U.S. actions in all fields should be taken at every opportunity to counteract the peace offensive of the Chinese Communists, and to cope with the flexible approach towards the destruction of the GRC which the Chinese Communists seem to be developing.

[Here follows a detailed list of actions to be taken, with the assignment of responsibility for each action to one or more agencies.]

1. Source: Department of State, OCB Files: Lot 62 D 430. Formosa & GRC, 1955. Top Secret. The source text is filed with a covering memorandum dated July 28 from OCB Executive Officer Elmer B. Staats to the Board, which states that it was revised and concurred in by the Board on July 20, and an introductory page, which states that the purpose of the Outline Plan was to set forth courses of action, responsibilities and timing prepared by the OCB in order to carry out NSC 5503 (Document 12) and that it was intended to serve as guidance for the participating agencies and overseas missions concerned.