Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

305. Paper Prepared by Robert McClintock of the Policy Planning Staff¹

[Washington,] December 31, 1957.

SUBJECT

• Review of U.S. China Policy: A Pacific Settlement?

I. Introduction

A. Present U.S. Policy.

U.S. policy toward the Far East is established in NSC No. 5429/5 of December 22, 1954. U.S. policy toward Taiwan and the Government of the Republic of China is set out in NSC No. 5503 of June 15, 1955. A memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs, dated January 7, 1957,² states that the Far Eastern Bureau sees no reason for change in these basic policies. FE summarized the policy in its position paper³ for the NATO Ministerial Meeting in Bonn of May 2–4, 1957, as follows:

“The United States adheres steadfastly to the three main aspects of its China policy, which are to recognize and extend military and economic assistance to the Republic of China; not to recognize the so-called People’s Republic of China; and to oppose the seating of this ‘People’s Republic’ in the United Nations as the accredited representative of what the Charter calls the Republic of China.”

The most recent reaffirmation of United States policy toward Communist China was the address of the Secretary of State before the convention of the Lions International at San Francisco on June 28, 1957.⁴ Mr. Dulles refuted a number of arguments, including the precedent of Russia, the consequences of recognition, and the argument that diplomatic recognition is inevitable. The Secretary concluded:

“Our policies are readily adjustable to meet the requirements of changing conditions. But there are occasions when others, and not we, should provide the change. Nothing could be more dangerous than for the United States to operate on the theory that if hostile and evil forces do not quickly or readily change, then it is we who must change to meet them.”

The purpose of this paper is not to take issue with the Secretary of State, but to examine all the elements of change, not only the possibilities of change by hostile and evil forces in Communist China. Change must be evaluated in our own people, among our allies and friends, among the overseas Chinese, and in two of our client countries in East Asia governed by leaders of advanced age, whose days are numbered.

These basic policies of the United States toward Communist China and the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan have brought fruitful results. The ratification of the U.S.–China Mutual Defense Treaty, which was signed in Washington on December 2, 1954, undoubtedly prevented an attack against Taiwan by the armed forces of Communist China. The presence of massive and mobile U.S. retaliatory power in the Western Pacific, backing up our policies toward China, has indubitably served to preserve peace in the Western Pacific. The wise decision of the Secretary of State to agree to undertake limited diplomatic conversations with the representatives of Peking, which have been conducted now for over a period of two years, has served on the diplomatic front to preserve peace. Although the People’s Republic of China has thus far refused to meet the main American point of renunciation of the use of force in accomplishing changes in the Western Pacific, the fact that the diplomatic conversations have been continued has in itself been an assurance against the outbreak of hostilities.

B. Changing Circumstances and U.S. Policy.

However, there have been changes in the situation in East Asia, both in regard to military strength and, on a worldwide basis, in the political position of the powers concerned. The Free World allies of the United States have shown an increasing skepticism of our policy, both as regards an embargo of trade with Communist China and with the contention that the Government of the Republic of China on Taiwan is in fact, to use the words of NSC 5503, the “only government of China …⁵ the representative of China in the United Nations and other international bodies.” The refusal of Great Britain, in the CHINCOM conversations in Paris, to apply a more stringent embargo policy towards Communist China than that it had accepted toward the USSR was generally followed by relaxation of trade controls throughout the Free World toward the regime in Peking. The statement by the President of the United States on June 4⁶ that such a relaxation of trade controls seemed almost inevitable, may encourage a growing faction in the United States to urge a similar course. On the crucial question of who in the UN should be accepted as being truly representative of the people of China, an internal memorandum of IO, dated March 11, 1957,⁷ after evaluating the evidence of support in the 11th General Assembly for voting “not to consider” the question of Chinese representation, came to the conclusion that if the British were to decide not to continue the moratorium arrangement on this subject:

“In brief, it would appear that a shift in the British position will lead to enough other changes in the voting pattern in the General Assembly as to make it difficult to maintain the position of the Republic of China in the GA and the Specialized Agencies and would lead to the seating of the Communist regime. In several of the other international bodies, where the voting pattern has often been more precarious from our point of view, the position of the Republic of China would certainly be undermined and the Communist regime would be seated at the first opportunity.”

In other words, there are sufficient evidences of change in the air to justify an inquiry, not as to the past validity of our China policies, but as to their future application unchanged in a changing world. Furthermore, it is helpful to recall that paragraph 9 of NSC 5429/5 outlining “Current Policy Toward the Far East” makes the following declaration:

“The United States should keep an open mind on the possibility of negotiating with the USSR and Communist China acceptable and enforceable agreements, whether limited to individual issues now outstanding or involving a general settlement of major issues.”

II. Assessment of the Facts

The problem essentially is one of assessing the facts which are available and of drawing dispassionate conclusions from those facts. Unfortunately in the task of such an assessment, frequently diametrically opposed conclusions are drawn from the same evidence.

A. Durability of the People’s Republic of China

The first fact to be evaluated is the degree of stability and public support of the People’s Republic of China. Most impartial observers are in agreement that the Peking Government is solidly in control of Mainland China. There is undoubtedly a widespread element of discontent under the communist regime, but for many centuries there have been similar elements of discontent in China against any regime which was incapable of fulfilling the almost limitless needs of the Chinese population. There seems little doubt that in the entire history of China no more effective military apparatus has been created. In the history of China this military force has for the first time been made up of indigenous elements, despite Red China’s dependence on the USSR for many military and strategic supplies. The military striking power of China on the Mainland does not depend upon foreign stimulus as was the case when the great predatory movements from Peking were fired by northern blood from beyond the Wall.

1. Estimate of the Overseas Chinese.

The fact of Peking’s supremacy on the Mainland is perhaps most readily revealed by the shift in the weather-vane loyalties of the overseas Chinese, one of the most over-valued minorities on the globe. These Chinese living abroad in other countries of Asia have as their basic patriotism a passionate devotion to the pocketbook. They are usually found on the winning side. If Chiang Kai-shek should be able to return to the Mainland and overthrow the communist regime, the overseas Chinese would have his picture everywhere. However, their current assessment results in an increasing display of the countenance of Mao Tse-tung. The overseas Chinese generally experience a feeling of vicarious pride that there is in their estimation a strong government in Peking, dominated by no foreign influence, which has brought about a recrudescence of Chinese power not witnessed in more than a hundred years, since the treaty which terminated the Opium War in 1842. We may not agree with this assessment, particularly in regard to foreign influence over the regime. However, most of the overseas Chinese in Asia are at present proud of Peking, and will not or do not see the menace of Communism enthroned in the Middle Kingdom.

B. Pressure of Population on Food Supply

The population of China is increasing at the rate of 12 million people a year. As the Peking regime strives to improve the economy, vast engineering projects for flood control will eventually reduce the perennial damage of flood and its corollary, famine. These works, combined with the application of modern public health techniques, will result in an increase in population. Therefore the immemorial balance of nature in China is changing. As the birth rate continues to rise and the death rate goes down, there is a strong chance that for once Malthus’ theory of the pressure of population on food supply will come into practical application. To counter his syllogism the Peking Government has instituted an ambitious program for increasing the food supply. The norm to be met by 1965 calls for no less than doubling the production of cereals in China. Whether in fact this goal can be attained before the increasing numbers of mouths to be fed cry for a change in policy is one of the mightiest questions which Mainland China and Asia must face. If in fact the food supply does not balance with the population’s need, it seems inevitable that the rulers of China will look to filling their nation’s wants by taking over the rice-bowl countries which fringe China to the south and west—Viet-Nam, Cambodia, Thailand and Burma. These countries, therefore, with India as an anxious spectator, will acquire an even more uneasy interest in the policies of Peking.

C. Time on Taiwan

On the Island of Taiwan time is running out. Embassy Taipei in its despatch No. 382 of March 5, 1957⁸ submitted impressive evidence, supported by excellent military analyses by the Army and Air Attachés, indicating that the armed forces of the GRC are now at their peak of efficiency in terms of manpower, training and war equipment. Soldiers from the Mainland in the nationalist forces will presently become overage, and it is calculated that if more than 30% of the GRC troops become of Taiwan origin, zeal to fight for a return to the Mainland will diminish below an acceptable level. It is likewise pointed out that Chiang Kai-shek, who conceives for himself an historic role in leading a return to the Mainland, is now 70 years old. Time, therefore, presses inexorably toward the point of diminishing return.

Our Military Attachés calculate that if a movement against the Mainland is not initiated within the next five to seven years it will not be possible for the GRC further to dream of reconquest. The Attaches provide lists of indicators, some or all of which would be present if the Chinese Government decided to initiate an attack against Mainland China. Perhaps the most disturbing of these indicators are the possibilities that an attack might be launched without warning, under the guise of large-scale maneuvers, or that the GRC might deliberately launch a provocative air strike to bring about a counterattack by Chinese Communist forces which would then produce not only a casus belli but also a casus foederis. The question therefore becomes whether before the point of diminishing return is met the Chinese Government may go beyond the point of no return.

Our treaty obligations to the Republic of China are set out in the Mutual Defense Treaty signed at Washington on December 2, 1954. The exchange of notes of December 10, between the Secretary of State and the Foreign Minister of the GRC, states “it is agreed that such use of force will be a matter of joint agreement, subject to action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.” Chiang Kai-shek has on several occasions indicated that he will not undertake a return to the Mainland without consulting us in advance. However, if there should be a sudden retaliatory Communist air raid, his government might consider that it could embark on “action of an emergency character which is clearly an exercise of the inherent right of self-defense.”

D. The Military Balance of Power

The United States, therefore, in assessing the facts on China is confronted with a powerful government on Mainland China controlling 600 million people and possessing a formidable war machine poised against the valiant government of the Republic of China on Taiwan controlling the destinies of some 10 million people of whom more than half are Mainland Chinese. The military balance of power as between the Governments of Peking and Taipei is made up by the presence of the U.S. 7th Fleet, of Strategic Air Command bases in the Western Pacific, and of American troops in Korea and Okinawa. There is at present an effective and continuing military balance of power as between the United States and Mainland China in the Western Pacific, including the de facto balances of power recognized by the arrangements terminating hostilities in divided Korea and divided Viet-Nam.

E. Admission of Red China to the United Nations

The political question most affecting the future of China and of greatest immediate importance, is the issue of which government of China should represent that country in the United Nations. According to the analysis quoted earlier in this paper, it would seem that the eventual admission of the Peking Government to the UN as representing all of China is inevitable. The British agreed once more this year that the moratorium on the question of China’s admission to the UN should be continued through the 12th General Assembly. However, over the next decade it seems practically certain that with the change in attitudes which will take place following the relaxation of trade controls, the increase of power on the Mainland, and the superannuation of Chiang Kai-shek and his forces, our allies and the uncommitted countries will eventually concur in the opinion that the Government of Peking, which controls the Mainland of China and the destinies of 600 million inhabitants of the earth, is in truth the Government of China. The plain fact must be recognized that other nations have accepted the fiction that the GRC is one of the Big Five in the Security Council solely because of strenuous and unremitting pressure by the United States. The reflex to constant pressure on this point is growing less automatic. Eventually it will disappear and our allies along with the uncommitted countries will vote Peking into the seat occupied by Taipei.

F. Recognition of the Peoples Republic of China

The question of recognition of Peking is a corollary to the more immediate and basic issue of admission to the United Nations. There have been a number of indications that various countries of the Free World and of the so-called uncommitted area will condition their policy of non-recognition or recognition of Peking dependent upon the action taken in the United Nations. There is no doubt that once the Peoples Republic of China is admitted to the UN, recognition of Peking will be almost universal. Whether or not at that time the United States should recognize Peking will be a matter for determination in light of our self-interest.

G. “Face”

If and when the People’s Republic of China is admitted to the United Nations as occupying the seat of the Republic of China, which is reserved for that country by the Charter, there will be an immense gain in prestige by Communist China throughout Asia and the world. There will ensue in consequence, because of the long-sustained and adamant opposition by the United States to the admission of Communist China to the UN, a corresponding loss of “face” for the United States. To the simple-minded, “The Commies won, the U.S. lost.”

The question then becomes one of whether or not this Government believes that the admission of Communist China to the UN is in fact inevitable. From the evidence available, it seems to the writer of this paper that whether we like it or not within the not-too-distant future the government of Peking will be seated in the UN as representing China. The question then becomes: not that China will gain face and the United States lose face, but how much gain and loss of prestige and influence will be involved in this changed situation?

The argument can be advanced unhesitatingly that if the United States continues its present policy and is beaten, Red China will gain infinitely more in prestige and influence than if the United States modifies its policy, recognizes the actual situation, and is able to negotiate a settlement with Mainland China which will be to our advantage. If such a settlement can in fact be negotiated before Red China is admitted to the UN, the impact on Asia of such admission will be far less. The United States will be respected as a realistic power, seeking to insure the peace of the Pacific. In terms of loss of face, therefore, there is much to be said for the United States now to reassess its China policy and to draw new conclusions from present facts.

It must be pointed out, however, that the time is now late to negotiate a settlement with Communist China which will produce as much advantage to the United States as when the diplomatic stakes for Peking were greater.

H. Alternative Courses for U.S.

1. Continuation of Present Policy

Before examining the outline of a potential settlement in the Pacific, it is only fair to examine the possibility of continuing our present policy unchanged. The United States, as paymaster of the Free World, can quite possibly contrive for another five years or so to dragoon the vote of the supposedly sovereign members of the UN to assure the continuing exclusion of Peking. Although we couch our policy in terms of purest principle, we should not, at least to ourselves, have any illusions as to the pragmatic basis from which our allies approach this problem. Paul-Henri Spaak⁹ of Belgium probably expressed the feeling most gently when he indicated within his own government that although he disagreed strongly with the Americans on their emotional attitude over the admission of Red China to the UN, the United States was nevertheless the leading power of the Free World and lesser friends of the U.S. should defer to its desire on this issue. Therefore, so long as the U.S. supplies not only the butter, but most of the bread, to many of the members of the UN, we can count with some assurance on being able in fact to buy their vote. Nevertheless, in the long run this will not suffice because our allies basically do not believe either in the practicality of excluding Mainland China or the principle which we assert is involved.

Similarly, although we can continue to insist that the government of the Republic of China is in the language of paragraph 7 of NSC 5503, “the only government of China … the representative of China in the United Nations and other international bodies,” we have only about seven years in which to maintain this insistence, since Chiang Kai-shek is not immortal and seven years from now his army will have reached that critical point when one-third will be made up of Taiwanese.

We can, by continued deployment of our military strength in East Asia, confine China to the Mainland, but on the basis of recent evidence we cannot prevent increasing trade with China on the part of Western Europe and Japan. The question arises whether, given the working out of the Malthusian theory in the case of China’s population and food supply, impelling the Government of Peking to look covetously on the rice-bowl countries of Southeast Asia, hostilities can be prevented in that area within the next decade unless policies designed to preserve the peace do not assume a greater degree of flexibility.

2. A Negotiated Settlement.

Although our leverage on Peking is slight because of the time factors adduced above, it would seem that we have more to gain by trying to negotiate a general settlement with Mainland China then by holding on to policies which time inevitably will change. A negotiated settlement will on the whole be pleasing to our allies in Europe and Japan. It will enlist the support of India and the Bandung powers generally. It will likewise cause concern in the Kremlin over the possibility of a crack in the Communist monolith. In this connection, it is worthwhile to recall that among the objectives of U.S. policy in the Far East is included (paragraph 4.d, NSC 5429/5) the continued goal of: “Disruption of the Sino-Soviet alliance through actions designed to intensify existing and potential areas of conflict or divergence of interest between the USSR and Communist China.”

III. Outline of a Pacific Settlement

As an exercise in postulating a Pacific settlement, which although not possible of immediate attainment might nevertheless be negotiated within the next decade, there is set forth below the outline of an optimum arrangement to preserve the peace in the Pacific:

A. The United States would withdraw its opposition to the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations, but would not vote in favor of such admission.

B. Taiwan would be admitted to the United Nations as the Independent Republic of Taiwan, neutralized, with its territorial integrity guaranteed by the signatory powers. Taiwan would in effect become the “Austria of East Asia.”

C. Korea would be unified and neutralized, its independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by the signatory powers. Korea would be admitted to the UN.

D. As a corollary of “A” and “C”, the existing armistice in Korea would be replaced by a treaty of peace through the agency of the United Nations, as a condition precedent to Red China’s admission, and the People’s Republic of China in seeking admission to the UN would accept the Charter provisions on peaceful settlement of international disputes.

E. Viet-Nam would be unified and neutralized and its independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by the signatory powers. Viet-Nam would be admitted to the UN.

F. Tibet would be neutralized, its independence and territorial integrity guaranteed by the limitrophe states, the USSR, China, India and Nepal. Simultaneously, Chinese troops would be withdrawn from Tibet. Tibet, if it desired, would be admitted to the UN.

G. The People’s Republic of China would be recognized by the other signatory powers and reciprocally Peking would recognize the signatory powers not previously represented in that capital. Provisions here would be included, if still necessary, for the safe return of U.S. nationals held in Chinese prisons, and safeguards would be provided for the preservation of the liberties of American citizens in China similar to those undertaken by the Soviet Union in the Roosevelt–Litvinov exchange of notes of November 16, 1933.¹⁰

H. A general pact for peace in the Pacific would:

1. Renounce any use of force in the settlement of disputes, although preserving the inherent right of individual and collective self-defense under Article 51 of the UN Charter.

2. Specifically undertake not to modify frontiers except by peaceful means.

3. Guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and neutralization of Taiwan, Korea, Viet-Nam and Tibet.

4. Provide for participation by the People’s Republic of China in UN work on international disarmament.

5. The signatories would be the People’s Republic of China, the USSR, United States, Japan, India, United Kingdom, the limitrophe countries of Mainland China, including Nepal, Burma, Thailand and Laos; the so-called uncommitted countries of the area, including Cambodia, Indonesia and Malaya; and other interested Pacific powers, including the Philippines, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. The countries whose unification, independence and integrity is to be guaranteed along with neutralization—Korea, Taiwan, Viet-Nam and Tibet—would likewise be signatories at interest.

I. Critique of Proposed Settlement

1. Con

As indicated above, the foregoing is a maximum settlement. It is not at present within the realm of practical achievement. It is obvious that neither Syngman Rhee in Korea, Chiang Kai-shek in Taiwan, or Ngo Dinh Diem in Viet-Nam (to say nothing of Ho Chi Minh in the North), would under present circumstances agree to renounce their imagined opportunities for settlement wholly on then-own terms. However, as repeatedly stressed in this paper, time is drawing very short for many of these protagonists on the Pacific stage.

a. PRC may choose to wait.

A more serious criticism of the proposed maximum settlement is the fact that the People’s Republic of China may now feel that if, according to the evidence available to it, its admission to the United Nations is already assured, there is no real need to make concessions now to expedite the achievement of the inevitable. Furthermore, the People’s Republic of China has consistently resisted any claim that Taiwan should not be considered as an integral part of Mainland China. Again, on its assessment of the evidence Peking may have concluded that the tenure of the Nationalists on Taiwan is brief and that all Mainland China need do is wait for the death of Chiang Kai-shek and the superannuation of his forces. The PRC may therefore refuse to consider the so-called “two China” concept. The Government in Peking similarly might prefer to take its chances of reunifying Korea and Viet-Nam on Communist terms, or, failing that, to maintain the present stalemate of divided regimes in both Korea and Viet-Nam. In Peking the giving up of suzerainty over Tibet might imply considerable loss of face. Peking thus far has resisted any proposal that it renounce the use of force in settlement of disputes and might prefer not to tie its hands in the future, particularly if it envisages the necessity of moving against the rice-bowl countries to the south and west.

b. Opposition of South Korea and Taiwan.

On the side of our allies in Taiwan and Korea, it is certain that their present governments would strenuously oppose neutralization, and the premature divulgence that such an objective was in view over the long run might in fact trigger off attacks made in desperation by Syngman Rhee and Chiang Kai-shek to utilize their optimum force while they still felt able to count on U.S. support. Of a similar nature would be the natural reluctance of the Government in Taiwan to give up its seat, as representing all of China in the United Nations, even if it should be compensated by being elected to membership in the UN as a new republic. Of much less importance is the argument that the seating of Communist China in the Security Council would provide another Communist veto, since two vetoes are no more obstructive than one.

2. Pro

The case for such a comprehensive Pacific settlement enlists a number of arguments. It can be maintained that the admission of the People’s Republic of China to the United Nations would lessen the immediate danger of Chinese aggression since the regime in Peking would know that the uncommitted countries of Asia would attach the utmost importance to this evidence of peaceful intent by Peking’s acceptance of the Charter’s responsibilities. The recognition of the establishment of a new state in Taiwan might not on either side rule out some eventual other settlement by mutual agreement with whatever government controls Mainland China over the next century. The creation of neutral buffer states on the periphery of China would lessen the danger of war in the Pacific and Southeast Asia.

a. Neutralization Will Ease Burden of US Aid.

Here digression is warranted to state a thesis of great importance to the American Government. It is generally concluded that we cannot continue indefinitely to expend vast sums of money on our bifurcated or insular allies in Asia, such as South Korea, South Viet-Nam and Taiwan, but no long-range policy has brought forth how to reduce the recurring annual charge. It is submitted that neutralization of these countries and the guarantee of their integrity by the Pacific powers, plus India, is the most effective way of lifting from the American taxpayer this otherwise unending burden.

b. Role of Japan in Neutralization of Korea.

In the case of Korea, unification with neutralization and a guarantee of independence has the added advantage of bringing Japan once more into its historic role in the maintenance of Korea as a buffer state. Japan, since the year when the Spanish Armada was wrecked by storm in the English Channel and the similar Armada of Kublai Khan was wrecked by storm in the Yellow Sea, has never lost from sight the fact that “Korea is a dagger pointing at the heart of Japan.” In the late 16th century Hideyoshi conquered Korea and in the campaign acquired a sufficiently large collection of human ears to make the well known mound called nunobiki. The Japanese in the late 19th century contested vigorously through diplomatic means against Yuan Shi Kai in Peking, and ultimately went to war with Russia over the issue of who should be dominant in Korea. In 1911 they annexed the so-called “Land of Morning Calm.” Thus in the history of Japan there has developed an almost automatic reflex on the question of the governance of Korea. If this peninsula should be neutralized under a Pacific settlement, we could look to the Japanese as certain and eager guarantors of its independence and neutrality as an essential buffer between Japan and its dangerous neighbors in Asia, China and the USSR.

c. Viet-Nam and the Rice-Bowl Countries.

Similar considerations prevail in the case of a unified and neutralized Viet-Nam. Other than China, the countries closest to Viet-Nam regard this Annamite state with fear. They recall that for almost one thousand years the Tonkin was under Chinese suzerainty. The rice-bowl countries such as Cambodia, Laos, Thailand and Burma fear that Viet-Nam may once more be used as a route for Chinese aggression. India, which sees its strategic frontier lying on the Mekong, would likewise be an enthusiastic guarantor of a neutralized Viet-Nam, as this would complete its carefully contrived ring of neutral buffer states around the periphery of China from Nepal to the South China Sea. The SEATO powers should welcome the neutralization of a unified Viet-Nam as removing one of the principal sources of possible future conflict in the area covered by that treaty. This arrangement for Viet-Nam coupled with a pledge not to undertake frontier modifications except by peaceful means would go far to reassuring the rice-bowl countries against the fear of Chinese aggression in case Malthus’ theory works out in Mainland China.

d. Taiwan.

As for the loss of Taiwan as a potential U.S. military base supposedly integral to the island chain which forms our guerdon against Mainland China, it has already been pointed out that the Nationalist forces, like their leader, are heading downhill toward superannuation. Furthermore, with the increased range of aircraft, the mobility of the 7th Fleet and the development of long-range missiles, it would seem that other U.S. strategic bases in Okinawa, the Philippines and Guam would permit the relinquishment of Taiwan as a military base, guaranteed in its neutrality by the other Pacific powers. The Offshore Islands, a continuing exacerbation, should be returned to Mainland China as a douceur, with provisions for their permanent demilitarization.

e. India.

A factor of very great importance in the proposed settlement would be the involvement of India as a guaranteeing power. The signature by India of such a pact would place that country essentially on the side of the West, since the United States does not intend to resort to force to alter the situation in East Asia and there is considerable reason to believe that China has not yet reached the decision to renounce the use of force. If this analysis is correct, India, despite its professed neutralism, by entering such a Pacific Pact would ipso facto find itself ranged with the United States and not with Communist China.

f. Schism between China and USSR?

The final argument in favor of a Pacific settlement is that the recognition of the People’s Republic of China as a Pacific power and its admission to the United Nations might start the process of schism between China and the USSR which as stated above is an objective of our policy. The admission of China to a Pacific Pact would turn its diplomacy elsewhere than toward reinforcing the policies of the Soviet Union and of seeking to play a role in satellite Europe. Over a very long view, the secular processes of change in China justify the hope that the impetus of such a Pacific Pact might lead to an eventual shift in the internal control of China and to the development of a regime which might be far different from that managed by the present doctrinaire exponents of Marxism.

IV. Conclusion

Unless the United States accommodates itself to the mutations of time, we shall find that time works against us. In the long run, the things we seek most to prevent by our present policies may with the passage of the years transpire, and without the United States having been able to wrest what minimal advantages may yet exist in an inauspicious situation. However, over the longer range, and by canalizing the interests of the Asian powers to sustain a definitive Pacific settlement, it should be possible to assure the maintenance of peace in East Asia with a corresponding reduction in U.S. military and economic expenditure, and the possibility of China evolving first, to become a power not beholden to the USSR, and eventually a power not dominated by Marxist doctrine.

Change, as the Secretary said, is the word: change in China, change in East and South Asia, change in the United States; change to meet in settlement for the peace of the Pacific.

1. Source: Department of State, PPS Files: Lot 67 D 548, China. Top Secret. There is nothing on the source text to indicate the origin or the ultimate disposition of this paper.
2. Reference is to a memorandum from Robertson to Bowie, the subject of which was “Review of NSC 5503 in Light of Prochnow Committee Report”. (Ibid., Central Files, 611.93/1–957)
3. The position paper quoted here is ibid., Conference Files: Lot 62 D 181, CF 871.
4. Document 268.
5. Ellipsis in the source text.
6. At a press conference at the White House on June 4, President Eisenhower said, with respect to the question of liberalizing trade with the People’s Republic of China: “I am personally of the school that believes that trade, in the long run, cannot be stopped. You are going to have either just authorized trade or you are going to have clandestine trade. You can stop the shipments from here. That is on the law, and that will be continued as long as it is on the law. But whether or not it should be, whether we should eliminate this differential, frankly, I don’t see as much advantage in maintaining the differential as some people do, although I have never advocated its complete elimination.” (Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Dwight D. Eisenhower, 1957, p. 105)
7. Not found in Department of State files.
8. Despatch 382 from Taipei is a nine-page assessment of the factors affecting the “return to the mainland” thesis on Taiwan. (Department of State, Central Files, 793.5/3–557)
9. Secretary General of NATO.
10. For the exchange of correspondence between President Franklin D. Roosevelt and Soviet Commissar for Foreign Affairs Maxim Litvinoff on November 16, 1933 relative to the extension of U.S. recognition of the Soviet Union, see Foreign Relations, 1933, vol. ii, pp. 805–814.