211. Memorandum From the Director of the Office of Chinese Affairs (McConaughy) to the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs (Robertson)1
Washington, October 1,
1956.
SUBJECT
- Adverse Effects of Geneva Talks.
REFERENCE
- Your Oral Request of September 27.
- 1.
- The talks create doubts throughout Asia concerning the steadfastness of American opposition to Communist China. They encourage [Page 433] age the belief that the United States is seeking to negotiate privately a “deal” with Peiping which would leave in the lurch our Asian friends who have been following our lead on China policy. The secrecy and the long duration of the talks lend color to this suspicion. This plays into the hands of all of those throughout Asia who advocate policies of closer relationships for their countries with Communist China. (See Tab A for documentation2)
- 2.
- The talks are no longer an effective means of bringing about the release of our imprisoned citizens. They may now have the opposite effect. If the Chinese Communists consider the talks of value to them (which they evidently do) they may continue to hold some Americans hostage to ensure that the talks continue. They may estimate that if all Americans were freed we would have attained our objective and immediately terminate the talks.
- 3.
- It is damaging to American prestige, particularly in Asia, for the U.S. to go on talking with a regime which is brazenly violating the only commitment they have made to us in the course of the talks. It would be more in keeping with our national dignity and would be readily understood throughout the world if we were to refuse to talk any longer with a regime which has shown its contempt for us by flouting its word. The tactical advantages we have obtained at Geneva could be preserved by the right type of break-off statement, which would emphasize that we would welcome at any time a bona fide Chinese Communist renunciation of force declaration.
- 4.
- The talks are not a conclusive factor in preventing a Chinese Communist attack on Taiwan or the offshore islands since the initiation of the Communist “smiles” campaign. The major deterrent is the presence of powerful American armed forces. The second important deterrent is the Chinese Communist desire to maintain a peaceful posture before the world. These two factors would continue to operate, even though the talks were terminated.
- 5.
- The talks are regarded with great antipathy and misgivings in Taiwan. We have made unusual efforts to reassure the GRC, without any success in allaying their apprehensions. Nothing would give a greater boost to morale on Taiwan than for the U.S. to break off the talks. As they see it, we have given the Communists a chance to undermine the whole anti-Communist position in Asia by merely releasing ten American citizens and signing an Announcement which would in fact be worthless.
- 6.
- The Chinese Communists are eager to establish a posture of desiring relations of every kind with the United States. Our policy is to deal with them only when we must. Under these circumstances, [Page 434] the Communists have the initiative in the talks, being in a position to make (and to publicize at the opportune moment for them) proposal after proposal of a seemingly praiseworthy character, such as those on trade and free travel and cultural exchanges which we must reject. This keeps us on the defensive and gives the Communists a great advantage.