138. Telegram From the Ambassador in the Republic of China (Rankin) to the Department of State1
681. The following aide-mémoire dated January 25 was handed to me this morning2 by the Foreign Minister:
“The Chinese Government after having studied the statement issued by the State Department on January 21 on the talks between Ambassador Johnson and the Chinese Communist representative in Geneva, feels constrained to present the following views for the consideration of the US Government.
“Since the opening of the Geneva talks, the Chinese Government has in its public pronouncements consistently supported the US effort to secure the release of its nationals illegally held by the Chinese Communists. The US Government has given repeated assurances that there would be no discussion any matters involving the rights, claims, or essential interests of the Republic of China. A careful study of the published account of the talks thus far reveals, however, that the negotiations in fact bear considerably upon the rights and interests of the Republic of China.
“The Chinese Government views with particular concern the offer made by the US to enter into a bilateral declaration with the Chinese Communist regime concerning the renunciation of the use of force. Such a declaration would be tantamount to an admission by the US to equal responsibility for the existing situation in the Taiwan Strait, for which the Chinese Communists should and must be held solely responsible. In the form now proposed by the US it might be understood to imply a tacit de facto recognition of the Chinese [Page 280] Communist regime. It would be construed by the free peoples in Asia and elsewhere as a further retreat of the US position and would consequently weaken their determination of resisting Communist inducement. It would also encourage those countries who are already inclined towards the idea of two Chinas to pursue their machinations with renewed and greater vigor. Since the Four-Power Conference in July, 1955, the tendency toward appeasement has already resulted in a series of trade agreements and other contracts by a number of countries in Asia and the Middle East with the Chinese Communist regime to the detriment of the position and prestige of the Chinese Government. On the other hand, the readiness on the part of the US, now made public, to accept the puppet Chinese Communist regime as an equal party in negotiation, together with the US willingness to renounce the use of force in an arrangement with an aggressor, tends to enhance the international position and prestige of the Chinese Communist regime whose flagrant violations of the principles of the Charter have been condemned by the UN and whose admission into the UN the US has consistently opposed.
“The Chinese Government is deeply perturbed by the disclosure that, throughout the negotiations between Ambassador Johnson and the Communist representative, the US has repeatedly assured the Communists that renunciation by the Chinese Communists of the use of force would in no way prejudice the peaceful pursuit of Communist policies in the Taiwan area. It is regretted that the US Government should have found it necessary to go to the extent of assuming such a position, the legal and political implication of which could only mean that the US was not only recognizing by inference the claims of the Chinese Communists, but was also giving encouragement to the pursuit of such claims on the part of the Chinese Communists. No amount of legal interpretation could conceal the fact that any arrangement made with the Chinese Communists in the terms offered by the US would gravely injure the basic rights and interests of the Republic of China. The Chinese Government finds it difficult to reconcile the position taken by the US in this regard with the assurances repeatedly given the Republic of China and considers it inconsistent with the spirit of the Sino-American Mutual Defense Treaty.
“It may be recalled that Foreign Minister Yeh has, both in writing and conversation with Secretary Dulles, stressed the vital importance for the Chinese Government to keep alive its political objective of recovering the Chinese Mainland. Any action on the part of the US which could be construed as de facto recognition of the Chinese Communist regime would be tantamount to US denial of the right of the Republic of China to strive for the deliverance of the Chinese people from the yoke of the Communist tyranny. The Government [Page 281] of the Republic of China has done its utmost to cooperate with the US in preserving peace in the Taiwan area. It hopes, however, that the US will refrain from any action which would, in the eyes of the free world and the Chinese people both on the outside and Mainland, tend to support the view that the Chinese Mainland is lost to the Communists forever.
“It is to be observed that, although the Communists have rejected the US draft of January 12, 1956, the rejection may not be final and there exists a possibility of their acceptance in substance at a later date when it becomes advantageous for them to do so. Such possibility appears even greater in view of Secretary Dulles’ expression of hope in his press statement yesterday3 that the talks would be continued to a fruitful conclusion. The Chinese Government would like to be informed whether in the event of an agreement reached on the renunciation of use of force the US would assume the position that the Chinese Communists have thereby demonstrated their peace-loving intentions and are thus eligible for admission to the UN. Should such a position be taken by other governments, such as those of India and the United Kingdom, would the US continue to oppose the admission of the Chinese Communists into the UN? Above all, can we be certain that the Chinese Communists would honor their renunciation of the use of force?
“It has been the consistent view of the Chinese Government that the Geneva talks, once permitted to go beyond the practical question of civilian repatriation, would inevitably degenerate into favorable platform for Communist propaganda and provide opportunities for neutralist countries to further exert pressure on the US toward appeasement. This view has unfortunately been borne out by recent events.
“It is the considered opinion of the Chinese Government that, in the interests of the US and the Republic of China as well as the free world as a whole, the Geneva talks on the renunciation of the use of force should be brought to an end as soon as possible. This is an opportune moment to do so since the Communists by their refusal to accept the many concessions made by the US could be held solely responsible for the failure of the negotiations. As to the renewed proposal of the Communists to raise the Geneva talks to a ministerial level, the Chinese Government feels that such a step would only serve to accentuate the implication of de facto recognition of the puppet regime in Peiping and to open the way to further Communist demands.
[Page 282]“The Chinese Government would appreciate an early reply from the US Government on the views stated above.”
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–2656. Confidential. Transmitted in two parts. Repeated to Hong Kong and Geneva for information.↩
- Rankin reported in telegram 682 from Taipei, January 26, that after giving him the aide-mémoire Foreign Minister Yeh stated that it was the result of the U.S. public statement of January 21 and the lack of a reply to his November 17 message to Secretary Dulles. Yeh expressed concern at the “neutralist tone” of the January 21 statement and at the implication of de facto recognition in the U.S. proposal for a joint declaration renouncing force; he asked if the United States was convinced that a “Two Chinas” concept was now inescapable. (Ibid.)↩
- For the transcript of Secretary Dulles’ press conference of January 24, see Department of State Bulletin, February 6, 1956, pp. 195–202.↩