Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume II

92. Memorandum From the Assistant Secretary of State for International Organization Affairs (Key) to the Secretary of State¹

Washington, February 5, 1955.

SUBJECT

• Status of Off-Shore Islands Item in the Security Council.

1. Pursuant to the Working Party agreement² which you approved, Ambassador Munro called a Security Council meeting on January 31 to consider “the question of hostilities in the area of certain islands off the coast of the mainland of China”. On January 30, the USSR had proposed that the Council consider “the question of acts of aggression by the United States against the People’s Republic of China in the area of Taiwan and other islands of China”. The Council:

(a) dealt with a Soviet motion to exclude the Chinese representative by deciding not to consider any proposals to exclude the representative of the Government of the Republic of China or to seat a Chinese Communist representative;

(b) admitted both the New Zealand and the Soviet items to its agenda, but decided “that the Council should conclude its consideration of the New Zealand item before taking up the Soviet item”; and

(c) decided to “invite a representative of the CPG of the PRC to participate in the discussion of this item, and that the Secretary General be requested to convey this invitation to the CPG”, after which Ambassador Munro stated that “the Secretary General would no doubt take into account the views expressed by representatives as to the desirability of the CPG of the PRC accepting this invitation”.

Although the Working Party in Washington had agreed that the Communists would be invited under Rule 39 of the Council’s Rules of Procedure (under which the Council may invite persons to supply information or give other assistance in examining matters within its competence), it had been decided in the course of consultations in New York that we would not refer to any article or rule as a basis for the invitation since it was felt that there was no article or rule which precisely covered this situation. It was also agreed that Ambassador Munro, as President, would suggest that the Secretary General take into account the views expressed by members of the Council. The United Kingdom and France wished to have this statement made because they did not believe that the Secretary General should act merely as a transmitting agent, but felt that he should use his judgment in making appropriate use of the contact he had established with Chou En-lai. Ambassador Lodge concurred in the statement to be made by Ambassador Munro, but made it clear that he could not agree to the Secretary General’s using his “good offices” in this case.³

2. Following the Security Council meeting, Hammarskjold transmitted through the Swedish Ambassador in Peking a factual telegram to Chou En-lai informing him of the Council’s decision.⁴ He also sent a personal message⁵ in which he stated that, “acting in accordance with the expressed wishes of members of the Security Council”, he wished to inform Chou that he believed “we are now at one of those junctures where we may come to grips with some of the political problems which have been harassing us for years” and that the New Zealand initiative should be viewed in this perspective. He added that New Zealand had acted “in the conviction that, once this difficult situation is tackled with good will from a modest start, there are possibilities for development—maybe largely outside the limelight of publicity—which may help us on”. We understand that Chou had not received this message when he dispatched his reply to the Security Council invitation, and we have not yet been informed that it has been delivered.

When shown a copy of the text of Hammarskjold’s message on February 1,⁶ Ambassador Lodge pointed out that he had no instructions concerning the manner in which the Secretary General should communicate with Chou En-lai and, further, that he was not aware of any U.S. decision favoring the linking of various contentious issues. On February 2, the Department requested Ambassador Lodge to take appropriate steps to ensure that, if the Communists accepted the invitation, their participation would be limited to that appropriate under Rule 39. Ambassador Lodge was also requested to inform Hammarskjold that the Department considered his message to Chou as exceeding his authority under the Charter and contrary to the understanding among the United States, the United Kingdom and New Zealand that all proceedings on this item were to be confined to the cessation of hostilities.⁷

In reply, Ambassador Lodge pointed out that the Department had known and approved of the understanding regarding the invitation which he had reached with the United Kingdom, New Zealand and France. As regards Hammarskjold’s message to Chou, Ambassador Lodge conveyed the Department’s views to the Secretary General and to the United Kingdom and New Zealand.⁸ In reply, the Department acknowledged that Ambassador Lodge had been authorized to omit specific mention of Rule 39, but reiterated the request that he protest to Hammarskjold regarding his oral message to Chou and his telegram inviting the Communists to “participate in the debate”.⁹ Ambassador Lodge conveyed this protest to the Secretary General on February 3.¹⁰

3. On February 3 the Communist rejection of the invitation became known. In his message to the Secretary General, Chou En-lai repeats the familiar charges of United States aggression against China, rejects the New Zealand initiative as an attempt to intervene in China’s internal affairs, and brands as intolerable the fact that China is represented by the Chiang Kai-shek clique. Chou states that “only for the purpose of discussing the resolution of the Soviet Union and only when the representative of the Chiang Kai-shek clique has been driven out from the Security Council and the representative of the People’s Republic of China is to attend in the name of China, can the People’s Republic of China agree to send a representative to take part in the discussions of the Security Council”. The message concludes as follows: “All genuine international efforts to ease and eliminate the tension created by the United States in this area and in other areas of the Far East will receive the support of the People’s Republic of China”.

4. On February 3, Ambassador Munro urgently requested the views of the United States as to the next steps, indicating he did not believe we could allow the issue to drag.¹¹ Ambassador Belaunde¹² has informed USUN that he is thinking of a suggestion to “neutralize” both the coastal islands and the Formosa Strait for a distance of 12 miles from the coasts of Formosa and the mainland, with troops being withdrawn a certain distance from the shore of Formosa and the mainland. A UN Control Commission would supervise these neutral areas.¹³

The UK delegation has indicated that while they see the need for another meeting of the Council to “tidy up” the situation, they think it might be delayed until about February 9. The UK doubts that anything of substance can be considered at this meeting and they wish to leave something in suspense for future action.¹⁴

Indications from London are that the Commonwealth Members do not favor further action in the Council at this time and are thinking instead of possible private contacts and other actions to reduce tension in the area.

There is attached a copy of Mr. Suydam’s press statement with reference to a possible Far Eastern Conference.¹⁵

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–555. Secret. Drafted by De-Palma.
2. Document 43.
3. These points were agreed upon by Lodge, Munro, British Representative at the United Nations Sir Pierson Dixon, and French Representative Henri Hoppenot at a meeting on January 29, which Lodge reported in telegram 409 from New York, January 29. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/1–2955)
4. In addition to Hammarskjöld’s January 31 telegram to Chou, described in Document 66, the Secretary-General sent a message on February 2 to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking for transmission to Chou which again informed him of the Security Council’s invitation and requested information as to who would represent the PRC Government if the invitation was accepted and when the representative might arrive. Hammarskjöld’s February 2 telegram is in Department of State, ROC Files: Lot 71 D 517, Offshore Islands, 1954–1955.
5. The personal message described here, which was to be given to Chou orally, was transmitted in Hammarskjöld’s February 2 telegram to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking, cited in footnote 4 above.
6. Lodge reported in telegram 418 from New York, February 1, that Hammarskjöld had showed him a draft letter to Chou which he described as similar in substance to the oral message which Hammarskjöld sent the following day. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–155)
7. The instructions were sent in telegram 391 to New York, February 2. (Ibid.)

8. Lodge reported the conversations and commented on the Department’s instructions concerning the terms of the Security Council’s invitation in telegram 422 from New York and in a letter to Hoover, both of February 2. The letter, which also transmitted the text of Hammarskjöld’s draft telegram to the Swedish Ambassador in Peking, comments that there was no doubt that the Chinese would reject an invitation extended exclusively under Rule 39 and states:

   “There is nothing in what Secretary Dulles said to me before his departure that leads me to believe that he wanted to make it impossible for them to come. When I talked to him on the telephone he asked me to state in the Council that we agreed to have them invited and that the reason was that …, it was obviously impossible to deal with a situation without one of the principal parties to it being present. If the Department did not want him [them] to come, I think the Department should have told me.” (Ibid., 330/2–255 and 793.00/2–255, respectively)

9. In telegram 394 to New York, February 2, 1955. (Ibid., 330/2–255)
10. Reported in telegrams 427 and 433 from New York, February 3. (Ibid., 330/2–355 and 793.00/2–355, respectively)
11. Reported in telegram 429 from New York, February 3. (Ibid., 330/2–355)
12. Peruvian Representative at the United Nations Victor A. Belaúnde.
13. Reported in telegram 430 from New York, February 3. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–355)
14. Reported in telegram 437 from New York, February 4. (Ibid., 793.00/2–455)
15. Suydam’s statement, made at a press briefing on February 4, expressed distaste for the idea of a conference similar to the Geneva Conference of 1954; for text, see New York Times, February 5, 1955.