Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

81. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Soviet Union (Bohlen) to the Department of State¹

Moscow, February 4, 1955—4 p.m.

1237. There is no information available here on which to base clear answer to question raised in Department’s telegram 604.² Following views therefore are speculation based on external evidence of Soviet attitude and handling of this question.

Chief evidence is statement in Molotov’s reply to British Ambassador: (1) That SC should deal with question and (2) that Soviet representative had been instructed that Chinese Communists should be invited to send representative. This general position, judging from telegram under reference, was adhered to and confirmed by Sobolev in SC meeting January 31. What we had generally anticipated here (and from foregoing apparently Soviet Government also) was Chinese acceptance to send representative to New York to discuss Soviet resolution accompanied by refusal to attend or participate in SC discussion New Zealand item. Pravda editorial (Embassy’s telegram 1212)³ seemed to forecast this possibility in paragraph quoted.

There was nothing in Soviet attitude or action which would indicate that they anticipated introduction of question UN representation and demand for expulsion Chinese Nationalist representative on SC which clearly precludes any Chinese Communist attendance or participation in any form SC consideration this question. It is of course possible that affair was carefully contrived maneuver agreed jointly by Soviet Union and Communist China to enhance impact of Chinese refusal in hope that this would produce major point division Western Powers. But this, I believe, unlikely since it is not characteristic of Soviet Government to risk its prestige in an official position which subsequently was repudiated by another country however closely allied. Insofar as effect on West is concerned, while impossible to judge from here, it would seem that adamant Chinese position would react unfavorably against Communists and tend to enhance rather than diminish support for US position.

I have already reported (Embassy telegram 1185)⁴ our doubts as to degree of influence Soviet Union in these interim and intermediary steps can exercise over Chinese Communists and I consider, on existing scanty evidence, Chinese reply was not that anticipated by Moscow when it adopted Soviet position in SC discussion. It would, however, be a serious mistake to expect that Moscow will not now give full support to Chinese position now that latter has been made public and official. Whatever degree of difference in initial phases of this question, it is highly unlikely that Moscow will give any indication of disagreement with Chinese Communists in any outward form. This does not totally exclude possibility behind scenes efforts by Soviets, possibly along lines indicated by Sobolev, in regard to private meetings,⁵ but even this is doubtful in face of Chinese attitude.

Soviet press publishes today without comment full text Chou En-lai reply and continues to feature news despatches from various parts of world in support Chinese Communist claim to Taiwan and alleged US interference and aggression.

On the larger issues, it is of course possible that Chinese Communists have convinced themselves that they are running no serious danger in turning down SC participation and therefore prefer that possible withdrawal from Tachen Islands forecast in foreign press and radio should take place not as result any UN action but as psychological-political victory for Communist China.

In connection with general subject Chinese attitude, … Ambassador yesterday showed me telegram from their representative Peking stating that it was generally believed there that Chinese would accept SC invitation but only for discussion Soviet resolution concerning US. … Embassy Peking also stated belief that Chinese Communists realize they would need full and active Soviet support in any serious attempt to attack Formosa and it was very doubtful if they had received any encouragement or assurance from Moscow on this point. In giving me foregoing … Ambassador asked that it be held in strictest confidence since he had no authorization from his government to show me this message.

In conclusion, I am of belief that general considerations outlined in my 1185 still obtain in regard to Soviet preferential policy. Whether certain elements in Soviet policy could be turned to our advantage depends, as I have already said, in large measure on degree of clarity we can develop in regard to our position on off-shore islands.

Bohlen

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–455. Top Secret; Niact. Received at 12:33 p.m.
2. Telegram 604 to Moscow, February 3, requested Bohlen’s views on the significance of Chou’s rejection of the Security Council invitation, especially his stress on the issue of Chinese representation in the United Nations, with specific reference to the question of whether it had been coordinated with Moscow. (Ibid., 793.00/2–355)
3. Telegram 1212 from Moscow, February 1, commented on a Pravda editorial of the same day which had declared that the United Nations should occupy itself not with the New Zealand item but with the question of U.S. aggression. (Ibid., 793.00/2–155)
4. Document 47.
5. Telegram 604 to Moscow, cited in footnote 2 above, stated that Sobolev had “put out feelers re possibility private meetings between Chinese Commies and some SC representatives.” The reference was to a remark made by Sobolev at a Security Council dinner on January 31. Telegram 416 from New York, February 1, reported that Sobolev felt the Security Council was too large a group and that “if the ChiComs did come it would be necessary to set up secret talks with only a few people present.” (Department of State, Central Files, 330/2–155)