Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

141. Telegram From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, at Geneva¹

Washington, January 30, 1956—6:13 p.m.

1559. Guidance for February 4 meeting.

1. Concur in your estimate (your 1426)² that most likely Communist tactic next meeting is renewed attack on US position regarding renunciation of force. You should respond along lines your presentation last meeting.

2. Reiterate demand for expeditious release Americans. Note that flagrancy Chinese Communist breach of Agreed Announcement cumulative with each added week of non-performance. Again reject in vigorous terms Communist attempt exclude imprisoned Americans from application Agreed Announcement. Point out that imprisoned Americans were very persons about whom we were making representations when Agreed Announcement was drafted and issued. Also point out that instead of fulfilling commitment to take appropriate measures expedite Americans’ return, in at least two cases some six weeks after issuance Agreed Announcement, Americans who had been held in prison several years were tried for first time and sentenced to long prison terms. This is callous violation their pledge. Longer they unjustifiably continue hold Americans, more apparent it becomes to people of world that they using human beings as political hostages. Such action is repugnant to all civilized nations. FYI During coming meetings you should continue build strong case against Communists aimed particularly at their failure to honor commitments and demonstrated use individuals as political pawns. End FYI.

3. Inform Wang US is investigating case of Yuan Jui-hsiang, alleged to have been taken into custody by US Immigration Service, but does not intend investigate other names previously submitted by Wang in absence specific showing claiming that US Government obstructing departure these persons. Refuse to accept any more names unless Wang makes such showing. Failure of Chinese in this country to write letters to Communist China is no evidence either that they wish to go to Communist China or that they have encountered obstruction.

4. Your argumentation at last meeting was excellent throughout and theme can be repeated next meeting with suitable variations.

5. FYI We do not wish talks broken off and under no circumstances should break come from us. Break, if inevitable, should come from other side. If Communist press for discussion of trade embargo or higher level meetings you should maintain position that fruitless to discuss other issues until both sides renounce use of force.

6. FYI. It would be possible by rearranging draft announcement of renunciation of force to eliminate any basis for claim that juxtaposition of reservation of self-defense and mention of Taiwan would represent Communist concession that Taiwan not part of China, and we could also insert statement that neither party gives up right to achieve objectives by peaceful means. However, because of categorical Communist statements which make clear their plan to contend that US renunciation of force would in effect give up US rights in Taiwan area and in implementation of Defense Treaty with GRC, we do not ourselves suggest any change in formulation of announcement, as it would be misinterpreted.

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/1–3056. Secret; Priority; Limit Distribution. Drafted by Phleger, Clough, and McConaughy; cleared in draft by the Secretary; cleared by Sebald; and approved by Robertson.
2. In telegram 1426, January 26, Johnson commented on the meeting the previous day and on Wang’s possible courses of action at the following meeting. He commented that the “extreme position” adopted by the Chinese with respect to the self defense clause and their public statements might represent a policy decision to make no further effort to reach agreement but to try to win support for a Foreign Ministers meeting. (Ibid., 611.93/1–2656)