37. Telegram From Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson to the Department of State1
585. 1. Had Wang to dinner last night2 with Ekvall3 and Wang’s interpreter. Talked from 7:30 until midnight using every device of carrot and stick of which I was capable but made no visible progress.
2. I had not intended enter into detailed discussion negotiations but he took initiative, restating his position and trying to impress on me number Americans that would immediately be released “was very considerable” and number remaining “would not be large”. He was obviously trying very hard to reassure me “everything was going be all right” and that release remainder would not take long without saying anything I could seize upon as commitment. (His instructions are clearly very rigid on this.) In response my pressing him throughout evening on definite time he continued return to an involved and tortuous explanation4 which I found it entirely impossible to pin down to a definite time period.
However the purport seemed to be that time would be less than year, as would be “doubly easy and doubly quick” over situation [Page 59] during past year. However, ominous note of “state of relations” as one factor in timing continued reappear. I returned again and again to necessity specific promise on time, even private if they desired (Deptel 6025 was not received until after I had returned) but he flatly refused. “Absolutely would not be forced into and could not state any exact time.”
3. While touching in varying degree on most of arguments I have used in previous meetings I hammered hard on theme that they were entirely misreading American public opinion if they expected slow piecemeal releases to “improve relations”. Any release involves telling of stories by former prisoners and produced very adverse public opinion reactions. This had to be expected. Best course in their self-interest was carry out immediate release of all. Wang countered we had previously made flyers major factor, they would not release even response UN SecGen, but released unilaterally interest good atmosphere and demonstration good faith these talks. “Did not hold them as bargaining counters and did not intend hold any others as bargaining counters.” They knew Col. Arnold very “antagonistic” but this did not prevent his being included release. Intimation was they very disappointed not only at public reaction to release but that after flyers had been removed as subject these talks we had now raised ante in demanding release all others immediately or in specified time. I countered by returning to theme public reaction to be expected, noted press attention flyers now declining and cited as proof value getting remaining cases completed quickly as possible. Believe this line may have made some impression.
4. I carefully outlined successive concessions we had made to obtain agreement and repeatedly stressed “we could go no further”. “We did not even have a definite promise, much less performance we expected, particularly in light Chou’s statements”. I also made it clear could not proceed anything else until item one settled. (He has never suggested we do so but of course their idea of settlement and ours are still very different.) Also in context importance their meeting our position on item one said it was important agreement be reached as if we failed probably would be long time until contact such as this could be resumed. He put his own emphasis on latter theme.
4[sic]. He gave me good opportunity to make clear no possibility even considering American visitors until all Americans now detained released by bringing up their desire for visitors including Americans and mentioning proposal for exchange “Chinese Opera” and Porgy and Bess companies. (This regard said they were not “boxers” desiring expel foreigners.)
[Page 60]5. During first part of evening he made apparently very purposeful lead up to but did not pursue idea American aid their economic development “which would require at least to end of century”. Much of this was familiar Chou line with foreign visitors. However there was no reference whatever to USSR, frank admission much difficulty and special reference to “peasant conservatism”, China wants no war with US, traditionally friendly, nostalgic reminiscences of friendship during World War II etc
6. I spoke very frankly on particularly ChiCom treatment US Consular and Diplomatic personnel at time ChiCom takeover and also on lack justification ChiCom intervention Korea and our unparalleled restraint there. His defense treatment Consular and Diplomatic personnel perfunctory and almost admission had been mistake. He showed little inclination defend Korean intervention or to retreat behind “volunteers”.
7. Subjects Formosa, Seventh Fleet, trade etc not mentioned any way.
8. We agreed meet as scheduled this morning at which time I will introduce our counterproposal accordance Deptel 571 [602] and previous for which I prepared ground last night. However view last night’s talk will keep discussion to minimum necessary.6
- Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2355. Secret; Priority; Very Limited Distribution.↩
- Johnson proposed in telegram 538 from Geneva, August
18, sent eyes only for the Secretary, that he invite Wang to a private dinner with only
interpreters present, commenting that he thought in such an
atmosphere he could “reinforce firmness our stand and at same time
put across thoughts contained urtel 526”. He added, “He is obviously
at end his instructions and I have feeling gesture such as this at
this time might help in moving Chou.” (Ibid., 611.93/8–1855)
Regarding telegram 526, see footnote 6,
Document 24.
Telegram 571 to Geneva, August 19, drafted by Dulles, instructed Johnson: “Follow your judgment but always bear in mind caution against what could be built up into promises which might come back to plague you.” (Department of State, Central Files, 123–Johnson, U. Alexis)
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Lieutenant Colonel Robert B. Ekvall, U.S. Army, Johnson’s interpreter. For his recollections of the Geneva Ambassadorial talks, see Robert B. Ekvall, Faithful Echo (New York: Twayne Publishers, 1960).
↩ -
Johnson expanded on this in letter No. 5, August 24, to McConaughy: “Ekvall and I reconstructed it [the “‘involved and tortuous explanation’”] immediately upon our return as follows: ‘There is no comparison to be made of the advantages which those who are left will have over those who have been released during the past one year. For there are three favoring factors which will make it clearly quickly and easily for them to be released. The three factors are (a) favorable effect release of the others will have on the people still there; (b) circumstances of the case itself; and (c) state of our relations.’
“I prodded and poked at this from every conceivable angle and was just unable to obtain any further explanation. His conversation otherwise was very rational and sensible and the only explanation I have is that he had been rigidly instructed to say absolutely nothing more on this subject. The phrasing, to my mind, very much carries the marks of Chou.” (Department of State, Geneva Talks Files: Lot 72 D 415, Geneva—Correspondence Re US–PRC, 1955–56)
↩ - Document 35.↩
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Johnson reported “additional minor sidelights” on the dinner with Wang in telegram 589 from Geneva, August 23, as follows:
“Particularly inquired about Bedell Smith’s health and later made point of saying ‘better relations began’ when Smith spoke to Chou in buffet at last year’s Geneva Conference expressing hope relations might improve.
“Gave usual line on Civil War events but with noticeable restraint in treatment Kuomintang and Chiang Kai-shek.
“Were thankful and appreciative American aid to China during World War II even though none received by Communists as it constituted contribution national strength in fight against Japan.
“In reply my raising Communist bloc characteristics of supersecrecy and hypersensitivity to criticism as major barriers to fruitful interchange persons and ideas which he had been urging, he did not contest but implied improvement this regard under way. He was very quick reject any implication Chinese Communists identification with satellites when I cited personal experience in Czechoslovakia.
“Rejected my suggestion China lacked natural resources, only problem was extraction.
“Noted full texts Secretary’s and President’s statements and speeches on Far East published in Chinese Communist press.” (Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–2355)
↩