95. Telegram From the Representative at the United Nations (Lodge) to the Department of State1
447. Re off shore islands. For the Secretary from Lodge. Re USUN telegram 446, February 6.2 I called on SYG Hammarskjold tonight on my arrival from Washington. He said that it had been established that three hours after sending his official reply to Hammarskjold’s message conveying the invitation of the SC, Chou-En-lai had sent message to Hammarskjold saying he had not received Hammarskjold’s personal message to him. Hammarskjold said that he saw in this a desire on Chou’s part to carry the matter somewhat further and he had wired back to Chou saying that while his personal message had been by-passed by Chou’s official reply, since he had communicated further he would instruct the Swedish Embassy to deliver it.
Hammarskjold then gave me the English text of the message he had received from the Swedish Ambassador in Peking containing Chou’s statement to the Ambassador in reply to Hammarskjold, from which he allowed me to take notes which follow almost verbatim:
“Every genuine effort to relieve tension in the world, including the tension in the Taiwan area, will be supported by China. The [Page 232] New Zealand proposal, however, cannot be of any help. On the contrary, it would put China and the Chiang Kai-shek clique on an equal basis, asking for interference in Chinese internal affairs. This whole activity is to put Chinese internal affairs in the international arena and create two Chinas, a theme openly discussed in the USA which would mean violation of the UN Charter. When Hammarskjold was here he said he would firmly oppose any violation of the charter. Because of these reasons we cannot take part in discussions within the UN which has no right to deliberate the matter. The representation of the Chiang Kai-shek clique makes it impossible to accept as a matter of course. As to the question of relieving tension in the Taiwan area the cause is US occupation, intrusion and war provocations. If tension is to be alleviated, persuasion should be directed toward the USA. China would not refuse to negotiate with the USA on this question. If the USA has the slightest wish to negotiate they should accept direct negotiations and give up their war threats. Hammarskjold could facilitate this by persuading his American friends. If the USA would think of using war threats to intimidate China or cause acceptance of the idea of two Chinas or continued occupation of Taiwan, it is a fantasy. If USA like to make war provocations let them do so. We say if the USA insist on war we will resist and never submit.”
(At this point in the text the Swedish Ambassador said in Swedish, which Hammarskjold translated, that “he considered two things significant in Chou’s statement to him. One, the emphasis on Chiang Kai-shek’s representation in the SC, and Chou’s apparent real desire for direct negotiations.” Also at this point the interpreter had interrupted for a clarification of some of Chou’s statements and Chou summed up as follows.)
“As I have indicated there is in principle no refusal on our side to negotiate directly with the USA. As for concrete steps, they would require further study. If I have anything more to say on this subject I will call on you.”
Hammarskjold told me that he thought Chou was extremely anxious to have direct talks but did not want to appear to be asking for them himself. He thought it significant that in his statement to the Swedish Ambassador he put the matter three different ways. First, that China would not refuse to negotiate, then, that if the US wished to negotiate they would accept direct negotiations, and finally, if US wished to use war threats China would resist.
Hammarskjold went on to say that he felt that by indicating his wishes for direct negotiations so clearly Chou had shown that he was in a weaker position than one might have thought. Hammarskjold also felt it was significant that, as he put it, with all the possibilities Chou had he had chosen the channel of the SYG to put forward the idea of direct negotiations. It struck Hammarskjold that Chou did not want to use New Delhi or Moscow and that he did not want a [Page 233] Geneva-type conference. Hammarskjold thought that Chou felt he had thrown the ball to the US and Hammarskjold believed that the ball should be thrown back to Chou. A form should be found, he said, to throw the ball back without allowing Chou to say that the US refused any talks. Of course, he said, in doing this one should not engage in polemics. One possible way to throw the ball back to Chou was a reply from the SYG along the lines of the following draft which he handed me and said that he would not, of course, want to send anything until we had indicated our views:
“I have received a report from the Swedish Ambassador on your comments on my message. I note your views on the possibility of direct negotiations.
From recent contacts with representatives of the USA, I have formed the conviction that at the present moment discussions going beyond the immediate issue raised in the New Zealand item, that is a de facto cease-fire around the off-shore islands, could not be proposed with any chance of success. As to the procedure for discussions, I note your reasons for eliminating the SC as a possible forum. I do not take this as meaning that you exclude the possibility of discussions under the aegis of the UN, if another, appropriate form could be found.”
Hammarskjold said in connection with the above draft reply to Chou that as a starting point, looking at the matter from our point of view, it should be clear that nothing should be discussed beyond the off-shore islands and that there should be no direct negotiations as such between US and China. The negotiations, he felt, should be under the aegis of the UN. I asked him what he meant by this. Did he mean, for example, that he should undertake negotiations? He avoided answering this part of my question but said that he thought that the SC might continue its discussions and end up with a blessing for negotiations which the US might undertake on behalf of the UN. In any case, he felt the matter should remain a UN matter.
Hammarskjold indicated several times that he was struck by the fact that Chou completely misunderstands the US attitude toward the question of two Chinas. He also felt that Chou’s request for direct negotiations with the US would not be palatable to Moscow, although he was sure that Moscow would be informed. He considered Chou’s message to him as the first indication that there would not be incidents in the evacuation of the Tachens.
At the close of our discussion Hammarskjold said that he felt the SC must meet this week, and must assert itself somehow.
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 793.00/2–655. Secret; Niact; Limited Distribution. Received at 12:53 a.m. on February 7.↩
- Telegram 446 reported that Hammarskjöld had received Chou En-lai’s reply to his personal message and that arrangements had been made for Lodge to meet with the Secretary-General that evening. (Ibid.)↩