Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

132. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State¹

Geneva, January 19, 1956—5 p.m.

1398. 1. Three hour ten minute meeting this morning.

2. Wang opened meeting with long prepared statement reiterating position of objection to individual and collective security clause on grounds it would require them recognize “U.S. occupation Taiwan”, referred my previous statements declaration did not involve third parties but said attempt incorporate individual and collective self-defense clause in Taiwan area automatically involves “Chiang clique”. Then referring my statements these talks must be free from threat of force, launched into long and strong attack on alleged statements by Secretary which constituted “clamor for atomic war against China”, “Chinese cannot be intimidated”, “blackmail doomed to failure”, “condemned by peaceloving people” etc., “this cannot benefit our talks”, “cannot but raise question whether U.S. had genuine sincerity peacefully settle questions between China and U.S.”

I replied with long extemporaneous statement first picking up his statements concerning Secretary which I characterized as “entirely uncalled for and gross libel.” Record of U.S. had more than demonstrated lack aggressive intent toward other countries including China, cited unparalleled U.S. restraint in Korea in face provocation Chinese attack which gave every moral and legal justification for defending U.N. forces attack Chinese bases. Consistent U.S. record of fostering and protecting freedom and independence other peoples. Purely defensive nature all U.S. collective defense arrangements with other countries. President and Secretary have repeatedly expressed overwhelming sentiment American people never to initiate attack. There is nothing Secretary has ever said in any way that could possibly be interpreted in terms employed by Wang. During subsequent give and take this subject in response my direct question Wang cited Life article² as basis for his statements. If had been said by “Knowland or McCarthy” would have been ignored but could not be ignored when made by Secretary. I said I had read article and find no statement by Secretary therein which could remotely support Wang’s allegations. Said he should not confuse official and authorized statements with expressions of opinion made on own responsibility by writer magazine article. During course discussion he stated “hard to understand why U.S. on one hand invites PRC make declaration renouncing force while on other hand Secretary State reveals that on three occasions U.S. was on verge unleashing atomic war against China”. I replied that I knew of no such revelation by Secretary but did know of statements of determination by U.S. to resist by war if necessary aggression unleashed by others.

Long discussion individual and collective self-defense for most part reiterated former positions. We each took increasingly adamant lines, I following line Department telegram 1496.³ I stated and reiterated “U.S. cannot and will not under any circumstances agree” in negotiating this declaration to PRC demand that U.S. renounce its legitimate right to individual and collective self-defense. Wang avoided meeting me directly on general principle, gave no reply to my interpretation of negotiations and yesterday’s public statement⁴ as denouncing [demanding?] U.S. renounce individual and collective self-defense but carefully limited presentation his adamant position to PRC recognition U.S. claim applicability this principle Taiwan area. Adamancy this position best reflected by Wang’s statement “If U.S. insists on including clause individual and collective self-defense in Taiwan area, I do not see how we can reach any agreement.”

While he did not challenge neither did he confirm my reference to his statement last meeting concerning willingness consider specific mention Taiwan in declaration.

He then initiated discussion implementation with relatively mild statement giving me additional list of four names. Discussion for most part followed general lines last meeting.

At close of meeting I made statement referring their public statement expressing disappointment, concern over effects on talks and made somewhat double barreled query whether this indicated they did not desire to continue these talks upon basis which I had suggested at beginning of talks and which I had tried very hard to maintain. In reply Wang stressed their statement only “one time operation” reasons for which he had given in two prior meetings. Reaffirmed desire continue talks without suggesting modification present procedures on publicity. He said “it my hope and desire that talks will reach positive, constructive, honest outcome.”

He took initiative suggesting next meeting, asking as special accommodation be held Wednesday January 25. When I asked whether this for just one meeting he replied hope next following meeting could be held Friday February 3. But in response my suggestion February 2 instead of February 3 next following meeting we agreed leave question open until next meeting. (For Department’s information “Porgy and Bess” company arriving Prague February 4 and I planning hold large reception for them February 4 or 5.)

[Johnson]

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–1956. Confidential; Niact; Limit Distribution.

2. The article under reference, “How Dulles Averted War,” by James Shepley, appeared in Life, January 16, 1956, pp. 70–80. McConaughy sent Johnson a copy with his January 16 letter (cited in footnote 1, Document 128), with the comment:

   “In view of the flurry this article has caused here we are taking no chances of your not having it. It is possible that it will either be mentioned by Wang or will influence the Chinese Communist tactics in some way. In any event it would be well for you to know what it says. Judge Phleger remarked on Saturday undoubtedly the article would receive close study in Peiping. He felt that it would probably have an influence on Peiping moves although it could not be predicted what the influence would be. It might well have something of a restraining and sobering effect, although the possibility of a different reaction could not be ruled out.”

3. Supra.
4. The statement issued on January 18 by the Foreign Ministry in Peking charged that the United States was deliberately dragging out the Ambassadorial talks, had refused to come to an agreement on the means for the relaxation of tension in the Taiwan area, and had demanded Chinese acceptance of “the status quo of United States armed occupation of Taiwan”. It declared that the only practical and feasible means of settling disputes between China and the United States would be a meeting of Foreign Ministers. Text is in New York Times, January 19, 1956.