Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, China, Volume III

43. Instruction From the Secretary of State to Ambassador U. Alexis Johnson, in Geneva¹

A–71

Washington, August 25, 1955.

SUBJECT

• GRC and CC Hostile Actions and Overflights Along Taiwan Strait

REFERENCE

• Geneva’s Telegram 389, August 10, 1955²

Taipei has informed the Department that during the period from March 3 (when the Mutual Defense Treaty came into effect) to August 15, 1955, the GRC Air Force flew 2,476 sorties which included day and night reconnaissance, combat patrols, leaflet drops and anti-ship strikes. A compilation made in the Department on the basis of daily reports yielded a total of 2,189 reconnaissance and patrol missions (at least 50% of which probably involved flights over the mainland or adjacent waters), 396 definitely confirmed overflights, 18 leaflet drops which are also confirmed overflights and 151 anti-ship strikes. The Department’s compilation was for the period March 3 to August 6 and added up to a total of 2,754 sorties. These figures are sufficiently close together to justify taking either compilation as being reasonably accurate.

During the same period, the Chinese Communists violated GRC air space on one occasion, on June 27, when two MIG–15’s flew over Matsu and attacked an unarmed Fuhsing airliner. Neither Taipei nor the Department has information which would indicate any other CCAF flights over GRC-held territory from March 3 to August 15.

So far as ground action is concerned, Taipei reports the GRC Armed Forces fired 2,863 artillery rounds from Quemoy onto the mainland and sent out 20 reconnaissance patrols. The Communists fired 1,069 rounds at the Quemoy complex and 11 Communist patrols were observed or captured.

GRC naval patrols were maintained on a 24-hour basis with orders to destroy Communist shipping. GRC naval vessels operated most intensively in the area of the Min River near Foochow, around the entrances to Amoy, and less intensively all along the coast, sometimes going as far north as the Taishan Islands (about 27 degrees North) and as far south as Swatow. It is doubtful that GRC vessels operated very often within the three-mile limit, but did fire on coastal targets 7 times and received shore battery fire six times. The GRC navy captured 32 Communist junks, of which four were released.

At the annual Air Force meeting of August 14–15, the Commander-in-Chief of the CAF, General Wang Shu-ming, announced the CAF had flown 13,000 sorties over the mainland during the past year. This announcement was probably made for propaganda purposes and appears to be grossly inaccurate. GRC-controlled English language newspapers described the “13,000” sorties as “combat and patrol missions” over the mainland and the Taiwan Strait. Our Embassy believes the English language newspapers carried a loose translation of General Wang’s remarks, which were more accurately reflected in the vernacular press.

While it is possible that General Wang’s exaggerated remarks were innocent and primarily intended to bolster the morale of the people on Taiwan, the Department believes the GRC may be motivated to issue such statements by the hope that they might cause difficulties in the Geneva talks. Foreign Minister Yeh has formally communicated the hope of his Government that the United States will not employ the restrictions on GRC offensive actions contained in the notes of December 10 as a means of urging a “cease-fire” upon the Chinese Communists.³

Dulles

1. Source: Department of State, Central Files, 611.93/8–1055. Secret.
2. In telegram 389, Johnson called attention to a report of an article in the People’s Daily which pointed out the “contradiction” between Nationalist activities, especially overflights of the mainland, and the U.S.-supported principle of refraining from the use of force. Johnson commented that the article probably indicated the line Wang would take when the talks reached that subject and that some kind of reply would be required. (Ibid.) Telegram 103 to Taipei, August 13, summarized the report to which Johnson had referred and requested full data on Nationalist “harassment” of the mainland. (Ibid., 611.93/8–1355)
3. Reference is to Foreign Minister Yeh’s message to Secretary Dulles transmitted with a note of July 28 from Ambassador Koo; see vol. ii, Document 322, footnote 2.